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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF NEZ PERCE

J. TAYLOR, an individual;
Plaintiff,

GARY D. BABBITT, an individual; D. JOHN
ASHBU, an individual; PATRICK V.
COLLINS, an individual; RICHARD A.
RILEY, an individual; HAWLEY TROXELL
ENNIS & HAWLEY LLP, an Idaho limited
liability partnership; JANE DOES I-X,
&own individuals;

II

Case No. CV 08-01 765
DEFENDANTS' MEMORANDUM IN
OPPOSITION TO MOTION TO AMEND
COMPLAINT

Defendants.

Defendants, by and through their counsel of record, Elarn & Burke, P.A., hereby submit the
following memorandum in opposition of plaintiffs motion of amend his complaint.

DEFENDANTS' MEMORANDUM LN OPPOSITION TO MOTION TO AMEND COMPLAINT - 1

The Court bas been provided briefs fsd heard oral

ents on Rule 12@)(6)Motions to

Dismss in t h s m d the compr;srrion case filed by plaintiff agakst the Clements, Brown & McNichols
law fim. The Motions to Dismiss were based on the legal principles of lack of privity, lack of
s h d i n g , lack of duty, and the litigation privilege. Plainties proposed mended complaint alleging
direct claims suffiers h m the same legal deficiencies as the original complaint. Insofar as p1aintifPs
proposed mended complaint alleges derivative claims, these claims also fail as a matter of law.

MENDXNC THE COMPLAINT WOULD BE A WTILE ACT
Under Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 15(a), when a party moves for leave to amend his
pleading "leave shall be fi-eelygiven whenever justice so requires." Whether to permit an amended
pleading is committed to the sound discretion of the trial court. McCann v. McCann, 138Idaho 228,
61 P.3d.585 (2002); Hines v Nines, 129 Idaho 847,934 P.2d 20 (1997); Hinkle v. k-lriney, 126 Idaho
993, 895 P.2d 594 (Ct.App. 1995). In determining whether an amended complaint should be
allowed, the court may consider whether the new claims proposed to be inserted into the action by
the amended complaint state a valid claim or whether the opposing party has an available defense
to the newly added claim. Spur Products Corporation v. StoelRives LLP, 142 Idaho 41,44,122 P.3d
300 303 (2005); Black Canyon Racquetball Club, Inc., v. Idaho First Nut '1. Bank, 119 Idaho 171,
804 P.2d 900 (1991). See also Estate ofBecker v. Callahan, 140 Idaho 522,527,96 P.3d 623,628
(2004) ("A court may consider whether the allegations sought to be added to the complaint state a
valid claim in determining whether to grant leave to amend the complaint.") See also Stonewall
Surplus Lines Ins. Co. v. Farmers Ins. Co., 132 Idaho 318, 971 P.2d 1142 (1998); Bissett v. State,
111 Idaho 865,727 P.2d 1293 (Ct-App. 1986).
DEFENDANTS' MEMORANDUM IN OPPOSITION TO
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The trial court should decline to grant leave to amend where the amendment would be a htile
act. Wells v. United States L f e Ins. Ca. 119 Idaho 160, 804 P.2d 333 (CtApp. 1991). An
"amendment is htile if the [pleadings], ras mended, would not sumive a motion to dismiss for
failure to state a claim upon whch relief can be granted.'' U S. v. Union Carp., 194 F.R.D. 223,237

(E.D.Pa. 2000). See also Gragossian v. Cardinal &alth Inize., 2008 WL 2 157004, at * l (S.D.Ca1.
2008) (It would be futile to allow leave to m e n d "where the proposed complaint contained only
conclusory allegations without supporting facts."); K Mane Ei'ls, S.A. v. International Flavors and

Fragrances Inc., 2008 WL 2559345, at *2 (D.N.J. 2008) ("LAproposed amendment is futile when
it cannot withstand a motion to dismiss. To s w i v e a motion to dismiss, the complaint's factual
allegations must be enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative level, on the assumption
that all the allegations are true.") (citations and internal punctuation omitted); In re Ever-esh

Beverages, Inc., 238 B,R, 558, 571 (S.D.N.Y. 1999) (""Elven liberal construction has its limits.
'[Flor the pleading must at least set forth sufficient information for the court to determine whether
some recognized legal theory exists on which relief could be afforded the pleader.")
AMENDING THE COMPLAINT WOULD BE FUTILE WHERE
THE PLAINTIFF CANNOT STATE A CAUSE OF ACTION

With respect to Reed Taylor's so-called direct claims, leave to m e n d should be denied
because, as a matter of law, Mr. Taylor has not and, indeed, cannot state a cause of action against
counsel for opposing parties. While the trial court cannot consider the sufficiency of the evidence
in deciding whether to allow the proposed amendment, Spur Products Corporation v. Stoel Rives

LLP, 142 Idaho 41,44,122 P.3d 300 303 (2005), sufficiency of the evidence is not an issue here
because the attempt to sue attorneys not in privity with the plaintiff is barred as a matter of law.

DEFENDANTS' MEMORANDUM LN OPPOSITION TO MOTION TO AMEND COMPLAINT - 3

A.

As a Maser sf Law, the Defendants Owed No Duly to Plahaff

The question of whether a legal duty exists is a question of law for the court to decide.

2008 WL 3905436, at " 5 @dab02008); Estate ofBeckr v. Callahan, 140 Idaho 522,525,96 P.2d

3d 623,627 (2004); Daleiden V. Jeferson Cow& Joint SGhooZ Dist. No. 2Sf,139 Xd&o 466,468,
80 P.3d 1067,1069 (2003); Ud' v. Czlster Gounq, 136 Idaho 386,389,34 P.3d 1069,1072 (2001);
Boots ex re:. Boots v. Winter$, 145 Id&o 389, 179 P.2d 352, 356 (Ct.App. 2008). Except in the
naxow circmstance of an attorney draAing testamentary i n s m e n t s , an attorney owes no duty
under Idaho law to third parties who are not his clients. Harrigfeld v. Hancock, 140 Idaho 134: 139,
90 P.3d 884, 889 (2004). The proposed amended amplaint does not allege any facts that would
come within the P;Tarri&Zd exception. Therefore, it should be held as a matter of law thar the
defendants cannot be held liable to Is&. Taylor under any theory professional negligence.
B.

As a Maner of Law, Plaiatiff Lacks S t a n h g to Sue Other Parties' Counsel

The issue of whether the plaintiff has standing is a question of law. Thompson v. City of
Lewiston, 137 Idaho 473, 50 P.3d 488 (2002); Young v. City oJ;Ketchunz, 137 Idaho 102,44 P.3d
1157 (2002); Osmunson v. State, 135 Idaho 292, 17 P.3d 236 (2000); StudentLoan f i n d ofIdaho,
Pnc. v. Payette County, 125 Idaho 824, 875 P.2d 236 (Ct.App. 1994). As a matter of law, Reed
Taylor lacks standing to sue lawyers who do not represent him for an alleged breach of duty. It
would be a futile act to grant leave to amend the complaint where it fails to allege a viable cause of
action for breach of duty, whether denominated legal malpractice or breach of fiduciary duty.
In Taylor v. Maile, 142 Idaho 253, 127 P.3d 156 (2005), the Taylors, as remainder
beneficiaries of a trust, attempted to sue the trustee's attorney for legal malpractice. AAer a thorough
DEFENDANTS' MEMORANDUM IN OPPOSITION TO MOTION TO AMEND COMPLAINT - 4

discussion of the Hrarridefd factors, the Court affinned dismissal under Rule 12@)(6)of the claim
of malpractice against tbe aeomey:
The third a u n t of the coaplaint wserts a professional malpractice claim
agajnst Mr. Maile and this count is precluded by the general rule espoused in
Harriafeld that m a~orney-clientrelationship with the plaintiff is a prerequisite for
holding the aaomey liable for negligence inthe p e ~ o m a n c of
e legal services.

Id. at 259, 127 P.3d 156.
The Court in Maile also upheld dismissal of the claim of breach of fiduciary duty against the
attorney because he bad assumed no fiduciary duty to them; he was acting as counsel for the
fiduciary rather than as a fiduciary himself. In the present case, the amended complaint alleges no
facts which would give rise either to a duty of care or a fiduciary duty on the part of the defendants
to Mr. Taylor. It would be a futile act to grant leave to amend the complaint merely to assert
nonviable claims.
C.

As a Matter of Law, Plaintiff Lacks Privity with Defendants

The issue of whether plaintiff and defendants were in privity in the circumstances of the
present case is an issue of law to be decided by the court, not an issue of fact for the jury, In the
absence of privity, the plaintiff has no cause of action against defendants for malpractice,Harrigfeld
v* Hancock, 140 Idaho 134,139,90 P.3d 884, 889 (2004), or breach of fiduciary duty, Taylor v.

Maile, 142 Idaho 253, 127 P.3d 156 (2005). Since the proposed amended complaint fails to allege
any facts which would establish privity, leave to amend is not warranted.
D.

As a Matter of Law, Plaintiff Has No Cause of Actian under the I.C.P.A.

Statutory construction is a pure question of law. Cordova v. Bonneville County Joint School

Dist. No. 93,144 Idaho 637,167 P.3d 774,778 (2007); Hayden Lake Fire ProtectionDist. v. Alcoi-n,

DEFENDANTS' MEMORANDUM IN OPPOSITION TO MOTION TO AMEND COMPLAINT - 5

141 Idaho 388,398,111 P.3d 73,82 (2005); Cmw'rd

v. Dept. ofl=orrection, 133 Idaho 633,635,

991 P.2d 358, 360 (1999); J. R. Simplot &lo. v. Idaho State Tax Com'n ., 120 Idaho 849, 853, 820
P.2d 1206, "110 (1991).
In the proposed amended complaint, plaintiff Reed Taylor at-tempts to allege a direct cause
of action for breach of the Idaho Consmer Protection Act, Idaho Code $548-601 k o u g h 48-619.
However, a private cause of action may be asserted under that Act only by a "person who purchases

ur leases goods or services and thereby suffers any ascertainable loss of money or property. . . ."
Idaho Code

5 48-608.

The amended complaint does not contain allegations that Reed Taylor

purchased goods or services fi-om any of the defendants. Granting leave to amend to bring a fatally
flawed claim under the Idaho Consumer Protection Act would be a futile act.
E.

As a Matter of Law, Plaintiff's Purported Claims for Conspiracy and Tortious
Interference Are Deficient

Plaintiff seeks to allege causes of action in I s amended complaint for tortious interference
with contract and civil conspiracy. However, the proposed amended complaint fails to allege that
the defendants acted in any capacity other than as counsel for their corporate clients. The
relationship of attorney-client is one of principal and agent. Jarman v. Hale, 112 Idaho 270, 73 1
P.2d 8 13 (1986); Honvitz v. Holabird & Root, 212 111.2d 1, 8 16 N.W.2d 772 (2004). As a matter
of law, an agent cannot conspire with h s principal. Afton Energy, Inc. v. Idaho Power Co., 122
Idaho 333,340,834 P.2d 850,857 (1992); Skarbrevikv. Cohen, England & Whitfield, 23 1 Cal.App.
3d 692,282 Cal.Rptr. 627 (1991). An attorney does not "conspire" with his own client merely by
giving advice. "To hold otherwise would be htosaying that 'a defendant could conspire with h s

DEFENDANTS' MEMORANDUM IN OPPOSITION TO MOTION TO AMEND COMPLAINT - 6
L;

C
;)

right a m ,which held, aimed, and fired the fatal weapon-"Tischer v. Estate of Flax, 816 A.2d I,

Nor c m the agent be held to have intederecl with hfs pTincipal's con&act. RECO Const. Go.,

Inc. v. J-U-B Engineers, h e . , 145 Idaho 719, 184 P,3d 844 (2008); JenIn"m v. Boise Cascade Corp.
141 Idaho 233,108 P.3d 380 (2005); Tlzomas v. 1MedicaE Center Physicians, P.A., 138 Idaho 200,61
P.3d 557 (2002); Leon v. Boise State Universiq, 125 Idaho 365, 870 P.2d 1324 (1994); Ostrander
v. Farm Bureau Mut. Ins. Co. ofIdaho, Inc., 123 Idaho 650,654, 851 P.2d 946,950 (1993).
Accordingly, the proposed amended complaint does not allege actionable claims against the
defendant attorneys for civil conspiracy or tortious interference with their client's contract with
plaintiff. Leave to amend should not be granted wlth respect to these ostensible claims.

F.

As a Matter of Law, Defendants Are Shielded from Suit by the Litigation
Privilege

The existence of an immunity or privilege is a question of law. Nation v. State, Dept. of"
Correction, 144 Idaho 177, 158 P.3d 953 (2007); Rincover v. State, Dept. offinance, Securities
Rzlreau, 128 Idaho 653, 917 P.2d 1293 (1996); Smith v. Reddy , 882 F.Supp. 497 (D.Md. 1995)
Sanchez v. Coxon, 175 Ariz. 93,854 P.2d 126 (1993); Darragh v. Superior Court, 183 Ariz. 79,900
P.2d 1215 (Ariz.App. 1995).
The defendants named in the proposed amended complaint are entitled to avail themselves
of the defense of litigation immunity or privilege. "An attorney owes no duty to a thud party in an
adversarial relationship." Bowman v. Two, 104 Wash.2d 181,188,704 P.2d 140 (1085). "Existence
of a duty to an adversary pasty beyond the courtesy and respect owed all participants in the legal
process. . . would interfere with the undivided loyalty an attorney owes a client and would diminish

DEFENDANTS' MEMORANDUM IN OPPOSITION TO MOTION TO AMEND COMPLAINT - 7

an attorney" ability to achieve the most advmtageous position Ebr a client." Id.at 189. Accord, 2%
Chapman Children's Trust v. Porter & Hedges, L.L.P., 32 S.W.3d 419 (Tex.App. 2000); hflzode v,
s,

288 Mont. 278,957 P.2d 1124 (1998); &rcia v. Rodey, Ifz'ckson,S b a s A& & Robb, P.R.,

106 N.M. 757,750 P.2d 118 (1988); Fi-iedman v. Dozorc, 412 Mich. 1,312 N.W.2d 585 (1981),

As aeomeys for pasties adverse to Reed Taylor, defendants are not subject to suit by him for
their actions taken in connection with litigation. Insofar as the mended complaint attempts to state
claims based on defendants' litigation strategy, positions taken in open court, cooperation with cocounsel in defending against Mr. Taylor's claims, or other matters collaterally related to pending
litigation such as pawent of litigation expenses, resisting the opposing party's attempts to possess
property, or negotiating, or declining to negotiate, with opposing counsel, defendant's actions are
privileged as a matter of law. The proposed mended complaint is an exercise in futility because it
merely seeks to advance claims whch cannot survive assertion of the defense of litigation privilege.

G.

As a Matter of Law, Plaintiff's Purported Claim for Conversion Does Not State
a Claim upon which Relief Can Be Granted

Plaintiff attempts in h s amended complaint to plead his claim for conversion in slightly
dif5erent terns, which are nonetheless insufficient to state a claim. Because plaintiff's conversion
allegations do not raise any justiciable issue, it would be futile to grant leave to amend.
Plaintiff's theory seems to be that the defendants can be held liable for conversion if it can be
shown that their fees were paid with the proceeds of assets in which the plaintiff alleges he possesses
a perfected security interest. If plaintiff's conversion theory were to be accepted, every person who
accepts payment fi-om a client or customer for services rendered would be subject to suit for
conversion by the secured creditor of such client or customer. The Uniforn Commercial Code rejects

DEFENDANTS' MEMORANDUM IN OPPOSITION TO MOTION TO AMEND COMPLAINT - 8

:;&I'

this approach. In Lake Ontario Production Credit Associa2"ion ofRochester v. Grove Hogan, 138
A.D.2d 930,526 N.V. S.2d 985 (19821), a debtor sold cows in wKch the plaintiff possessed a pedectd

ty interest. At least p&o@the p c e d s h n z the sale of the cows was used.to pay the debtor's
aaomeys. The court held that the s e c w d creditor could trace the proceeds from the sale of the
collateral only imo-far as such proceeds remained in. the hands of the debtor. The law firm wkch
rcmived p a p e n t from the sale of collateral took free of any claim by the secured creditor. While
the UCC lkas been mended aPld rmmbered since the date of the Grove Hogan case, the concept
contkues under cunent version of the Gode. See Idaho Code 5 28-9-332 whch makes it clear that
persons who in good faith receive p a p e n t of money from a debtor for services rendered take free
and clear of any security interest in such. money.
With respect to assets remaining in the hands of Hawley Troxell's clients, any perfected
security interest plaintiff may have (assuming for the sake of argument that plaintiff possesses a
perfected security interest) is governed by existing commercial law principles. Either such security
interest is traceable to proceeds or not, depending on application of the provisions of the Unifom
Comercial Gode. Hawltey Troxell is not liable for conversion simply because it acts as counsel for
one or more debtors who challenge the validity of the debt and the alleged security interest. Among
other tfungs, the litigation privilege bars any claim for civil damages against opposing attorneys for
statements made or actions taken, including the assertion of defenses with which the plaintiff
disagrees, in the course of representation of an opposing party in litigation. Kahala Royal COT. v.
Goodsill Anderson Quinn & Stifel, 113 Hawai'i 25 1, 151 P.3d 732 (2007).

DEFENDANTS' MEMORANDUM IN OPPOSITION TO MOTION TO AMEND COMPLAINT - 9

.;62'

For the Erst time, plaintiff Reed Taylor alleges in

mended complaintc that be

is entitled to bring not only direct claims on his own behalf, but also a shareholder" derivative action.
"This is the primary and perhaps only substantive change to the complaht.' A "derivative proceeding"
is defined in Idaho Code

8

30-1-740 as a civil suit on behalf of a domestic or, in limited

circmstances, foreign corporation. As discussed in greater detail below, kfr.Taylor improperly
tends to conflate his individual claims with the so-called derivative claims.
The shareholder's derivative action was developed as an extraordinary equitable device to
enable shareholdersto enforce a corporate right that the corporation failed to assert on its own behalf.
Aronson v. Lewis, 473 A.2d

805,811 (Del. 1984).

The nature of the derivative proceeding is two-fold. First, it is the equivalent of a
suit by the shareholdersto compel the corporation to sue. Second, it is [a] suit by the
corporation, asserted by the shareholder on its behalf, against those who are liable to
it. The corporation is the real party in interest and the shareholder is only a nominal
plaintiff. The substantive claim belongs to the corporation. . . .
13 Mr. Fletcher et al,, Cyclopedia of the Law of Private Corporations 5 594 1.10 (1995 Rev.)
"Because a corporation exists as a separate legal entity, the shareholdershave no direct cause
of action or right of recovery against those who have harrned it. The shareholders may, however,
bring a derivative suit to enforce the corporation's rights and redress its injuries when the board of
directors fails or refuses to do so." Grossett v. Wenaas, 72 Cal Rptr.3d 129, 135,42 Cal.4th 1100,

It is doubtful whether the purported derivative claims are properly classified as such. Paragraph13 of the
proposed amended complaint alleges that Reed Taylor is entitled to bring derivative claims but then asserts that he is
personally entitled to "recover and possess all fitnds, damages andfor property recovered &om all direct and
derivative causes of action." It is a fimdamental principle that derivative claims belong to the corporation, not the
shareholder(s) who bring the derivative action on the corporation's behalf.

DEFENDANTS' MEMORANDUM IN OPPOSITION TO MOTION TO AMEND COMPLAINT - 10

1108, I 75 P.3d 1184,1189 (2008). A shareholder may not maintain an action on h s own behalf for
a wrong done by a third person to the corporation on the theory that such wrong devalued h s stock
because such an a c ~ o would
n
lead to multitudinous litigation. Sufferv. General Petroleu
28 Gal 2d 525,530, 170 P.2d 898 (1946). "When a derivative action is successful, the corporation

is the only party that benefits from at any recovev; the shaseholders derive no benefit 'except the
indirect benefit resulting from a realization upon the corporation's assets."'

Grossett v. Wenaas,

supra, 72 Cal Rptr.3d at 135,42 Cal.4th at 1108, 175 P.3d at 1190 (2008).
A.

Reed Taylor Is Not a Shareholder

Idaho Code (j 30-1-741 provides that a person cannot commence or maintain a derivative
proceexitingunlesshe "[wlas a shareholder at the time of the act or omission complained of or became
a shareholder through transfer by operation of law &om one (1) who was a shareholder at that time."
The proposed anended complaint does not allege that Mr. Taylor was a shareholder at the time of the
acts complained of. His status is that of former shareholder whose stock was redeemed and who now
seeks to recover the balance owing notwithstanding the insolvency of the corporation. This does not
qualify k m as a "shareholder." He ceased to be a shareholder when h s stock was redeemed.
Whether or not he will ever again become a shareholder by operation of law or otherwise remains to
be seen. Nor does h s security interest in the stock of AIA Insurance, Inc., make hlm a shareholder.
Whether or not his security interest is enforceable and, if so, whether he possesses any right other than
to sell the collateral in a comercially reasonable manner has not been adjudicated.

B.

Reed Taylor Does Not Fairly Represent the Interests of the Corporations

The second criterion of Idaho Code 5 30-1-741 is that the shareholderbringing the derivative
action "fairly and adequately represents the interests of the corporation in enforcing the right of the
DEFENDANTS' MEMORANDUM IN OPPOSITION TO MOTION TO AMEND COMPLAINT - 11

corporation." It is impossible to conceive of any way that Reed Taylor can be said to represent the
interest of AIA Services or AIA Inswance, or the larger cornunity of shareholdas. In every respect,
h s personal interest is adverse to the corporations lurd hostile to the irnterests of other shaseholders.
Paynnent of even a subsbtial portion of the balance due for the rdemption ofhis stock will bankrupt
the corporations and leave n o t h g for other

shareholder^.^

F d e m o r e , because of the conflict of interest that Reed Taylor has with the corporations and
all other shareholders, his attorneys cannot property serve as counsel in a derivative action. See, e.

g., New Cmuiford YirZley, Ltd v. Benedict , 847 P.2d 642 (Colo. Ct. App. 1993) (holding that the
"existence of other litigation between a [derivative action] plaintiff and the same [derivative]
defendants in which that plaintiff seeks to have the defendants' assets applied to the satisfaction of
a personal claim, rather than transferred to the corporation, represents a serious conflict of interest'"
and concluding that "plaintiffs present counsel also have an irreconcilable conflict so that they
cannot continueto represent the other shareholders,includingother named plaintiffs" in the derivative
action). See also Cuenther v.Pac. TeZecom Inc., 123 F.R.D. 341,346-47 (D.Or. 1988) (explaining
that the court was "compelled to exercise [its] discretion in favor of disqualifying plaintiff's present
attorneys from representing the remaining plaintiffs" because of a similar conflict).

CONCLUSION
The proposed amended complaint adds nothrng to Reed Taylor's ostensible direct claims.
Such claims still are not valid for a variety of reasons, including lack of privity, lack of standing, and

2

See, for example, ?/ 17 of the proposed mended complaint, which alleges that the debt allegedly owing by
ALA Services to Reed Taylor exceeds its assets by $3 million, and ?/ 29 of the proposed amended complaint which
alleges that AIA Services is insolvent and unable to pay the amount allegedly owing to Reed Taylor.
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lack of a duty owed to h m on behalf of the defendant aeameys, all of which are matters of law, not
contest& facts. Also as a matter of law, Reed Taylor cannot sue directly under the Idaho Consumer
Protecfcion Act because he did not parchase goods or services fiom the defendm%, Nar does he
possess a cause of action against the aaomey defendms for conspiracy or tortious inte~erencewith
conkact because, as a rnatter of law, an agent cannot conspire with h s principal or intedere with h s
principal's con&act. Under the UCC, the mere payment of legal fees by the AIA corporations does
not constihte conversion. Finally, the litigation privilege as a matter of law precludes claims against
the attorney defendants named in the amended complaint based on their litigation-related actions.
Since all of the direct causes of action whch Reed Taylor attempts to plead in his amended complaint
are deficient, it would be a futile act to grant h s motion to amend.
With respect to Reed Taylor's purported derivative claims, the amended complaint is also
deficient. He is neither a shareholder nor a party who can be said to fairly represent the AIA
corporations. His interest is inimical to the interests of the corporations and to the interest of other
shareholders. Therefore, he is not a party qualified to bring a shareholder derivative action.

The

C o w should decline to grant leave to amend the complaint where the amendment would merely be
a futile act.
DATED this

5 day of November, 2008.
ELAM & BURKE, P.A.
By:
k d e s D. LaRue, Of the Firm
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the ,$ day of November, 2008,I caused a true and correct
copy of the above and foregoing instrument to be served upon the following in the manner indicated
below:
Michael S. Bissell
CAMPBELL
BISSELL& K ~ YPLLC
,
7 South Howard Street, Ste. 416
Spokane, WA 99201

-

J@S

U.S. Mail
Hand Delivery
Federal Express
Facsimile Transmission (509) 455-71 11

D. LaRue
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTHCT OF THE
STATE: OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF NEZ PERCE

REED J. TAYLOR, an individual,
Plaintiff,

)
)

CASE NO. CV08-01765

1

)
)
)
GARY D. BABBITT, an individual; D. JOHN )
ASHBY, an individual; PATRICK V.
)
v.

OPINION AND O D E R ON
DEFENDANTS' MOTION
TO DISMISS AND PLAINTIFF'S
MOTION TO AMEND
COMPLAINT

COLLINS, an individual; RICEIARD A
1
RILEY, an individual; HAWLEY TROXELL )
ENNIS & HAWLEY, LLP an Idaho limited )
liability partnership; JANE DOES I-X,
1
unknown individuals;
)

Defendants.

This matter is before the Court on Defendants' Motion to Dismiss and Plaintiffs Motion
to Amend Complaint. A hearing on the Motion to Dismiss was held on October 16,2008 and a
hearing on Plaintiffs Motion to Amend Complaint was held on December 4,2008. Plaintiff
Reed Taylor was represented by attorney Michael S. Bissell. Defendants Babbitt, Ashby,
Collins, Riley and the law firm of Hawley T'roxell Ennis & Wawley were represented by attorney
James D. LaRue. The Court. having read the motion and briefs of the parties, having considered
Taylor v Babbrtt, et al
Opinion & Order on Motion to Dlsmiss
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the record in the maeer, having tiexd oral arguments of counsel and being h l l y advised in the

matter, hereby renders its decision.

FACTUALANDPROCED~BACKGROUND
The above-entitled matter is rooted in the underlying case of Taylor v. AL4 et al., Nez
Perce County Case No. CV07-00208. The issues in the underlying case are complex and its
procedural hrstory leng-thy, though the matter has yet to go to trial or be fully adjudicated. Reed
Taylor's complaint in the underlying case, amended five times, asserts eleven claims including
one for default of a $6 million promissory note issued to Reed Taylor by the corporate
defendants as part of a buy-out or retirement package. In order to understand the claims being
asserted in the instant matter, certain events in the underlying case must be reviewed.
On January 29,2007, Reed Taylor filed suit against AIA Services Corporation, AIA
Insurance, inc., John Taylor, Connie Taylor, Bryan Freeman and JoLee Duclos. AIA Insurance,
Inc. is a business entity under the umbrella of AIA Services Corporation. At the time of the
filing of the lawsuit, John Taylor was the CEO of the corporations and a board member along

with Bryan Freeman and JoLee ~ u c l o s . 'Connie Taylor, the former wife of John Taylor, held a
community property interest in the corporations. Following the filing of the lawsuit, attorney
Michael McNichols was retained to represent AIA Services, AIA Insurance and John Taylor;
attorney David Gittens was retained to represent Bryan Freeman and JoLee Duclos; attorney Jon
Hally was retained to represent Connie Taylor.
On February 27,2007, upon motion by the Defendants, the Court granted a temporary
restraining order against Reed Taylor after he attempted to exercise management authority over

'

Bryan Freeman and JoLee Duclos resigned as board members shortly after the lawsuit was filed and two new
board members were appointed to replace them.
Taylor v Babbztt et a1
Opinion & Order on Motion to Dismiss
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Court made no determination relative to other terns in the extensive buy-out agreement between
AIA Insurance Corporation and Reed Taylor, such as the effect on voting shares and receivables
upon default of the promissory note. Those issues were not before the Court in the context o
motion for partial summary judgment and, therehre, have yet to be determined.
After twenty-one months of niotions and hearings in the underlying case, after trial dates
bad been set and reset, and with a number of motions still pending before the Court, Reed Taylor
filed the above-entitled action against aeorneys Babbitt, Ashby, Collins and Riley and the law

firm of 14awley Troxell Ennis & I-fawley, cunent counsel for the corporations in the underlying
case. In his action, filed August 8,2008, Reed Taylor asserts the following claims against
Defendants: (1) aiding and abetting or assisting others in the c o m i s s i o n of tortious acts in the
underlying case; (2) conversion and misappropriation of AIA corporate assets; (3) violations of
Idaho's Consumer Protection Act, I.C.

5 48-601 et seq.; and, (4) professional negligence andior

breach of fiduciary duties. Defendants, through counsel, filed a motion to dismiss pursuant to
I.R.C.P. 12(b)(6) along with briefmg. Reed Taylor filed briefing in opposition and on October
16,2008, the Court heard oral arguments of counsel.
One day prior to the Court's hearing on Defendants' Notion to Dismiss, Plaintiff filed a
motion to amend his complaint, attaching his proposed amended pleading. Upon order of the
Court, the Motion to Amend Complaint was heard on December 4,2008 and the Court will
address the matter herein.

STANDARD ON MOTION TO DISMISS
In ruling on a motion to dismiss pursuant to I.R.C.P. 12(b)(6), a court is to review all
facts and inferences in favor of the non-moving party and ask whether a claim for relief has been

Taylor v. Babbitts et al.
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stated. Rohr v. Rahr, f 28 Idabo 137, 141,911 P.2d 133, 137 (1996). In the instant matter, the
arguments made by the parties incorporated events and actions that have occurred in the
underlying case of Taylor v. RL4, et al. Therefore, in making its analysis in the instmt matter
and pursumt to I.R.E. 20 1, the Court will take judicial notice of the underlying case in toto.

ANALYSIS
{A)

DEFENDANTS' MOTION TO DISMISS
The issues raised in the instant matter are less daunting and complex than the lengthy

briefs and pleadings would make them appear at first blush.' As stated by Reed Taylor in his
opposition brief, the gravamen of lus Complaint is that Defendants aided and abetted John
Taylor and others in committing torts against Reed Taylor and acted to deprive Reed Taylor of
money and property to which he is ~ n t i t l e d . ~
Plaintiff's core contention is that Defendants are acting in violation of Idaho's
Professional Rules of Conduct by representing all of the corporate defendants in the underlying
case and by entering into a joint defense agreement with the other named defendants. Plaintiff
argues that by their actions, Defendants have aided and abetted John Taylor and others in the
commission of tortious acts that have resulted in significant financial damage to Reed Taylor.
The Defendants in the instant case were retained to represent AIA Insurance, AIA
Services and CropUSA after previous counsel for the AIA corporations had obtained a
preliminary injunction from the Court that ordered the operations of the corporations to remain
unchanged until the claims asserted by Reed Taylor have been adjudicated. The injunction was

Plaintiffs Complaint is twenty-three pages in length. Defendants' brief in support of the motion to dismiss is
thirty-six pages in length. Plaintiffs brief in opposition is fifty-seven pages in length.
4
Plaintiffs Response to Defendants' Motion to Dismiss, at page 18.
Taylor v Babbitt, et a1
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sought after Reed Taylor self-declased the promissory note in default, self-declared himself the
sole shareholder of the corporations and then anempted to take over physical and operational
control of the corporations, all without the benefit of a judicial finding on the iss
The Court has reviewed in camera (a) written correspondence to the defendants in the
underlying matter from the law firm of Hawley Troxell Emis and Hawley, (b) the witten
representation agreements entered into by the codefendants who are represented by the law firm,
and (c) the written joint defense agreements entered into by the defendants in the underlying
case. After reviewing the documents and the applicable Idaho Rules of Professional Conduct,
the Court is persuaded the Defendant attorneys and law firm are well versed in the rules and have
met the criteria necessary to represent clients with potential conflicts of interest. The various
documents are well-drafted, effectively address the concerns and requirements of the
professional rules of conduct and protect and preserve any potential claims that may arise
between the clients.
Of particular concern to the Plaintiff is the joint defense agreement between the
defendants in the underlying case. The purpose behind joint defense agreements is to allow
defendants in the same litigation to communicate and share documents without the
communications andor documents becoming subject to discovery where those communications
andor documents are otherwise non-discoverable or fall within the attorney-client privilege. In
the underlying case, many of Reed Taylor's claims challenge interests that the corporations and
the individual board members have in common and, therefore, require a common defense. It is
only reasonable that a degree of cooperation must take place between counsel for the
corporations and counsel for the individual board members, as the corporation is incapable of
communicating with its counsel except through those individuals who run the corporations.

Taylor v. Babbitt, et al.
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C o n t r q to the position asserted by Plaintiff, entering into a joint defense agcernent does
not prc~hibitthe codekndmts fiom asserting claims against each other if such claims are
wananted. Rather, it provides the parties ce~$ainprotections in regard to their communications
with each other on those areas of c o m o n defense and c o m o n interest. The joint defense
privilege, or c o m o n interest rule, is merely an extension of the aeomey-client privilege in that
it protects communications between the parties when they are part of an on-going and joint effort
to set up a c o m o n defense strategy in connection with actual or prospective litigation. Intex
Recreation Corp. v. Team Worldwide Corp., 471 F.Supp.2d 1I (D.D.C.2007). The joint defense
privilege applies not only to comunications but also to documents protected by the work
product doctrine. Id. The circumstances in the instant matter require a degree of cooperation
between the defendants in the underlying case and, therefore, the Court finds the joint defense
agreements reasonable and within the standards allowed by Idaho's Professional Rules of
Conduct.
Having put to rest the questions of joint representation and joint defense agreements, the
Court's analysis moves to the Defendants assertion that PlaintifT's claims in the instant matter
should be dismissed as a matter of law based on the theory of litigation privilege, a doctrine that
has yet to be addressed by Idaho's appellate courts. Nevertheless, numerous other jurisdictions
have addressed the doctrine at length, providing the Court with direction as to the applicability of
the privilege.
The courts in West Virginia have addressed the litigation privilege on a number of
occasions. In Clurk v. Druckman, 624 S.E.2d 864,218 W.Va. 427 (W.Va.2005), the plaintiff, a
physician and former defendant in a medical malpractice suit, asserted claims in negligence
against counsel for the plaintiff in the malpractice lawsuit. The Clark Court, looking first at the

Taylor v. Babbitts et al.
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duties of xi attorney, found an inflexible requirement that atrtorneys diligently, l'aii-hhlly and
legitimately p e r h m every act necessary to protect, conserve and advance the interests of their

Clark v Druekurtan, 624 S.E.2d at 858. The Court then noted that its research revealed
no case law that would support Clark's assertion that an aaarney owes a duty to an opposing
party, such that breach ofthe duty would subject an atrtorney to liability. Id. at 869. The Court
stated, "This Court can find no justification for imposing a duty of care in favor of an opposing
party upon counsel. Imposition of such a duty can only work to the detriment of counsel's own
client and would adversely impact counsel's duty of zealous advocacy for his or her own client
and would create an impossible and unjustified conflict of interest.'"d.
Court's that have had the opportunity to address the litigation privilege recognize the
adversarial system would be turned on its head if parties to a lawsuit are allowed to bring claims
in tort andlor legal malpractice against opposing counsel for conduct done within the scope of
litigation. While attorneys rnust not knowingly counsel or assist a client in committing a crime
or fraud5, Idaho's Rules of Professional Conduct require an attorney to pursue matters on behalf
of a client despite opposition, obstruction or personal inconvenience to the attorney and require
an attorney to take whatever lawful and ethical measures are required to vindicate a client's

cause or endeavor. I.R.P.C., Rule 1.3[1]
The doctrine of litigation privilege appears intended to create a safety zone for attorneys
so that they may zealously advocate for their client without fear of retribution. The Supreme
Court of Appeals of West Virginia aptly described the scope and purpose of the litigation
privilege in Czar-k v. Druckman, 624 S.E.2d 864, 218 W.Va. 427 (2005).

In her concurring opinion in Rarefield v. DPIC Companies, Inc., 2 15 W.Va. 544,
600 S.E.2d 256 (2004)' Justice Davis discussed the policies underlying the
5

I.R.P.C., Rule 1.2[10]
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lriigation privilege. Therein she stated:
[tJhe public policies associated with the 1itigaLion privilege include: (I)
promoting the candid, objective and undistorted disclosure of evidence;
(2) placing the burden of testing the evidence upon the litigants during
trial; (3) avoiding the chilling effect resulting from the threat of
subsequent litigation; (4) reinforcing the finality of judgments; (5) limiting
collateral attacks upon judgments; (6) promoting zealous advocacy; (7)
discouraging abusive litistion practices; and (8) encouraging se.t-tlernent.
Matsuura v. E.1" du Pont de Nenzours & Co., 102 Hawai'i 149, 73 P.3d
687,693 (2003).

Barefield, 215 W.Va. at 560,600 S.E.2d at 272 (Davis, J., concurring). In light of
these policies, we see no reason to distinguish between communicatiorzs made
during the litigation process and conduct occurring during the litigation process.
As recognized by the Florida Supreme Court:
absolute immunity must be afforded to any act occurring during the course
of a judicial proceeding, regardless of whether the act involves a
defamatory ~tatementor other tortious behavior such as the alleged
misconduct at issue, so long as the act has some relation to the proceeding.
The rationale behind the immunity afforded to defamatory statements is
equally applicable to other misconduct occurring during the course of a
judicial proceeding. Just as participants in litigation must be free to engage
in unhindered communication, so too must those participants be free to use
their best judgment in prosecuting or defending a lawsuit without fear of
having to defend their actions in a subsequent civil action for misconduct.

Levin, Middlebrooks, Mabie, Thomas, Mayes & Mitchell, P.A., v. United States
Fire Insurance Company, 639 So.2d 606,608 (Fla. 1994). See also Jackson v.
BellSouth Telecommunications, 372 F.3d 1250, 1274 (1 1th Cir.2004) (quoting
Levin ).
In Collins, we recognized that absolute privileges, such as the litigation privilege,
should only be permitted in limited circumstances. Collins, 21 1 W.Va. at 461, 566
S.E.2d at 598. Thus, we do not believe that a litigation privilege should apply to
bar liability of an attorney in all circumstances. In Mehafj, Rider, Windholz &
Wilson v. Central Bank Denvez; N.A., 892 P.2d. 230, 235 (Colo. 1995), the
Colorado Supreme court noted that "an attorney is not liable to a non-client absent
a finding of fraud or malicious conduct by the attorney." See also Baglini v.
Lauletta, 338 N.J.Super. 282, 768 A.2d 825, 833-34 (2001) ("The one tort
excepted from the reach of the litigation privilege is malicious prosecution, or
malicious use of process."). We believe such exceptions to an absolute litigation
privilege arising from conduct occurring during the litigation process are
reasonable accomodations whch preserve an attorney's duty of zealous
advocacy while providing a deterrent to intentional conduct which is unrelated to
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legitimate litigation tactics and which harms an opposing party. As recently noted
by a California court:
[a] fraud claim against a lawyer is no differertt: from a fraud claim against
anyone else. If an aaomey commits actual fraud in h s dealings with a
third party, the fact he did so in the capacity of attorney for a client does
not relieve him of liability. M i l e an attorney's professional duty of care
extends only to his own client and intended beneficiaries of his legal work,
the limitations on liabilily for negligence do not apply to liability for
fraud.
Vega v. .Jones, Day, Reavis & P o p e , 121 Cal.App.4th 282,291, 17 Cal.Rptr.3d

26, 3 1-2 (Cal.Ct.App.2004)(internal citations and quotations omitted).
In order "[t]o maintain an action for malicious prosecution it is essential to prove:
(1) That the prosecution was malicious; (2) that it was without reasonable or
probable cause; and (3) that it terminated favorably to plaintiff." Syl. Pt. 1, Lyons
v. Duvy-Pocahontas Goal Co., 75 W.Va. 739, 84 S.E. 744 (19 15). The term
maliciotzs is defined as cc[s]ubstantiallycertain to cause injury" and "without just
cause or excuse." Black's Law Dictionary 977 (8th Ed.2004). This definition
implies an improper or evil intent or motive or the intent to do harm. Where an
attomey files suit without reasonable or probable cause with the intent to harm a
defendant, we do not believe the litigation privilege should insulate him or her
from liability for malicious prosecution.
As noted above, we can find no reasonable justification for distinguishing conduct
fiom communications for the purposes of the litigation privilege. However, we
also recognize the need for limited exceptions from application of the absolute
litigation privilege for certain intentional actions. Accordingly, we now hold that
the litigation privilege is generally applicable to bar a civil litigant's claim for civil
damages against an opposing party's attorney if the alleged act of the attomey
occurs in the course of the attorney's representation of an opposing party and is
conduct related to the civil action.

Clark v. Druckman, 624 S.E.2d at 870-87 1.
In the instant matter, the conduct and actions of the Defendants that form the basis of
Plaintiff's

claims are all conduct and actions within the scope of the underlying litigation. Mibile

Plaintiff correctly notes that there are potential conflicts of interest that exist between the clients
of the Defendants, the Court is sufficiently persuaded, based on its review of the in camera
documents, that the Defendants' clients have knowingly waived any conflicts and are fully
informed that, as the litigation progresses, the common interests and defenses of the underlying
Taylor v Babbzff et a1
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defendmts may diverge m d the parties may find tlnemselves adversaries. While the underlying
case is conlplex in that it involves numerous claims asserted against multiple defendants and
involves inter-corporate trmsactions approved by directors that cross over from corporati
corporation, the circumstances are not so unique that the Court is unable to look to the general
analysis of courts with similar, albeit distinguishable, facts.
A case with many similarities to the instant case is helpful to the analysis the Court must
make. In Alpert v Crain Cuton &James P C . , 178 S.W.3d 398 (Tex.App.-Houston [lStDist.]
2005), Robert Alpert filed suit against the law firm of Crain, Caton & James afier the firm had
represented hlark Riley, an attorney who found himself being sued by Alpert after their attorneyclient relationship had soured. Alpert's suit against Crain Caton law firm asserted the firm had
conspired with Riley to defraud Alpert, had aided and abetted Riley to defraud Alpert, and had
torti~uslyinterfered with Riley's fiduciary duty to Alpert. The law firm moved to dismiss the
lawsuit based on PLlpertYsfailure to state a recognizable claim. The lower court granted the
motion and Alp313 appealed. The trial court's dismissal of the lawsuit was affirmed by the Texas
Court of Appeals. In reaching its decision, the Texas Court made the following statements:
Perhaps as an offshoot of its privity jurisprudence, Texas case law has
discouraged lawsuits against an opposing counsel if the lawsuit is based on the
fact that counsel represented an opposing party in a judicial proceeding. Bradt Y.
Sehek, 14 S.W.3d 756, 766 (Tex.App.-I-fouston [lst Dist.] 2001, pet. denied). An
attorney has a duty to zealously represent his clients within the bounds of the law.
Bradt v. West, 892 S.W.2d 56,7 1-72 (Tex.App.-Houston [I st Dist.] 1994, writ
denied). In fulfilling this duty, an attorney has the right to interpose defenses and
pursue legal rights that he deems necessary and proper, without being subject to
liability or damages. Id. If an attorney could be held liable to an opposing party
for statements made or actions taken in the course of representing his client, he
would be forced constantly to balance his own potential exposure against his
client's best interest. See id. Such a conflict hampers the resolution of disputes
through the court system and the attainment of justice. Thus, to promote zealous
representation, courts have held that an attorney is "qualifiedly immune" from
civil liability, with respect to non-clients, for actions taken in connection with
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representing a client in litigation. See, e.g., Butler v. LilZy, 533 S.W.2d 130, 13 134 uex.App.-Houston [lst Dist.] 1976, writ dism'd).
This qualified i m u n i t y generally applies even if conduct is wrongful in the
context of the underlying lawsuit, li'enfioe v. Jones & ,4ssocs., 947 S.W.2d 285,
288 (Tex.App.-Fort Worth 1997, writ denied) ("'Under Texas law, attorneys
c m o t be held liable for w o n g h l litigation conduct.'". For example, a third party
bas no independent right of recovery against an attorney for filing motions in a
lawsuit, even if frivolous or without merit, alhough such conduct is sanctionable
or contemptible as enforced by the statutory or inherent powers of the court. West,
892 S.W.2d at 72. Courts have refused to acknowledge an independent cause of
action in such instances "because making motions is conduct an attorney engages
in as part of the discharge of his duties in representing a party in a lawsuit." Id.
(holding no cause of action existed for making motion for contempt because
attorneys do not owe duty to be correct in legal arguments-"even if the ... motion
for contempt had been meritless, their conduct in so moving, corning as it did in
the discharge of their duties in representing a party in a lawsuit, would still not be
actionable."). Thus, an attorney's conduct, even if frivolous or without merit, is
not independently actionable if the conduct is part of the discharge of the lawyer's
duties in representing his or her client. Id at 74; Chapman Children's Trust v.
Porter & Hedges, L. L.P., 32 S.W.3d 429,44 1 (Tex.App.-Houston [14th Dist.]
2000, pet. denied). The i m u n i t y focuses on the type of conduct, not on whether
the conduct was meritorious in the context of the underlying lawsuit. Renfroe, 947
S.W.2d at 288.
As the Texas Supreme Court observed in McCamish, a lawyer's protection from
liability arising out of his represenlati011of a client is not without limits. See
McCamish, 99 1 S.W.2d at 793-94; see also Tales v. Tales, 113 S.W.3d 899, 91213 (Tex.App.-Dallas 2003, no pet.). For example, a cause of action could exist
against an attorney who knowingly commits a fraudulent act outside the scope of
his legal representation of the client. See Likover v. Sunflower Terrace I%, Ltd.,
696 S.W.2d 468, 472 (Tex.App.-Houston [lst Dist.] 1985, no writ). If a lawyer
participates in independently fraudulent activities, his action is "foreign to the
duties of an attorney." Id. (quoting Poole v. fibuston & 11 C. Ry. Co., 58 Tex. 134,
137 (1882)). A lawyer thus cannot shield his own willful and premeditated
fraudulent actions from liability simply on the ground that he is an agent of his
client. See id.

Alpert v. Crain, Caton & James, P.C., 178 S.W.3d at 405-406.
In the instant case, Reed Taylor's claims against the Defendants are all based on conduct
and actions engaged in by the Defendants within the scope of the underlying litigation.
Nevertheless, under the theory asserted by Plaintiff, a defendant's attorney may become liable to
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a plaintiff if the plaintiff disagrees with or is offended by the litigation tactics of defense counsel
or disagrees with or is offended by the decision of an opposing party to waive conflicts of
interest in order for common interests to be defended in the most efficient andjor e E e c ~ v e
manner. It is this very morass that the litigation privilege seeks to prevent.
Each of Plaintifrs claims against the Defendants contends that by defending the
corporations in the underlying action, by accepting payment for their representation, by arguing
positions to the Court in favor of their clients and against the claims of Reed Taylor, and that by
failing to agree with Reed Taylor's positions in regards to his claims, the Defendants have aided
and abetted and conspired with the corporations and individual directors to interfere with the
contracbal rights of Reed Taylor. Yet, Plaintiff is unable to direct the Court to any conduct or
action on the part of the Defendants that falls outside the scope of the Defendants' representation
of their clients.
The Court appreciates the Plaintiffs right to zealously prosecute his claims in the
underlying action and respects his belief that his claims are sound, that he will prevail on those
clainis and that the underlying defendants are simply delaying the inevitable. However, the
Court also appreciates the defendants' right in the underlying action to disagree with Reed
Taylor's position and to defend against his asserted claims. The Court is persuaded that the
litigation privilege is a sound judicial concept that should be recognized in Idaho as it is
consistent with the Idaho Rules of Professional Conduct and the firmly held established standard
in Idaho that an attorney is obligated to provide his clients with zealous representation. In the
instant matter, the conduct and actions of the Defendants, as alleged by Plaintiff, all fall within
the scope of the Defendants' representation of their clients and, therefore, fall within the
protection of the litigation privilege.

Taylor v. Babbitt, et al.
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The Court is further persuaded, based on its review of the various documents provided to
the Court for in camera review, that the Defendmts took all steps necessary to insure compliance
with the mles of professional a n d u c t in their representation of clients with potential codlicts of
interest and in the use of a joint defense agreement. Therefore, there has been no conduct of
aiding and abetting or conspiracy on the part of the Defendants in. their representation of the
underlying corporate defefendmts. Neither has there been m y conversion of assets by the
Defendants. Prior to the Dekndants being retained in the underlying case, the Court entered a
preliminary injunction ordering operational authority of AIA to remain status quo. Thus, the
directors of the corporation, including John Taylor, had authority to retain the Defendants to
represent the corporations. Furthermore, representations made by the Defendants to the Court in
furtherance of their of their clients' defense do not constitute violations of Idaho's consumer
protection laws when those representations are made within the scope of litigation. Finally,
PlaintifPs claim for legal malpractice fails as a matter of law. The existence of an attorney-client
relationship is a necessary element to a legal malpractice claim and Plaintiff, who specifically
raises the fact that he has not been allowed to choose counsel for the underlying defendants, has
no attorney-client relationship with the ~ e f e n d a n t s . ~

(B) PLAINTIFF'S NOTION TO AMEND COMPLAINT
"The decision whether to allow a party to amend its pleadings is left to the sound
discretion of the trial court . . . ." Wells v. Uizited States Insurance Co., 119 Idaho 160, 166, 804
P.2d 333 (Ct.App. 1991). It is not an abuse of discretion to deny a motion to amend where the

This issue was addressed fully in the Opinion & Order on Defendants Motion to Dismiss in the companion case of
Taylor v. McNichols, et al., Nez Perce County Case No. CV08-01763. See also Harrigfeld v. Irlancock, 140 Idaho
134,90 P.3d 884 (2004) and again in Estate ofBecker v. Callahan, 140 Idaho 522,96 P.3d 623 (2004).
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record contains no allegation that? if proven, would entitle a plaintiff to the relief claimed. Id. at
167.
The Court, afier hearing oral argments of counsel and after revie-wing Ealaintifrs
proposed mended complaint, finds it would be a futile act to grant PIaintifPs motion to amend
as the proposed mended complaint would not withstand a motion to dismiss. In his proposed
amended complaint, Plaintiff asserts the same claims as set forth in his original Complaint and
seeks to add derivative claims. Plaintiffs amended direct claims fail as a matter of law for the
same reasons as addressed by the Court above, despite Plaintifrs bare allegation that the conduct
and actions of the Defendants exceeded the scope of their representation.
Plaint~ff's attempt to bring derivative claims on behalf of AIA Insurance and AIA
Services fail as a matter of law. Idaho Code 5 30-1-741 clearly and unambiguously provides
standing to bring derivative proceedings only to those who are shareholders at the time of the act
or omission complained of and only to those shareholders who fairly and adequately represent
the interests of the corporation. As noted by the ABA Official Comment at the end of I.G. 5 301-741, while some state's have eliminated the "contemporaneous" ownership rule, Idaho's
legislature chose to retain the requirement, as is evidenced by the language in the statute.
Plaintiff contends that, because other states have allowed creditors and stock pledges to bring
derivative claims, standing should not be limited to shareholders. The Court is not persuaded.
Idaho Code (j 30-1-741 is clear and unambiguous, making it clear Idaho's legislature has chosen
to limit derivative claims to shareholders only.
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OmER
PlaintifPs &lotionto /mend Complaint is hereby IJENXED.
Defenda~ts'Motion to Dismiss is hereby GRANTED.

Dated this

Taylor v. Babbitt, et al.
Opinion & Order on Motion to Dismiss

day of December 2008.

I hereby certify that a true ropy of the foregoing OPINION AND ORDER ON DEFENDANTS'
MOTION TO DISMISS AND PLAINTIFF'S MOTION TO AMEND COMPLAINT was

li~aiieri,postage prepaid, by the undersigned at Lewiston, Idabo, this
to:

Micl~aelBissell
7 So Howard St., Ste. 41 6
Spokane WA 99201
J a ~ i ~ LaRue
es
PO Box 1539
Boise ID 83701-1539
PATTY O. WEEKS, CLERK
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day of Decetllber 2008,

CAMPBELL, BISSELL (4i; KIRBY PLLC
7 South Howad Street, Suite 4 16
Spokane, WA 99201
Tel: (509) 455-7100
Fax: (509) 455-71 11
Attorneys for Plaintiff Reed Taylor

IN TWE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF NEZ PERCE
REED J . TAYLOR, an individual,
Case No.: CV08-01765
AFFIDAVIT OF MICHAEL S. BISSELL
IN SUPPORT OF PLAINTlFF REED J.
TAYLOR'S MOTION TO DISALLOW
DEFENDANTS' REQUEST FOR
ATTOWEUS' FEES AND COSTS

GARY D. BABBITT, an individual; D. JOHN
ASWBY, an individual; PATRICK V.
COLLPNS, an individual; RICHARD A.
RILEY, an individual; HAWLEY TROXELL
E W I S & HAWLEY LLP, an Idaho limited
liability partnership; JANE DOES I-X,
unknown individuals;

I

Defendants.
STATE OF WASHPNCTON

1
) ss:

COUNTY OF SPOKANE

1

I, Michael S. Rissell, being first duly sworn on oath, deposes and says:
1.

I arn over the age of eighteen years, competent to testify in court, the

attorney for the plaintiff in the above-entitled action, and make this Affidavit based upon
my personal knowledge and belief based upon the infonnation available to me.

2.

Attached as Exhibit A is a true and correct copy of Reed Taylor's Motion

to Compel filed in Taylor v. AIA Services Colporntion, et al. By way of the attached

TAYLOR'S MOTION TO DISALLOW DEFENDANTS' REUEST FOR
ATTORNEYS' FEES AND COSTS
i -j r
i) \I

Motion, Reed Taylor sought copies of tolling agrements and represelltation docun~ents
subtnined by certain defendants (who were

y the Defendants in this action)

to their experts to testifjr in opposition to Reed Taylor's Motion to Disqualifi counsel in

Taylor v. AIA Sewices Corporation, et at. The documents requested in the Motion were
the same tolling ageements and evidence apparently relied upon by the Court in
dismissing Reed Taylor's Complaint against the Defendants in this action.
3.

Attached as Exhibit B is a true and correct copy of the Court's Order

de~iyirtgReed Taylor's request to obtain copies of the documents referenced above. By
denying Reed Taylor's Motion to Compel (Exhibit A), the Co~lrt permitted the
kfendants to use the documents referenced in the Motion to Compel as a shield fi-om
being disqualified, and as a sword for dismissing Reed Taylor's claims in this action.
4.

Attached as Exhibit C is a hue and correct copy of the itemization of fees

requested by the Defendants in this action. My office numbered each entry so as to
provide a basis to cite to the applicable entry for objection purposes,
5.

1have not pursed any claims in this action for any harassment, fiivolous or

unfounded purposes. I stand by the claims asserted by Reed Taylor, as they were
asserted in good faith and supported by substantial law, as dernonstrated by the
documents filed in this action. I have not, and would not, pursue any action for any client
Illll
////I
lllll
lllll
lllll
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knowing that the claims and facts asseired were not suppoired by the law or a good faith

ent for the reversal, modification or expaslsion of existing law.

TED: This 20'" day of January, 2009.

SUBSCEIlBED AND SWORN to before me this 2othday of January, 2009.

A&BM~~~PWE~T;~%EL~S
~ ~ % ~ - S

~ P POFOPLAINTIFF
R T
REED J.
TAYLOR'S MOTION TO UISALLOW DEFENDANTS' REUEST FOR
ATTORNEYS' FEES AND COSTS
.:;
I

fl

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
day of' Jmuary, 2009, 1 caused to be
1 HEWBY CERTIFY that on "che
served a t-rue md coned copy of the foregoing document lo the .following:

"

HAND DELIVERY
U.SMAfL
OWRN1CHT MAIL
FAX TWNSMISSIOH
EMAIL (.pdf attachent)

J m e s D. LaRue

E l m cgE; Bmke, PA
P.O. Box 1539
Boise, UD 83704

A&BWY%PMG%&EV
$IW%W.SBPOF
PO
PLAINTIFF
RT REED J.
TAYLOR'S MOTION TO DISALLOW DEFENDANTS'REUEST FOR
ATTORNEYS' FEES AND COSTS
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RODERTCK C. BOND (Pro Hac Vice)

M2D A. O N ,ISB No. 233 L
SMITH,CANNON & BOND PLLC
508 Eighth Street
Lewislon, Idaho 83501
Telephone: (208) 743-9428
Fax: (208)746-842 1

MICFtAF,L S. BISSELL, ISB No. 5762
CAMPBELL, BlSSELL & KIRBY PLLC
7 South Roward Street, Suite 4 16
Spokane, WA 99201
'I'el: (509) 455-7100
FM: (509) 455-7 11 1
Attorneys for Plaintiff Reed J. Taylor
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Ild TE-IE DISTRICT COURT 01:THE SECOND JUDICIAI, DISTRICT OF 7'IE
STATE OF IDAHO, M AND FOR 'THE COUNTY 01; NEZ PERCE
REED J. TAYLOR, a single person,
Case No.: CV-07-00208

Plaintiff,

/

v.

AIA ST?RVICES CORPOEUTION, an TtIaho
corporation; M A INSURANCE, WC., an Idaho

corporation; R. JOHN TAYLOR and CONNIE
TAYLOR, individually and the community
property comprised tiiereot BRYAN
FFCEEMAN, a single person; JOLEE DUCLOS,
a single person; CROP USA INSURANCE
AGENCY, lNC., an Jdaho Corporation; and
JAMES BECK and CORRIME BECK
individuaily and the community property
comprised thercoc

REED TAYLOR'S MO1'ION TO
COMPEL PRODUCTION OF
DOCUMENTS PROVIDED TO
EXPERT WTl'NESSES OF M A
SERVICES, AIA INSURANCE AND
JOIIN TAYLOR AND PRELIMWARY
RESPONSE IN OPPOSITION '1'0
MOTION FOR hV CAMERA WVTEW

REED TAYLOR'S MOTION TO COMPEL
PRODUCTION OF DOCUMENTS - I

AFFIDAVIT OF MICHAEL S. BISSEL
TAYLOR'S MOTION TO DISALLOW
ATTORNEYS' FEES AND COSTS
.\

TIFF REED J.
FOR

..I 8 .$)

Plaintiff, Reed J. 'Taylor {""Reed Taylor"), submits this Motion to Compel rhe
Production of C)ocumenls Provided to Expert Wibesses of AIA Serviceu, AHA Insurance,
GropUSA, and John Taylor.

l, BRIEF TA
SIn opposition to Reed 'Faylor" M&ion to Disqualifyjl, AIA Services, ALA

Insurance and John Taylor submitled. the dtidavits of expert witnesses Thomas D.
Morgan and John A. Strait. Cornlie Taylor; James Deck and Corrirte Beck filed a Joiiider
horporating by referet~cethe expert witness affidavits. See Connie Taylor, Ja~nesBeck
and Corrinc Reclc's Joinder. The Aaidavits of ?bornas Wrgan and John Strait refer to
doctu11enis reviewed by each in renciel.ing their expert opinions. Some of the riocunlents

revicwcd by each are claitncd to bc subject to privilege.

A list of the privileged

docrunents rr:viewed by Morgm is set forth at pages 4-5 of his affidavit. A list of the
privileged documents r c v i e ~ ~ eby
d Strait is set forth at pages 8-9 of his afidavit.
Atracllcd as Exhibit I to the Supplemcntd Affidavit of Roderick Bond is a combined list
of the some of the priviieged documents reviewetl by each ("'priviie~ddoc;uments"j.
Et is essential to note that Morgan and Strait relied upon the privilegd documents

in re~deringtheir rcspcctive opinions. Spccificaly, on page 21 of his affidavit, Strait

en~phasizevthat his opinion is btised upon privileged documents and cnridiclly points out
that Reed 'l'aylor's expert witness, Peter Jarvis, "simply doesn't have relevant

[privilcgcd] irtformation from tv12ich to opine."

See Straight Aff.

This slateinent

perfectly frames the fss~ieon this motion to compel: Whether disclosure to a testifying
expert of privileged materials in connection with his testimony constitutes a waiver of the

atlorttey-client and work product privilege as to the material disclosed such that the
opposing party is entitled to discovery? As discussed below, the answer is yes.

AFFIDAVIT OF MICHAEL S. BISSELL IN SUPPORT OF PLAINTIFF REED J
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-;se,

Far this motion

$0

compel, it is also to bc materially noted that alrc privileged

doc~ments- before being disclosed to defendan&kxpel.ts - were the subject of Reed
Taylor's Req~iestsfor Production of Docrunenis. Sge Affidavihf Ruderick Bond;
Supplcmcn~alAmdavit of' Rodcrick Bond. The Defen&dnts have rehsed to provide the
documents claiming ~~rivilege,See AfGdavit of RocIerick Bond; Supplerneiltai A-fTjdavit
of Roderick Bond.
'1%~next business day aAer being served wit11 the Affidavits of ?'hornas Mofgetr
and folm Strait, the attorney for Reed 'Taylor again requested of the defendank that the

doculr~entsprovided to the expert witnesses. Set Affidavit of Roderick: Bond, EX.E. 'i'he
attorneys for the dcfendanh were provicted with written notice and an opportunity

to

produce the documearls. Iri Thc Defendants contitl~teta refuse production and so stated
in an ernail dated October 14, 2008, from John Ashby to Roderick Rortd. See Affidavit

of Roderick Bond, Ex. E. No other respoases were provided by any of the Defendants.
Reed Taylor riow moves the court to enter an order compelling defendants to
produce the docuntents identifiect in Exhibit I to the Supplemental Affidavit of Roderick

C. Bond.

A,

Rsed Tlpgrlos A t t e ~ ~ p t cTo
d Rasohe This Maate%Witlhov~tCorjlrt Actioa,
However, Tbe Defcadnatis Hit~kjrr, Refused To Produce Discovergble
Documents,

T.R.C.P. 37(a)f2j governs tiiis rotio ion lo compef, and the rule provides as 1ollo.t~~
in pertinent part:

(2) Motion. ... [Iff a party, in Iespotlse to a request for inspection submitted
under Rule 34, fails to rcsportd that inspection will he permitted as requested or
fails to permit inspection as rey~tested,the discovering party may move for an
order corl~pcllir~g
... inspection in accordance wit11 the request. T11c motion must
REF,D TAYLOR'S MOTION TO COMPDI.
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include a cerlification &fit the movant has in good kith conferred or atternpled lo
coztfcr with the party not ~nakingthe disclosure in an effort to secure tlie
disclosum without court action.
I.K.C.P. 37(a)(2),
Here, Reed Taylor, though his counsel, has complied with I.R.C,P. 37(a)(2).
Recd 'faylor in good faith attempbed to resolve fithis ctisputc Mri%out court action, but due
to the de.fendmts~e%saito produce relevmt documents this molio~nis required,
8.

The Defend;tnts3 Dbclosura To A Testifying Expert Oft Privileged Documeatst
Corzstifotes A Waiver Of The Atforney-Client- PriviIegc And Work Product
Pri-vifegie, Wfsich Requires The Produckion Of All Sech Documents 'I'o Reed
Tilylar,
A party waives privilege when he or she discloses privileged documents to a

testifyii~gexpert witness. U.S. F i d e f i ~d Czrar. Go. v. Brcl$petro Oil Servs. Co., 2002

W t 15652 (S.D.N.Y.), 53 Fed.R.Serv.3d 60 (S.D.N.Y. 2002); Jn re Pioneer fi-Bred

Intern., Inc., 238 F.3d 1370 (8Ih Cir. 2001); In Mil*~,relmunv. PItillips, 176 F.R.D. 194
@.Md. 1997); In Doe v. Lzacrne Counry, 2008 WI. 251 81 31 (M.l).Pa. 20012); CP Kdco
US. IFJC.
V. Pkr~rrntacizrGorp., 213 F.R.D. 176 (D.5~1.2003); ,State ex rel. Tmcy v.

Dandzimnd, 30 S. W.3d 83 1 (Mo. 2000); Gulf v. Jumison, 44 P.34 233 (Colo. 2002).
la1 US. Fidelity R Guar. Co. v. I3r.nspeti.o Oil Servs. Co., 2002 JVL 15652

(S.D,N.U.), 53 Fed.R.Serv.3d 60 (S.D.N.Y. 2002), the cox~rlordered all documents
produccd to d ~ eplaintiffs hoiding that discIosi~reof rnatcrials to a teutifyir-ig expert in
cotmeetion with his testimony effects a waiver lo the same extent as any other disclosure.

The cotlrl stated:
Lt is well eshbljshcd that voluntary disclosi~reof a docu~nentto a party outside the
privilege waives thc ~ttomey-cficrrtprivilege regarding that document. (Multiple
citations omitled). This is because such disclos~trcundercuts tlre very reason for
the privilege, which is to protect the confidcrttiaiity of colnln~inicationsbetween
clients and their attorneys. (Multiple citations omitted).

REED 1'AYI,OR'S IvlO'SlON TO GOMPEI.
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U S . FideiiD & Gaclr. Ca.* 2002 WI 15552

ili

5. T~ICcourt cited the Advisory

Cummittec's Notes to the 1993 Amendments to Rule 26 of the Pede~.;r.atRates of Civil
Procedure and quoted:
'[Ljitiga~~ts
should no longcr be able to argue thnt materials filrnished to their
expert!: to be .used in forming their opinions-whet11er or not uttimately relied on by
the expett-are privileged or otlicrwise protected from disclosure.'

in re Yioncer FJi-Bred

Itlketn.,

Inc., 238 F.3d 1370 (8"' Cir. ZOOl), the Eighth

Circu~tCourt of Appeals held tlzat "kndamental Fdirness" reqrzires any disclosure Lo a
testifying expert of privileged or protected material in conr~ectiortwitfl his testimony
;anstit~tt-esa waiver of thc tlttorncy-cfietlt and work prodirct privilege to the same extcnt
as with any ather disclosure. 'I'ltc court also referred to tile 1993 Amcndmet~tsto R u b 26

ufihe Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and stated:
rTl11e 1993 amendments to Rule 26 ofrhe Federal Rules of Civil Procedure make
clear that documents and information diseloscd to a testifying expert in
collncction with his testimony are discoverable by the opposing party, whether or
not the expert relies on the documents and informatior1 in preparing his repox-t.
Rule 26(rt)(Z) requires that the testifying expert's report "co~itain a complete
statement oF all opinions to be expressed and the basis and reasons ificrefor; the
data or other idormation considered by the witr~cssin Forming tttc opinions;...."
7'hc accompanying Advisory CommiEee Note expIicitly states thnt "[tjhe report is
to disclose tlie data and other infomation considerect by the expert.... Given this
obligtxtion or disclosure, litigants should no longer be able to argue that materials
f'ur~lishedto their experts to be used in forming their opi-c~ions-whedie~
or not
udtimately relied upon by t I ~ cexpert-are privileged 01 otherwise protected from
disctosure when such persons iure testifying or being deposed." (Citation
omitted). &
I' rcvisccl r g t c g ~ n ~ c tc lc~~c~~ ~ t i rthat
l t&ttdamc~t&fJ~~it~~csq
l
ctcg.tircs c&&ttse,
o f i d l 1i2frtnn-&
it icstifi:irrr! c x p r t i 1-1 cotinectio~
w i l ! ? m g n v . ititicd-&uniIblc
to p E $ i u l : what i n t c ~ s j u g d ~ !
&cr vet1 by_peru~iftins? cotrnsc1
gwvidc e o ~ . e - y x L ~ & a ~ testifying
i
cxgert
n f s u c l ~ m i a to
l the omgin-.
--atld then ta den~tiiscotr@rv
In re Pioneer ffi-Bredintern., h c . , 238 F.3d at 13115 [emphasjs added).
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In Nusseln~unv PhillQs, f 76 F.R.D. 194 (D,Md. 1997), the court held that ivhcn

ajl attorney furnishes work product to an expert witness rctained for purpose d'provi
upinion Icstimony, then the opposing party is entitlccl to discover such communication.

'I'hc court slso disctssed the 1991 Amendments to Rule 26 OF the Federal lttiles of Civil
Procedure and the status of case law:
Bused largely on the Advismy Committee's Note to Rule 26(aj(2)(R), a number of
courts and commentators have accordingly concluded U=t if an attorney provides
work product to an expert who consiclers it iir fornling opinions whkh he or she
will be tesiibng to at trial, this information is no longer privileged add nrust be
disclosed. See, c.g., 3 Charles A. Wright, Arthur R. Mille~,& Richard I..
Marcus, Federal Pmcticc and 13rocedur@§ 2016.2, at 250 (1994) ("At Iectst with
respect to experts who testify at trial, the disclosure requirement oEKuIe 2(r(a)(2),
adopted in 7993, was intendcd to predetermine farther discussion and mandate
disclosure despite ftlae work product] privilege."). ..("'13oth the [I 993
Amenclments to the 17ederal Rules) and tire Advisory Corilmittee Notes inciicatc
that materials supplied to an cxpert are st~bjjectto discovery.").
Mzissotmcx~,176 F.1i.D. 194 at 197-198. 1x1 Doe v. Ltrzeme Cotmty, 2008 WL 25 111 13 1

[W.D.Pa. 200Rj, the corlri held that work-product priviicgc protection is waived whcri an
attorney discloses privileged documents tu an expert witness that considers, relics upoil
and citcs the docun~entsin writing an expel* repurt. 'fke priviieged documents are
rccyuired to be produccd to the opposing party.
In CP Kefco US. JRC.

V.

Phutmacin Corp.,' 213 F.1X.D. 1'46 (D.DcI. 20031, the

district court also held that a party is required to prociuce dncurnctlts protected by tbe
attorney-client privilcge whcn it provides the doc~unentsto an expert witness that offers.
In the context of an assertion of privilege, the inviolability of lhat rule is of
fimdnmental in-rportaace. It wotrld be martifestly unfair to allotv a party to ~ i s tfx
c
privilege to.&icld information which it ltncl r l e l i b e r ~ . ~ ~ g ~ ~ j y s
as Pharmacia iiicl In this insta~lccwhen it i~sedthc afteaecilv nriviiercd documents
to arm ifs expert for testimony. ( See Fed.E.Giv.P. 26(b)f4)(a) and Advisory
Commitlee note.) 1.Ience.ffie tndsm that a orlvilegc cannot he uscd as bottr a
$Geld and a sword. See United States v. Rylander, 460 17.3.752, 758, 103 S.Ct.
1548, 75 L.Ed.24 521 (1 983). The non-Ieaat cqtlivafettt. of that truism is eaually
to O i hpain[:
~
"You cstr'"txave it bur11 wav&xav&g CIIOS~IT toc~$e:
the infntn~iitirt~

REED TAYLOR'S MOTION TO COMPEL
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c t fli:nsI&
-i

&L M K Ccle~
~CIIQ!?~
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!g&&Im-

irtformalion from disciasure is, and rernains, waived.

tP Melco US, Irac., 213 F.R.D. I76 at 179 (cfnpharjis arlded).
In S t ~ x t ecx rcf. Trucy Y. anduraurd, 30 S.W.Jd 831 (Mo. 2000), the court held
that a party waives the attorney-client privilege as to clocumcnts pravidcd to an expert
witness tvl~otestifies and the opposirtg party is entitled to the prodt~ctionof ufl of the
materials provided lo the expert.

Rttle 56.01(b)[4) wissouri denomination of Rule 26(b)(4)] should hc read to
require production of all of the materials provided to the mpert. 'To hold
otherwise wotttd illlow the expert witness or t l x patty retaining the expert witness
to select which documen~qto produce after the expcrt has reviewed thc docurnen&
in preparation for tire expert's testimony.. .it is appropriate, at depositton or trial,
to cross-examine an expert witness as to illformaGon provided to the expert that
may contradict or wealc~nthe bases for his or her opinion regi~rdlessof whether
the cxpert relied upon or considered B c in formntion.

In Gnfl v. Jamison, 44 P.3ri 233 (Colo. 2002), the Colorado Supreme Court, en
banc, held 11.1at privileged matcririls lose their privileged status when disclosed to, and
consiciered by,

it

testifying expert.

In a scholarly and comprel~cnsivelyconsictercd

opinion, [he court stated:
A 1993 amendmet~tto Rule 26 of the Federal IPttles of Civil 12rocedure and a
parallel 1995 amenctment to its Colorado countev.rt mandate firif disclosure of'
"ihc materials considered by an expert witness, even if the materials include
The plain Iangxiage of the amended Rrtle, the
attorney work product
accompai~yingadvisory co~nmittee'snote, policy conqidexations, and the weight
of authority compel the conclusior~tftat privileged inateriais lose their privileged
status when disclosed to, and co~rsideredby, a testifying expert

Gull, 44 P.3d at 234. 'l'hc Cotorndo Supreme Court a190 specificnlly addrcsscd and
rejected the disclosing party's argument that an in cntncrra inspection of Lbe disclosed
cfocuinents was an available alternative:

REED 'FAYLOR'S IVlOTION TO COMPEI,
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Strong prt'biic policy co~~siderations
s~ippo&a consfr~tction o f Rule 26fa)(2)

of

w&-fcs

!kc

rules

c ~ ~ ~ & ~ ~ ~ c ~ w ~ ~ ~ c L I ~ c c J ~

resources.
--

A brigl~t-linerule preserves judicial ecolromy by obviating the need for a judge to
consicler whether counsel's commui~ications to retained experts cofttain work
product.

Gall, 44 P.3d at 239 (cmphasis added).
Lastly, becatlse of its succinct and instruclive nature, the guidance offered io
attorneys in Law m d Practicc of I~lsrlranccCoverage Litigation tj 24:39 (2008) is
mentioncd.

AAer stating that there "are tl~reeimportarit kaidelincs" for disclosing

ducumedlrs to an expert witness, the first guideline is statcrt:
First, counsel must consider wlteth~rthe doct~meutto be provided is subjcct fa
any privilege because providing tho doc~mentto thc expert will constitz~tea
waiver of that privilege. Certainly, an exper"tshoufd not be provided with any of:
CO~IIIEL'I'S nri~ilcggd~~ft.ttnutlit.at~~yit1~
till: c!ittrt,ar ~
~
(
~
are
taking
the
cxtrcrnelv
u
n
u
w
a
s
l
~
t
g
of
waiving
such
privileges,
-

I.aw and Practice of Insurance Coverage Litigation 5 2439 (2008) (crnphasis added).
ikcre, the John Taylor, AIA Services, AIA Tnsurance, and Crop USA all srrbmitted
expert reports by and tlxough their attoixeys. Connie 'f'i~ylor,Jaines Beck ;tad Carrine
Beck filed a J ~ i n d e opposing
r
disquali5cation. Thcy have alf waived their attortiey-client

privilege and dl docilments mast be produced thcit have been provided to or relied upon
by the experts, including, all notes and related documetlts.

REED TAY I,OK'S tviO'I~ION-1.0 COMPEL
PRODUCTION OF DOCUMENTS - 8
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$6

~

~

~

~

Far the reasons s&~ulakdabove, the Court shouId gatat Reed Taytor's N o ~ o nto
Compel Productiol~uf Daeunxerzts Pravided lo Experl Witnesses J b h StraigIrt and

' h m a Morgm. The D d e b n t s shotxld be ordered to produce all docamefi% provided

to Thomas Morgm and Job S.trai&t and their nates, in parlicdar, all documents listed in

For the same reasons set fb& above, the Motion for In C m r a &view shouid be
denied because the fbefencfanlshave wnived any privilege,

DATED. 'This 35'" d ~ of
y October, 2008.
SMTTH, C A W O N & BOND PLLC
CAMPBELL, BISSELL & KIRBYa,I,C

Ned A. Camon
Micl~aeiS . Bissell
Atlomeys for PIdnfiEReed J. Taylor
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R I C T COURT

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF
STATE OP l'DAH[O, IN AM)

JUDIC'flALDISTRICT OF THE
OF NIEZ PERCE

REED I.TAYLOR, a singIe person,
CASE NO. CV07-00208

Plaintiff,

OPINION AND ORDER ON
PLAINTIFF'S MOTION TO
COMPEL DOCUMENTS
PllOVTDER TO DEFENDANTS'
'EXPERTS RELATIVE TO
PLAINTIFF'S MOTION TO

AIA SERVICES COWORATION, an Idaho

corporation; AIA INSURANCE, INC., an
Idaho corporation; 8,JOHN TAYLOR and
CONNXE TAYLOR, individually and the
community property comprised thereof,
B W FREEMAN, a single person; and
JOLEE DUCLOS, a single person; CROP
USA INSURANCE AGENCY, MC.,an
Idaho corporation; and JAMES BECK and
CORRINE BECK, individually and in the
community property comprised thereof;
Defendants.

DISQUALIFY

)

1

This matter is before the Court on Plaintiffs Motion to Compel filed October 15,2008.
On October 20,2008, the Court heard Plaintiff's Motion to Compel along with Plaintiffs Motion
to Disqualify and Defendants' Motions to Submit Documents in Cameru as the motions were all
related. The Court took the moxions under advisement, Shortly thereafter, the C O Ugranted
~

AFFIDAVIT OF MICHAEL
TAYLOR'S MOTION TO DI
ATTORNEYS' FEES AND C

OF PLAINTIFF REED J.
' REUEST FOR

NO. 9443

P. Z/?

in part on the i~ camera docmenfs, Ihc:Coufi later entered itx Opinion and Order on Flakties

he Attorneys and Law Firms of Hawley Troxell Emis & EIawley LLP,
Clements Brown & McNichols, P.A.,and Quarles & Brady ILU. The Court now adcfxesses

PfhtifPs motion to compel disclosuse of the docmeats provided to the Court iul camem,
After careful review of the doc~meassought by Plah~-Efl
the Court Grids the documents

are w r k product subject to a~omeyIc1ientpfivilegt: and not discoverable. Therefore, Plain~ffs

Motion to Compel is hereby DENIED,

Dated ihir

7

day of January 2009.

rT"rl
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"KQ&

JAN. 9.

&*fj

2009 1:36FM

NO. 9443

<$ziRI@1 COURT

CERTmU
1hereby cerliq &at a a e copy of .the foregoing 0 D E R was:

dw4 /
U '
mailed, postage prepaid, by the undersiped at Lewision, Idaho, this %%aY

/hand
-

delivered via court basket, or

Jmxay, 2009, to:

Ksoderick C. Bond
Smith md ~ m 6 n
505 Eighth St
Lewiston, ID 8350 1

David R, Risley
Randall, Blake & Cox
PO Box 446
Lewislon, ID 83501

Mchael S.BisseII
7 S Wowsd St
Spokane, Wi?l 99201

James Gatziotirj
Charles E?. Harper
QuarIes and Brady LLP
500 W Madison St., Ste 3700
Chicago IL, 60661-251l.

Mchael. E, McNichols
Clements, Brown SG McNichols
POBox 1510
Lewiston, ID 53501

Charles Brown
PO Box 1225

David A. Gittins
PO Box 1191
Clarkston, WA 99403

Gary 5).Babbitt

Lewiston, TCI 83503.

.

D John Ashby
Wawfey, Txoxell Emis & Hawley LLP
PO Box 1617

To Plaintiff's Motion to Disilualify
3
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ELAM & BURKE ATTORNEYS A T LAW

East Pront Street, Suite 3 0 0
Post Office Box -9
Boise, Idha 83701
Telephone 208 343-5454

251

Fax 208 384-5844

IRS NO.82-045 1327

FOR PROFESSION= SERVICES RENDERED
Through December 29, 2008

RE: HTEH (I) Reed Taylor (C)
Claim: B086124
DATE

\

*

8/20/08 JDL

CLIENT/MATTER 07082-00013

HOURS
5.00 Review emails from Bissell with attached complaint forward copy to client and ALPS (.4).Telephone
conferences with client re new lawsuit,
McNichols complaint and appointed counsel, and
related issues (1.1). Review numerous email.
communications (.8). Review Complaint against
HTEH (1.5) Letter to consultant ( .1) Call
co-counsel re: McNichols Complaint (.1). Brief
review of McNichols Complaint (.3). Work on
issues to develop and understand ( . 7 ) .
1.10 Review and analyze email correspondence re filing
of complaint against HTEH (.I). Analyze issues
re complaint against HTEH and individual
attorneys ( .3) Review and analyze complaint
filed against HTEH and individual attorneys (.7)
1.30 Receive and review complaint by Reed Taylor
against Hawley Troxell and individual members of
that finn.
.20 Review case law and analyze its applicability to this
action.
1.80 Receive and review complaints against Hawley
Troxell and Mike McNichols; analyze defenses to
complaint against Hawley Troxell.
4.70 ~ e g i noutline for motion to dismiss for failure
to state a claim by identification of legal
theories in complaint, possible responses and
research needed and identification of documents
to support (2.3). Communications with
client/carrier (1.1). Telephone conversation
with attorney ( .1) Develop analysis and
strategy of sequencing underlying and attorney

.

k.

8/20/08 JNP

.

.

3.

8/20/08 LC1

q.

8/20/08 LC1

5.

8/20/08 LC1

la.

8/21/08 JDL

.

.

AFFIDAVIT OF
TAYLOR'S M
ATTORNEYS

SUPPORT OF PLAINTIFF REED J.
FENDANTS' REUEST FOR

8/21/08 LC1
8/21/08 LCI
8/21/08 LC1
8/21/08 LCZ
8/21/08 LC1
8/22/08 JDf,

Lawsuits, motions, stays, and other
considerations ( . 9 ) . Comunications with
attorney Bissell re: acceptance of service(.3).
2-10 Xesearch and analyze Idaho case law re elements of
cause of action (1.4). Research and analyze Idaho
case law re elments of claims ( .7).
1.00 Prepare maorandurn analyzing complaints,of Reed
Tyler vs. Hawley Troxell and defenses to causes
of action.
' 5 0 Review consolibted financial statments of corporations.
.70 Research case law re plaintiff's causes of action
for alleged civil conspiracy and aiding and
abetting client in comission of tortious acts.
.50 Analyze defenses to complaint, Rule 12 (b)(6)
motion, and possible motion for change of venue.
.50 Commence preparation of Rule 12 ( h f (6) motion ta
dismiss and supporting brief.
2.00 Research and continued preparation of brief in
support of 12 (b)(6) motion to dismiss.
.70 Call to client (.2f. Review email communications ( . 3 ) .
Discuss structure of motion to be filed in response
to complaint and consideration of Rule 11 sanctions
in motion ( . 2 ) .
5.60 Review and analyze Idaho Code provisions and
Tdaho case law re the Idaho Gonsumer Protection
Act, elements of individual claims and defenses
(3.1). Draft memorandum summarizing research and
analysis re claims for conversion, violations of
the Idaho Gonsumer Protection Act, and defenses
(2.5).

8/24/08 LC1
8/24/08 LC1
8/25/08 JDL

1.50 Work on brief in support of motion to dismiss.
.50 Research case law and impact on plaintiff's cause
of action for alleged aiding and abetting.
7.50 Research privity rule in Idaho in legal
malpxactice action; continue preparation of
motion to dismiss.
7.00 Continue briefing issue of whether privity is
required in legal malpractice action.
1.00 Research issue of alleged aiding and abetting
liability.
5.60 Review numerous emails between clients,
McNichols, Bissell and counsel ( . 9 ) . Review file
documents and complaint t.6). work on memorandum
in support of motion to dismiss (2.5) Calls to
attorney re: issues common to recently filed
complaints. ( . a ) . Call client re: various issues ( . 4 ) .
Review email from Bissell re: acceptance of
service of complaint and discovery (.2).
Consider method of accepting service of discovery
- discuss with client ( . 2 )
3.90 Research and analyze case law, treatises and law
review articles re conversion and claims for
conversion against attorneys by non clients
(2.6). Draft section of memorandum in support of
motion to dismiss re plaintiff's claims for
conversion and alleged violations of the Idaho
Consumer Protection Act (1.3)
3.50 Research issues of liability of attorneys under

.

.

8 / 2 5 / 0 8 LCI

.
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theories of civil conspiracy and aiding and
abetting.
4.60 Research and brief issues of conversion, alleged
breach of consumer protection act, civil
conspiracy, aiding and abetting, litigation
imunity, and Section 876 of the ~estatemenflSecond)
of Torts.
3.10 Develop analysis for purposes of motion to dismiss
and conference with clients (1.2). Commication
with attorney ( . 3 ) . Telephone call to carries's
representative (-6). Call Brad Geary - Lewiston
Tribune - on behalf of HTEII (.I). Commication with
client re: various issues (.I). Review
of email from client ( .8).
5.50 Continue to research and analyze case law,
treatises and Law review articles re conversion
and claims for conversion andlor violation of
consumer protection acts against attorneys by non
clients.
.20 Receive and review correspondence from clients.
.50 Analysis of specific allegations of complaint and
defenses to same.
2.40 Research and brief issue of litigation privilege
or immunity; briel: application of Taylor v . Maile
decision.
2.30 Work on brief re plaintiff's cause of action for
aiding and abetting and civil conspiracy.
4.20 Review documents prior to contact with
client f . 3 ) . Telephone conference with client:
re: upcoming motions and other xssues (.7).
Communication with attorney Bissell with
acceptance of service ( . 2 ) . Review additional
email communications ( . 9 ) . Communications with
client re issues (.2). ~eviewemail comunications
from client (.9). ~eviewand forward Bissell
email to client ( .l). Develop issue list for
meeting with clients (.4). Review CV of
poteritial consultant ( . 2 ) . Telephone conference
with attorney re: common considerationsfissues
f.3).

4.60 Continue to research and analyze case law,
treatises and law review articles re conversion
and claims for conversion and/or violation of
consumer protection acts against attorneys by non
clients (3.0). Further develop legal arguments
re plaintiff's claims for conversion and
violations of the Idaho Consumer Protection Act

633'4,

35.
36

8/27/08 Lcr
8/27/08 LCI
8/27/08 LC]:
8/28/08 J D L

(1.6).

'50 Review relevant documents pertaining to complaint.
.20 Assist with preparation of section of brief in
support of motion to dismiss which deals with
alleged conversion of personal property.
.30 Receive and review client's comments regarding
factual allegations of complaint.
1.30 Provide input into memorandum to be filed against
complaint (.3). Complete list of meeting topics
for discussion ( . 3 ) . Communication with client
re: items for discussion (.3). Review prior
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trial court decision in preparation for meeting
with client ( . 4 ) .
9'60 Further develop factual and legal. arguments in
support o f dismissal of plaintiff's claims for
conversion and the Idaho Conskzmer Protection Act
3
Research and analyze case law from Idaho
and surrounding jurisdictions re elments of
conversion and conversion of money (2.4).
Further develop mmormdum in support of motion
to dismiss to include additional legal and
factual arguments addsessing plaintiff's
conversion and Idaho Consumer Protection Act
claims (3.9). Review local rules for the second
judicial district to verify whether there is a
page limitation for briefs in support of motions
(.21.

8/28/08 LCI
8/29/08 JDL

€*/79/08JNP

8/31/08 LCL

8/31/08 LC1
9/02/08 JNP

10.50 Continue preparation of brief in support of Rule
10 (b)(6) motion to dismiss.
6.40 Numerous telephone calls and anail eomunications
to/from client and carrier re: recent filings and
retaining consultant (11.3). Review draft memorandum
in support of motion to dismiss - recommendations for
change/additions (1.5). Telephone calls to
prospective consultants (.3). Initial review of
motions filed in underlying matter (2.9). Provide
draft memorandum in support of motion to dismiss
to clients (.I). Review and forward copy of
written discovery from plaintiff to client
representative and carrier. { . 3 ) .
1.80 Further develop memorandum in support of motion
to dismiss re plaintiff's claims for conversion
and alleged violations of the Idaho Consumer
Protection Act (1.5). Telephone conferences with
Nez Perce County Clerk's Office re page
limitations for filings ( . 2 ) .
1.50 Revise, edit and proof first &aft of brief.
- 4 0 Make changes to brief.
.30 Receive and review plaintiff's initial discovery
requests.
.10 Receive and review plaintiff's first set of
interrogatories and request for production
propounded to defendant Hawley Troxell Ennis L
Hawley, LLP.
1.50 Analysis of documents relevant to complaint.
1.30 Research issue under Idaho re: application of
Uniform Commercial Code.
.70 Research issue re: remedies.
.80 Research issue re: alleged breach of fiduciary duty.
.30 Review general allegations of complaint against
Hawley Troxell and prepare schedule of factual
allegations to discuss with defendant attorneys.
1.00 Research whether corporation's attorneys are
subject to claim of conversion for receipt of
attorney's fees from collateral subject to
security interest of creditor of corporation.
.70 Review complaint and prepare memorandum of issues
to discuss with Hawley Troxell attorneys.
.30 Analyze potential implication of article 9 of the
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0n,

9 / 0 2 / 0 8 LGZ

9 / 0 3 / 0 8 LCX
9 / 0 4 / 0 8 JDL

9/06/08 LCI
9 / 0 8 / 0 8 JDL

9 / 0 8 / 0 8 JNP

UCC re plaintiff's conversion claim (.2).
Telephone conference with Judge Brudie's law
clerk re local rules for page limitations (.I).
. 4 0 Analyze claim for conversion in lawsuit against
Wawley Troxell attorneys.
se of
3.00 Meeting with clients to dis
lawsuit.
1-30Revise brief to incorporate client's cements.20 Analyze and formulate a r w e n t s in support of
dismissing aiding and abetting cause of action.
1.20 Research issue of whether creditor of corporation
has direct cause of action for breach of
fiduciary duty against directors and attorneys
for alleged breach of fiduciary duty.
.10 Correspondence to clients re: issues.
.30 Review draft motion, memorandum and affidavit in support
of protective order against discovery from RTEK pending
ruling on 12 (b)(6) motion - forward copy to client ( .3 ) .
4 . 2 0 Review and analyze plaintiff's first Set of
discovery requests in preparation for drafting
motion for protective order to stay discovery
( 3 ) Research and analyze Idaho case law and
Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure re bases for
staying discovery pending the outcome of a
dispositive motion (1.4). Formulate a r m e n t s in
support of staying discovery pending the outcome
of defendants' motion to dismiss ( . 4 ) . Draft
motion for protective order ( .l). Draft
memorandum in support of motion for protective
order 11.5). Draft affidavit in support of
motion for protective order t . 5 ) .
.50 Work on revision of brief in support of Rule
12 (b)(6) motion to dismiss.
2.00 Research issue of whether creditor of corporation
has direct cause of action against corporate
officers, directors, and others.
2.00 Revise brief in support of motion to dismiss to
incorporate suggestions of Hawley Troxell
attorneys,
8.80 Complete brief in support of motion to dismiss
and circulate for comment.
3 . 9 0 Work on memorandum in support of motion to
dismiss (2.4). Telephone conference with client re:
modifications to memorandum in support of 12(b)(6) motion
and motions scheduled for hearing ( ' 2 ) . mail to
client with copy of memorandum in support of
12 (b)( 6 ) motion to dismiss 1.2). Review client s
suggestions re: 12 (b)(6) memo ( .4). Call
from counsel for Mr. McNichols ( . 5 ) . Final motion for protective
order re: discovery sought in ETEH lawsuit ( . 2 ) .
. 6 0 Research and analyze Idaho case
law and Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure re timing
of reply briefs and affidavits after a 12(b) (6)
motion is converted to a summary judgment motion
(.GI.

1.00 Receive and review comments on brief and revise
same to accommodate comments.
3 . 5 0 Receive and review emails from Hawley Troxell
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attorneys re 1 2 ( b ) (6) brief and incorporate
comments into brief.
2,50 Final memorandum in supporc of motion to dismiss,
motion for protective order, create proposed
order grating motion for protective order
correspondence to Clerk/Court with motions and
supporting documents (1.7). Review various email
cornmications from client ( . 4 ) .
Identify issues
for telephone conference with attorney Bissell
1
) Telephone conference with attorney
Bissell re: handling of pending motions ( . 3 ) .
' 2 0 Letter to Bissell re: timing of hearing on pending
motion to dismiss and agreement re: pending discovery ( . 2 ) .
3.80 Work on stipulation and order re: protective
order staying discovery f.3). Gall clients re:
cornmications with attorney Bissell
and answer in malpractice case ( .2). Review and
respond to email from attorney Bissell re: change
of hearing on motion to dismiss ( .1). Begin
draft of answer (2.9).Call from attorney
( 2 Forward copy of amended notice of hearing
and proposed stipulationlorder re: discovery to
attorney Bissell ( .1).
2.90 Gommwication with client re: attached draft
answer (.I). Analysis and development of
additional affinnative defenses for answer ( . 3 ) .
Telephone communication with client re:
inquiry from Quarles and Brady re: expert (.2).
Work on letter re: claims against BTEH (2.3).
.50 Suggest revisions and additions to answer to
complaint.
.20 Review civil conspiracy research.
1.90 Work on answer to complaint (1.2). Call client
re: telephone conference to address issues for
answer ( .3). Create newest edition of answer

-

9 / 1 0 / 0 8 JDL

9/16/08 JDL

9/17/08 JDL

9/18/08 LC1
9/23/08 JDL

t.4).

9/23/08 LC1
9/24/38 JDL

.I0 Review Hawley Troxell suggestions re answer.
2.80 Review memos (.7). Final and forward draft
answer to client (.3).Telephone conference with
attorney re: common issues on motion to
disqualify, motion to dismiss, and other related
issues ( . 5 ) . Review comunications from cfients
re: answer, integrate recommended
changes/additions and create another edition of
answer for client review and comment. ( . % I .
Cornmication with client re: issues common with
McNichols and updated version of answer ( . a ) .
Telephone call from client ( . I ) .
.50 Review proposed answer to complaint and suggest
revisions to same.
- 5 0 Receive and review additional comments and
proposed changes to answer from clients ( . 2 ) .
Prepare changes to answer ( .3).
.20 Review and analyze new Idaho Supreme Court case
(J-U-B v. Lopez) regarding requirements for legal
malp~acticeclaim under Idaho law.
2.20 Review and outline proposed response to plaintiff
Reed Taylor's brief in opposition to Rule
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10/05/08 LC1
10/06/08 LGI
10/07/08 JDL
10/07/08 LC1
10/08/08 JI)&

10/08/08 LC1
10/09108 JDL

12 (b)(6) motion to dismiss.
1.30 Prepare memoranda regarding arguments advanced
by plaintiff in opposition to.motion to dismiss
and proposed response to siune.
2.10 Review response to 12 (b)(6) - outline issues in
response to 12(b)(S) motion to facilitate reply
brief (2.1).
.70 Zlnalyze plaintiff's brief in opposition to motion
to dismiss and how to respond to same.
2.00 Research and prepare reply brief in support of
motion to dismiss.
2.50 Con~inuedpreparation of reply brief.
9.50 Continued preparation of reply brief.
1.10 Work on reply brief.
6.60 Continued preparation of reply brief.
2.90 Work on reply brief (1.9). Review memorandm in
opposition to motion to disqualify to insure
consistency with 12(b)(6) motion and for
background information that may be helpful in
arguing 12 [b)(6) motion ( .7). Call from attorney
re: substance of 12(b)(6) motion, opposition and
reply; thoughts re, standing/status to argue motion
to disqualify on behalf of clients; and related issues (.3)
3.90 Receive comments regarding reply brief and revise
same.
.50 Draft additional revisions to reply brief.
5.00 Work on hearing notes for motion to dismiss ( 3 . 9 ) . Call from attorney re: reply issues ( . 2 ) .
Email communication with client (.3). Call to/from
attorney ( . 3 )
Calls to/from carrier ( .3)
3.80 Receive and review comments re brief from Hawley
Troxell and revise brief to incorporate comments.
4.10 Work on hearing notes for motion to dismiss (3.8).
Communication with attorney re: reply to
response to motion to dismiss ( . 2 ) . Final and
file/serve reply brief ( .l)
1.70 Telephone conference with client regarding
comments concerning 12 (b)(61 reply brief (0.2);
revise brief to accommodate such comments (0.5);
receive additional comments from client (0.3);
check quotation from treatise on corporate
dividends and redemptions (0.2);revise brief per
client's comments and suggestions (0.4);
correspondence to Hawley Troxell attorneys re new
revisions (0.1)
5.50 Communications with client (.2). Work on
hearing issues (5.2). Call from attorney
re: reply and issues for hearing (.I).
.10 Assist in preparation of oral argument on motion
to dismiss.
2.80 Work on hearing outline re: motion to dismiss (2.8).
5.90 Work on hearing issues for 12(b)(6) motion (1.71.
Email from and response to Eissell's office re:
availability for hearing on motion to mend
complaint ( .I) Travel to Lewiston (3.3) Review
new filings from attorney Bond ( .4) Meeting with
client ( . 4 )
7.20 Prepare for hearing (1.91 Meeting with client

.

10/09/08 LC1
10/10/08 JDL

.

.

10/13/08 JDL

10/14/08 JDL
10/15/08 JDL

10/16/08 JDL

.

.

.
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..4 7

10/17/08 LGZ

105. 10/20/08 J D L

1o-k' 10/21/08 JDL

to%. lo/zz/os JDL
10/23/08 JDL

kto.

10/27/08 LC1
10/28/08 L C 1
10/29/08 JDL

113'

l.0/29/08 LCI

' 7 )
Court appearance for hearing (1.2). ~eview
proposed amended complaint in malpractice case ( . 8 ) .
Travel to Boise (2.6),
2.50 Review e m i l from attorney ( .I). m i l to
client and ALPS with copy of proposed amended
complaint: and obsemations from initial review
(
3 bail to attorney with copy of proposed
amended complaint (,I). ~ e g i ndetailed review of
proposed mended complaint (1.5). Analysis of
timing, procedural and substantive reasons to
oppose the motion to amend complaint and seek
derivative relief l.5).
1.10 Receive and review plaintiff Reed Taylor's motion
to amend complaint and memorandum of law,
together with proposed amended complaint.
.5O Analysis of proposed amended complaint and
defenses to motion to amend.
1.40 Comunications with client and carrier(.2).
Analysis of issues under derivative
claim statute, and other defenses applicable to
derivative claims stated in proposed amended
complaint (1.2).
1.00 Analyze plaintiff's arguments in support of
motion to amend complaint; formulate arguments in
opposition to motion to amend complaint re
standing, violation of stay in underlying action,
and noncompliance with Idaho Code provisions re
derivative actions (.5). Research and analyze
Idaho case law re elements of judicial estoppel
3
Draft memorandum outlining elements for
application of doctrine'of judicial estoppel
(.2t.
. 9 0 Review communication from client (.I). Review
memo re: judicial estoppel and/or judicial
admissions as defenses to amended complaint ( . 3 ) .
Telephone conference with client ( . 5 ) .
1.10 Telephone conference with attorney for Mr. McNichols
re: issues with proposed amended complaint (.3).
Review derivative action statutes f . 8 ) .
1.30 Analysis of issues which should be raised in
opposition to motion to amend complaint and
consideration of timing of same (.8).
Communication with client representative re:
opposing motion to amend (.2). Review newly
filed motion and supporting documents in
underlying case f.3).
.90 Review and analyze plaintiff Reed Taylor's motion
and memorandum of law to amend complaint.
1.60 Research regarding conditions precedent for
filing shareholder derivative action.
1.30 Outline issues for opposition to motion to amend
complaint.
.50 Analysis of facts and contentions in opposition
to plaintiff's motion for leave to amend
complaint.
1.20 Research issue of requirement that plaintiff in
shareholder derivative action must plead and
prove irreparable injury to corporation, as
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V8

1 1 / 0 3 / 0 8 LC1
1 1 / 0 4 / 0 8 JDL

11/04/08 LC1
1 1 / 0 5 / 0 8 JDL

1 1 / 2 5 / 0 8 JDL
1 1 / 2 6 / 0 8 JDL
1 2 / 0 2 / 0 8 JDL
1 2 / 0 3 / 0 8 JDL

1 2 / 0 4 / 0 8 JDL

opposed to purely personal dmages allegedly
sustained by plaintiff shareholder or creditor of
corporation.
5 . 7 0 Research and prepare brief in opposition to
plaintiff's motion to amend complaint
.80 Work on opposition to motion to file mended complaint
(.4). Review draft opposition to motion to file
amended complaint in the McNichols matter t . 4 ) .
6 . 6 0 Research and prepare brief in opposition to
motion to mend complaint.
2 . 4 0 Work on draft brief opposing motion to mend
complaint forward draft to client for comments
and recommendations.
3.40 Prepare section of brief dealing with shareholder
derivative action.
- 5 0 Review draft of brief and revise same.
3 . 0 0 Work on memorandum in opposition to motion to
amend. ( . 9 ) . Communication with client re:
possible changes to memorandum ( . 2 1 . Review
modifications recommended by client ( . 5 ) . Call
client re: memo (.I). Return call to
attorney ( - 2 ) . Final, file and serve
opposition memorandm (1.1).
. 3 0 Research case law re standing o f minority
shareholders to bring a direct or derivative
claim against corporate counse1 for malpractice,
fraud, and breach of fiduciary duty.
. 7 0 Work on hearing notes for motion to amend
complaint.
.30 Consider focus of hearing on motion to mend
complaint.
1 . 5 0 Review reply to opposition to motion to amend and
attached cases.
6 . 1 0 Work on oral argument responses to arguments and
authorities raised in reply brief ( 5 . 8 ) . Review
emails from client representatives addressing
issues raised in reply ( , 3 ) .
. 7 0 Receive and review plaintiff's reply to
defendants' memorandm in opposition to motion to
amend complaint.
1 . 4 0 Review cases and authorities cited by plaintiff
in support of motion to amend.
. 9 0 Research Idaho statutes; rules of court and cases
re shareholder derivative actions.
1 . 2 0 Assist in preparation for hearing on motion to
amend complaint.
1 . 8 0 Research and prepare memorandum re issue of
whether plaintiff Reed Taylor is fairly qualified
to represent interests of shareholders in
derivative action.
1 . 9 0 Final preparation for hearing on motion to amend
complaint ( 1 . 0 ) Meeting with client pre-hearing discussion of arguments available
( . 9 ) Participate in hearing on motion f . 8 ) .

-

PROFESSXOMAL FEES

43,912.50
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MICHAEL S. BISSELL, 1SB No. 5762
CAMPBELL, BISSELL & KIRBY PLLC
A.l-tsmeysfor Appellant Reed Taylor
7 South Howard Street, Suite 4 16
Spokane, WA 99201
Tel: (509) 455-7100
Fax: (509) 455-71 11

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF TEE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF NEZ PERCE
REED J. TAYLOR, an individual, who is
bringing this action on behalf of himself and
on bebalt of the creditors andor shareholders
of AIA Services Corporation and AIA
Insurance, Inc.;

Case No.: CV-08-01765

NOTICE OF APPEAL

Appellant,

GARY D. BABBITT, an individual; D. JOI34
ASI-IBY, an individual; PATRICK V.
COLLINS, an individual; RICHARD A.
RILEY, an individual; HAWLEY TROXELL
ENNIS & MAWLEY LLP, an Idaho limited
liability partnership; JANE DOES I-X,
unknown individuals;
Respondents.
TO:

THE ABOVE NAMED RESPONDENTS, GARY D. BABBITT, D JOHN
ASHBY, PATRICK V. COLLINS, RICHARD A. RILEY, AND
HAWLEY TROXELL ENNIS & HAWLEY LLP. AND THE PARTIES'
ATTORNEY JAMES D. LARUE, ELAM & BURKE, P.A., P.O. BOX
1539, BOISE, ID 83704; AND

TO:

THE CLERK OF THE ABOVE-ENTITLED COURT.

NOTICE OF APPEAL - 1

NOTICE IS HEWBY GIVEN THAT:
1

The above n m e d Appellant Reed J. Taylor appeals against the above-

named Respondents Itt the Idaho Supreme Court from the final Order g r w i n g
Defendantswotion to Dismiss and denying Plaintfrs Motion to Amend Cornplaint
entered in the above entitled action on the 23rdday of December. 2008, the Honorable
Jeff M. Brudie presiding.
2,

Appellant has a right to appeal to the Idaho Supreme Court, and the

JudgmcntslOrders described in paragraph 1 above are appealable Orders under and
pursuant to Rules 4 and 1l(a)(l), I.A.R.
.2

A preliminary statement of issues on appeal, which the Appellant intends

to assert in this appeal are as follows (several of which are issues of first impression);
provided, the following list of issues is not exhaustive and Respondents should expect
others:
a. Did plaintiff state causes of action against attorneys for fraud,
breaches of fiduciary duties, conversion, excessive compensation,
and/or tortious interference and/or causes of actions pertaining to
aiding and abetting and/or conspiracy to assist others in the
commission of any of any of the foregoing causes of action.
b. Does the Litigation Privilege exist in Idaho and, if so, does it bar
claims against attorneys for fraud, constructive fi-aud, breaches of
fiduciary duties, conversion, excessive compensation, and tortious
interference and/or causes of action pertaining to aiding and
abetting and/or conspiracy to assist others in the commission of
any of the foregoing causes of action?
c. Does a plaintiff state a cause of action against an attorney for
conversion and other causes of action by alleging that the attorney
accepted payment for attorney's fees and costs from funds the
attorney knew or should have known were funds in which the
plaintiff held a valid and perfected security interest?

NOTICE OF APPEAL - 2

d. Does a stock pledgee, who is also a secured creditor of the
revenues and all of the stock of the corporation, have standing to
pursue direct causes of actions against parties ibr cliiims owned by
the corporation? Does the same plaintiff have stallding to pursue
derivative causes of action on behalf of the cofporation?
e. Does a creditor of an insolvent corporation, who is also a secured
creditor of the revenues of the corporation, have standing to assert
direct causes of action against padies for claims owned by the
corporation? Does the same plaintiff have standing to pursue
derivative causes of actions on behalf of the corporation?

f. Are allegations that an aaarney has exceeded hislber scope of
represenbtion sufficient to defeat a motion to dismiss for failure to
state a claim based upon the Litigation Privilege?
g. Can an attorney represent corporate clients with diverging interests
when the representation was approved by persons with
directorfofficer conflicts of interest?
h. Does Idaho's Consumer Protect Act bar a person from asserting
claims against an attorney, when the plaintiff does not have privity
of contract with the attorney, for violations of Idaho's Consumer
Protection Act?
i. In considering a motion to dismiss under I.R.C.P. 12(b)(6), is it
permissible for the district court to take judicial notice of an
entirely different case in toto andlor to consider documents which
are not in the record for that case?

j.

Can a stock pledgee of all of the stock and revenues of a pledged
corporation assert direct and/or derivative causes of actions for
malpractice against an attorney?

k. Can a secured creditor, who is also the most significant creditor of
an insolvent corporation, assert direct and/or derivative claims for
malpractice against an attorney?
1. Can the district court judge, who is the same judge for two related
actions, consider privileged documents in granting a motion to
dismiss under IRCP 12(b)(6) without requiring production of the
documents to the other party?
m. If a party provides privileged documents to an expert and the
expert provides testimony through an affidavit relying on the
privileged documents for the experts testimony, has the attorneyNOTICE OF APPEAL - 3

<j12

client privilege been waived and must the documents be produced
to the opposing party upon a motion to compel?
n. If Idaho adopts the Litigation Privilege deknse f i r an attorney, can
the defense be asserted to dismiss an action pursuant to I.R.G.P.
12(b)(Ci) for actions taken by the aaorney which the attorney
asserts were under the scope of representation, when such scope of
representation was purportedly agreed to by representatives from
the corporation client, when the attorney knows or should have
known that: (I) the representatives of the corporation have
conflicts of interest; (2) the board of directors of the corporation
client have conflicts of interest; (3) the corporation has not held an
annual shareholder meeting in years; (4) the purported scope of
representation was not in the best interests of at least two
corporation clients with diverging interests; and (5) the scope of
representation was not in the best interests of each of the attorney's
three different clients.
o. Does an attorney owe a non-client any fiduciary duties, special
duties, andor third-party beneficiary oblagations when the attorney
knows or should have known (including, without limitation): (1)
that all of the shares and revenues of the corporation client the
attorney is purportedly representing are pledged as collateral to the
non-client and another client is in default of the obligations which
trigger remedies pertaining to such security interests; (2) the nonclient has voted the shares appointing himself as the sole officer
and director of the corporation client, the corporation client is
being wrongfully managed by persons breaching fiduciary duties
and not safeguarding assets; (3) the assets and funds are
insufficient to pay; (4) that millions of dollars in assets and funds
may have been wrongfully transferred from the corporation client
by the very individuals directing the litigation (5) the parent
corporation of the pledged corporation is also being represented by
the attorney and the same non-client is owed millions of dollars by
the parent corporation client who is highly insolvent?
p. Does a plaintiff have a constitutional right (whether under the
United States Constitution or the State of Idaho's Constitution) to
obtain documents, prosecute causes of action and/or pursue causes
of action to protect andor recover assets which are subject to a
security interest and/or pursue causes of actions action attorneys
relating to any one or more the foregoing?
4.

There has not been an Order sealing all or any portion of this record.

5.

A reporter's transcript is not requested.

NOTICE OF APPEAL - 4

4.

Appellant requests the following docunents be included in the clerk's

record, in addition to those automatically included under Rule 28, I.A.R.:
a. This Notice of Appeal;

b. Defendants' Motion to Dismiss;
c. PlaintifPs Response in Opposition to Motion to Dismiss;
d. Dekndants' Reply in Support of Motion to Dismiss;
e. Plaintiffs Motion to Amend and Supplement Complaint (including
the attached proposed First Amended Complaint);
f. Defendants' Response in Opposition to PlaintifPs Motion to
Amend Complaint; and
g. Opinion and Order on Defendants' Motion to Dismiss and
Plaintiff's Motion to Amend Complaint.

7.

I certify that:
a. A copy of this notice of appeal has not been served on a reporter

because a transcript has not been requested.
b. The clerk of the district court has not been paid any fee for
preparing a transcript because a transcript has not been requested.
c. The estimated fee for preparation of the clerk's record has been
paid.
d. The appellate filing fee has been paid.

e. Service has been made upon all parties required to be served
pursuant to Rule 20.
DATED this 3othday of January, 2009.
CAMPBELL, BISSELL & KIRBY PLLC

By:
Attorneys for Appellate Reed Taylor
NOTICE OF APPEAL - 5

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I HEWBY CERTIFY that on the 30" day of January, 2009,I caused to be served
a true and correct copy of Appellant's Notice of Appeal to the following:

WAND DELIVERY
U.S. MAIL
OVERNIGHT MAIL
FAX TUNSMISSION
EMAIL (.pdf attachment)
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James D. LaRue
E l m & Burke, PA
P.O. Box 1539
Boise, ID 83704

James I>. LaRue ISB #I780
J e E e y A. Thornson ISB #3380
ELAM & BUHCEi, P.A.
25 1 E, Front Street, Suite 300
P.O. Box 1539
Boise, Idaho 83701
Telephone: (208) 343-5454
Facsimile: (208) 3 84-5844

Attorneys for Defendants

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF NEZ PERCE

REED J. TAYLOR, an individual;
Plaintiff/Appellant,

GARY D. BABBITT, an individual; D. JOHN
ASEIBY, an individual; PATRICK V.
COL,LINS, an individual; RICHARD A.
RILEY, an individual; HAWLEY TROXELL
ENNIS & HAWLEY LLP, an Idaho limited
liability partnership; JANE DOES I-X,
unknown individuals;

TO:

II

Case No. CV 08-01765
REQUEST FOR ADDITIONAL
TRANSCRIPT AND ADDITIONAL
CLERK'S RECORD

THE ABOVE NAMED APPELLANT AND THE PARTY'S ATTORNEY, THE
COURT REPORTER AND CLERK OF THE ABOVE ENTITLED COURT;
NOTICE IS HEREBY GIVEN, that Respondent in the above entitled proceeding hereby

requests, pursuant to Rule 19, I.A.R., the inclusion of the following materials in the clerk's

REQUEST FOR ADDITIONAL TRANSCRIPT AND ADDITIONAL CLERK'S RECORD - 1
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record and rqort-er7stranscr^ipt in addition to that required to be includecl by the T.A.R. and
identified in the notice of appeal:
1,

2.

Reporter" Transcript:
A.

Transcript of hearing on Motion to Dismiss held on October 16,2008; and

B.

Transcript of bearing on Motion to Amend held on December 4,2008.

Clerk's Record:
A.

Memorandum in Support of Motion to Dismiss, filed September 10,2008; and

B.

Opinion and Order on Defendants' Motion to Dismiss and Plaintiffs Motion to
Amend Complaint, filed December 23, 2008, in the case of Reed J. Taylor v.
Michael E. MeNichols, et al.,Nez Perce County Case No. GV-08-0 1763.

'3.

I certify that a copy of this request for additional reporter's transcript has been served on

each court reporter of whom a transcript is requested as named below at the addresses set out
below and that the estimated number of additional pages being requested is 100.
Linda Carlton
Court Reporter to Judge Brudie
425 Warner
Lewiston, ID 83501
4.

I further certify that a copy of this request for additional record has been served upon the

Clerk of the District Court and upon all parties required to be served pursuant to Rule 20, I.A.R.

REQUEST FOR ADDITIONAL TRANSCRlPT AND ADDITIONAL CLERK'S RECORD - 2

DATED this

12-day of February, 2009.
ELAM & BURKE?, P.A.

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

/z

I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the
day of February, 2009, I caused a true and
correct copy of the above and foregoing instrument to be served upon the following in the
manner indicated below:
Michael S. Bissell
CMBELL BISSELL& KIRBY, PLLC
7 South Howard Street, Suite 41 6
Spokane, WA 99201

/U.S.
Mail
Hand Delivery
Federal Express
Facsimile Transmission
(509) 455-71 11

Linda Carlton
Court Reporter to Judge Brudie
425 Wamer
Lewiston, ID 83501

/U.S.
Mail
Hand Delivery
Federal Express
Facsimile Transmission
(208) 746-1474
/
U.S. Mail
Hand Delivery
Federal Express
Facsimile Transmission
(208) 799-3058

Clerk of the District Court
Nez Perce County Courthouse
P.O. Box 896
Lewiston, ID 83501
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FILED

J m e s D. L a u e ISB ##I 780
Loren 6 . Ipsen ISB ##I 767
ELAM 8r BU
25 1 E. Front Street, Suite 300
P.0, Box 1539
Boise, Idaho 83701
Telephone: (208) 343-5454
Facsimile: (208) 384-5844
E: & B File No. 7082-0013

P A F T i u. WEEKS

C*kgsJAvx
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DEPUTY

-.

Aaomeys for Defendants

PN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, PN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF NEZ PERCE
=ED J. TAYLOR, an individual;
Plaintiff,

II

v.

Case No. CV 08-01765
MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF
MOTION TO DISMISS

GARY D. BABBITT, an individual; D. JOHN
ASHBY, an individual; PATRICK V.
COLLINS, an individual; RICHARD A.
RILEY, an individual; HAWLEY TROXELL
E W I S & HAWLEY LLP, an Idaho limited
liability partnership; JANE DOES I-X,
unknown individuals;
Defendants.

I

Defendants, by and through their counsel of record, Elam & Burke, P.A., hereby submit the
following memorandum in support of their motion to dismiss the plaintiffs complaint pursuant to
Rule 120>)(6) of the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure.

MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF MOTION TO DISMISS - 1
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I. INTRODUCTION
This case presents the unusual issue of whether one party may sue another's attorneys for
decisions made during the course of litigation or for alleged malpractice. The plaintiff in this case,
Reed Taylor, is not and was not represented in connection with any of the events alleged in the
complaint by the defendants, the law firm of Hawley Troxell Ennis & Hawley and indi~dual
attorneys employed by that firm (the firm and its individual attorneys will be referred to herein as
"HTEH").

Lacking privity of contract, Reed Taylor cannot assert a direct claim for malpractice

against HTEH. Rather, he premises his complaint on positions advanced by HTEH on behalf of its
clients in the case of Taylor v. M A Services Corporation, et al., Case No. CV-07-00208, in the
District Court of the State of Idaho, Nez Perce County (hereinafter referred to as the "Underlying
Litigation"). Additionally, he attempts to assert claims for malpractice against HTEH for advice
given or legal services rendered, not to him, but to clients of HTEH who are parties in the
Underlying Litigation.
Reed Taylor is suing AIA Services,Inc. ("AIA Services"), in the Underlying Litigation upon
a contract to redeem his stock. He has also named as defendants AIA Insurance, Inc. ("AIA
Insurance"), a wholly-owned subsidiary of AIA Services, CropUSA Insurance Agency, Inc.
("CropUSA"), and various officers and directors of the three corporations. HTEH represents AIA
Services and AIA Insurance and has appeared as local counsel for CropUSA in the Underlying
Litigation. The individual defendants are represented by counsel of their choice.

In vague and

conclusory tams, the complaint in the present action attempts to assert claims against HTEH for
malpractice or wrongful actions arising out of the defense of their clients in the Underlying

MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF MOTION TO DISMISS - 2
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Litigation or related mattm. Reed Taylor has also filed scaparate but substantially similar lawsuits
against counsel who have appewd in behalf of other defendants in the Underlying Litigation.
ot escape notice that by filing suits against opposing counsel, Reed Taylor implicates
ethical issues regwding whether they can continue to represent their clients in the Underlying
Litigation.

If the present lawsuit and the companion lawsuits against defense counsel are not

dismissed, defense counsel may be required to withdraw Erom representing their respective clients
in the Underlying Litigation after nearly a year and a half of proceedings. In effect, Reed Taylor
seeks to strip the opposing parties of their chosen counsel. See Alumet v. Bear Lake Crazing Co.,
112 Idaho 441,732 P. 2d 679 (Ct.App. 1987), noting that filing suit against opposing counsel may
have the effect sf requiring them to withdraw because privileged matters between litigants and their
counsel may have to be revealed in order for counsel to defend thmselves, thus possibly
jeoprdizing the litigants' positions.
Shortly after filing this action, Reed Taylor moved to disqualify defense counsel, in the
Underlying ~ i t i ~ a t i o n . 'Strategies to disqualify opposing counsel are disfavored by the courts.
Tisby v. BufJlo General Hospital, 157 F.R.D. 157,163 (W.D.N.Y. 1994) ('Motions to disqualify
opposing counsel must be viewed in the context of favoring a party's right to be represented by
counsel of its own choice, as opposed to disqualification as a strategic weapon."); Spence v. Flynt,
816 P.2d 771 (Wyo. 1991) ("Disqualification motions are often simply common tools of litigation
process used for strictly strategic purposes.") (citations and internal quotations and ellipses omitted)

'

See Reed Taylor's Motion to Disqualify the Attorneys and Law Firms of Hawley Troxell Ennis &
Hawley LLP; Clements, Brown & McNichols, P.A.; and Quarles and Brady LLP, dated Septembei4.2008.
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G:\7082\0013\Pleadings\Motion
to Dismiss - Memo\Motion to Dismiss - Memo ver-l I .wpd

REQUEST FOR ADDITIONAL TRANSCRIPT
AND ADDITIONAL CLERK'S RECORD

521

For the reasons discussed in this m m o r m d m , it will be seen that the complaint against HTEW is
merely pretexhal and fails to stale a claim upon which relief can be granted.
11. S T m D A m OF ADWDIGATION

W e r e a complaint contains no allegations which, if proven, would entitle the plaintiff to the
relief claimed, it is subject to dismissal pwsuant to Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 120>)(6). Fells
v. UizitedStatesLge Im. Go., 119 Idaho 160,804 P.2d 333 (Ct. App. 1991). A Rule 120>)(6)motion
to dismiss for failure to state a claim, without affidavits or deposition testimony introduced into the
record either in support or in opposition, is addressed soley to the sufficiency of the complaint.
Orthman v. Idaho Power Go., 126 Idaho 960,962, 895 P.2d 561,563 (1995). All inferences Erom
the facts pleaded in the complaint must be drawn in favor of the party opposing the motion; and the
issue presented is "whether the plaintiff is entitled to offer evidence to support the claims."

Id.

However, the court need not accept as true legal conclusions or unwarranted factual inferences.
Cornez v. Toledo, 446 U.S. 635, 636 n. 3, 100 S.Ct. 1920, 1921 n. 3., 64 L.Ed.2d 572 (1980).
When ruling upon a Rule 120>)(6)motion, the question is whether the nomoving party has alleged
sufficient facts to support his claim which, if true, would entitle him to relief. Rincover v, State of
Idaho, Dept. of Finance, Securities Bureau, 128 Idaho 653,917 P.2d 1293 (1996). For example,
standing is a preliminary question to be determined by the court as a matter of law; if the plaintiff
lacks standing to bring the claim, his complaint should be dismissed pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6).
Young v. C i y ofk'etehum, 137 Idaho 102, 104,44 P.3d 1157, 1159 (2002).
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111. FIRST GAUSE(S) OF AmION AmINC AND METTING TORTIOUS ACTS

CIVIL CONSP
A.

The Compl&t Is Factualfy Dc?ncltent
As a g a d rule, attorneys who r q m e n t clients in litiption m o t be held liable to their

clients' d v m w based an the attorney' conduct of the IitSgation. W l e there me excepciona to
the g m d rule, the plaintiff has failed to plead any facts which would fall within any of such
exceptions. Therefore, the p l h t i f f s h t cause of action shodd be dismissed for failure to state a
claim upon which relief can be panled.
A party may not rely on pleadings which assert only legal conclusions, but must allege facts
w k h , if true, state a claim for relief Resolution T m t Cotp., v. Famer, 823 F.Supp. 302,309
(E.D.Pa. 1993). While well-pled facts alleged in the complaint are viewed in the light most.
favorable to the plaintiff, conclusory allegations are not accepted as true without specific factual
allegations to support thesn. Production Resources Group, L.L.C. v. NCT, 863 A.2d 772, 781
(Del.Ch. 2004); Tri-Star Pictures, Inc., titigaton, 634 A.2d 3 19,326 (Del. 1993) (articulating the
Rule 12 (b)(6) standard). If a factual basis for the relief is not alleged, then the pleading is subject
to dismissal under Rule 12(b)(6). In the case at bar, plaintiff merely states a number of conclusory
allegations but fails to plead any facts which would justify an award of damages against HTEH.

El.

The Complaint Fails to State a Cause of Action for Aiding and Abetting.
The first cause of action of the complaint is mnwtually muddled because it attempts to plead

a cause of action for (1) civil conspiracy, or (2) aiding and abetting without distinguishingbetween
the two theories. In actuality, they are sepmte and distinct causes &tion
and each will be discussed below.
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enmwagment or assistance of one p m o n is a substmhal factor in causing the resulting tort, then
the one guing it is himself a tortfernor and is responsible for the consquenccr of the other's art.

Id. at 678,701 P.2d at 298.
No Idaho case has been found dealing with the issue whether a I a y e r can be found liable
for aiding md abetting the comission of an allegedly tortious act by giving advice to his or her
client, whe&er in connection with litigation or otherwise. Other jusisdictions that have grappled
with the issue have prdominantly (that is, with limited exceptions not applicable here) held that the
attorney-client relationship precludes aider-abettor liability.
Section 876(b) of the Restatement (Second) of Torts (1 979) states:
For h a m resulting to a third person from the tortious conduct of another, one is
subject to liability if he

*

*

*

(b) knows that the other's conduct constitutes a breach of duty and gives substantial

assistance or encouragement to the other so to conduct himselfl.]
To state a cause of action, the plaintiff must also sufficiently allege that his injury was "a
direct or reasonably foreseeable result" of the conduct complained of. Bloor v. Carro, Spanbock;
Londin, Rodman d Fass, 754 F.2d 57,63 (2d Cir. 1985). Damages caused by the alleged tort must

be alleged and proved.

Britestarr Homes, Inc. v. Piper Rudnick LLP, 453 F.Supp. 521, 528

Plaintiff Reed Taylor's attempt to plead a cause of action for aiding and abetting fails at the
outset because he fails to plead facts which, if true, would constitute a tortious act or to allege
damages proximately caused by a tortious act ofAIA Services, AIA Insurance or CropUSA. Merely
mislabeling alleged contractual breaches does not convert them into torts. See Decker v. MasseyMEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF MOTION TO DISMISS - 7
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F e r w o n , Ltd., 681 F.2d 111, 119 (2d Cir. 1981) (allegations of aider-abkttor liability were
dismissed on the ground of being "so broad and conclusory as to be meiunindess.").
Even if it is assmed for the sake of

m t that the complaint sufficiently alleges the

ission of one or more tortious acts on the part of ALA Services, AM Inswmce or CropUSA,
it is still deficient because it fails to allege which of the HTEH attorneys allegedly aided and abetted
any particular act, what howledge any of them had of any particular act, what assistance was
purportedly lent by any of them, or how the plaintiff's alleged damages were caused by them.
Furthermore, to the extent the underlying purportedly wrongkl acts are based on allegations of fraud,
the plaintiff has f"ailed to plead with particularity the elements of fraud as required by Idaho Rule of
Civil Procedure 9@).2
A case where the plaintiffs asserted claims strikingly similar to those in the present case is

Mann v. GTCR Golder Rauner, L.L.C., 351 B.R. 685 (D.hiz. 2006), where suit was brought by
shareholders of a corporation against the law firm of Kirkland & Ellis ("K & E") for allegedly aiding
and abetting its clients, the parties in control of a corporation, to breach their fiduciary duties. The
shareholders also alleged that K.& E committed professional malpractice and tortiously interfered
with the plaintiffs' contractual relations and prospective economic advantage. K & E moved for and
was granted summary judgment with respect to the aiding and abetting claim on the ground K& E

*

Rule 9@) requires that all averments of fraud must be stated with particularity. The nine elements of
fraud are: (1) a statement of fact; (2) its falsity; (3) its materiality; (4) the speaker's knowledge of its falsity; (5) the
speaker's intent to induce reliance; (6) the hearer's ignorance of the falsity of the statement; (7) reliance by the
hearer; (8) the hearer's right to rely; and (9) consequent and proximate injury. Country Cove Development, Inc. v.
May, 143 Idaho 595,600, 150 P.3d 288,293 (2006);Jenkins v. Boise Cascade Corp., 141 Idaho 233,239, 108 P.3d
380,386 (2005); Lettunich v. Key BankNA., 141 Idaho 362,368, 109 P.3d 1 104, 1 1 10 (2005).
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did no more than provide legal advie to its own

@

The court found that K. & E's act of

glving advice to its clients, even if such advice were faulty, did not conrti~teaiding and abetting the
allegd breach of fiduciw duty.4
A plethora of cases have held that a lawyer acting on behalf of his or her client and within

the scope of the attorney-climt relationship is not liable for assisting the client in conduct that
breaches the client's fiduciary duty. See, e.g., Durham v. Guest, 142 N.M. 817, 17 1 P.3d 756
(2007), holding that an attorney who represented an insurer in a claim arbitration could not be held
liable for aiding and abetting the insurer's allegedly wrongfir1 denial of the claim; Morin v. Trupin,
7 11 F.Supg. 97 (S.D.N.Y. 1989),holding that attorneys who represented their client in negotiations

regmding the collection of allegedly Eraudulent promissory notes were not liable to an adverse party
for aiding and abetting their client in seeking to enforce the notes; Camp v. Dema, 948 F.2d 455 (8'
Cir. 1991), holding that a corporate attorney could not be held liable for securities fraud solely on
the basis of advice given to his client; and Schatz v. Rosenberg, 943 F.2d 485 (1991)' holding that
attorneys had no duty to disclose misrepresentations of their client in connection with the sale of
securities where the attorneys themselves did not make or assist in the making of misrepresentations.
See also, the U. S. Supreme Court's recent decision in Stoneridge Investment Partners v. ScientiJc
Atlanta, Inc., 128 S.Ct. 761, 169 L.Ed.2d 627 (2008), declining to hold alleged aiders and abettors

The court also dismissed the malpractice claim because K 62 E had no attorney-client relationship with
the plaintiffs and the totious interference claims because "the mere act of giving legal advice to a client cannot
constitute tortious interference." Id. at 70 1 .
4

K & E advised bringing in a so-called crisis manager. This turned out to be a disastrous decision, as the
crisis manager dissipated the corporation's assets and led to its demise. Id. at 691-692.
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liable for securities violations under $10(b) of the Securities and Exchange Act of 1934 and Rule
1%-5.'
A third p m ' s claim against a lawyer puts the l a v a at odds with his or her client in a
m m e c which wmpromises the attorney-client relationship. Protecting that relationship protects
more than just an individual or entity in any particular case or transaction; it is fundamental to the
i n t e ~ t of
y the judicial process itself. As pointed out in Durham v. Cues?, 142 N.M. 8 17,823,171
P.3d 756,76 1 (2007), to permit claims against attomeys by adversary parties in civil litigation would
have a chilling effect on representation because:
[Alnytime a plaintiff alleged that a defendant had breached a fiduciary duty to the
plaintitf, an additional claim against the defendant's counsel for aiding and abetting
would withstand a Rule [12@)(6)] motion, even though the defendant's counsel had
simply been representing the client's position in an adversarial proceeding. Before
agreeing to represent a client, an attorney faced with this dilemma would have to
evaluate the merits of his client's position and the attendant risks, then would have
to monitor the case during the representation in order to evaluate the risk of liability.
This would have a detrimental effect on the representation. . . .
Few rules, of course, are absolute. An attorney, wen acting the course of litigation, can be
liable for egregious conduct that amounts to an abuse of process or malicious prosecution. Kahala
Royal Corporation v. Goodsill Anderson @inn & Stifel, supra, at 270, 151 P.3d at 751. However,
no factual allegations are contained in the complaint which support these exceptions. The plaintiffs
claims against HTEH for purportedly aiding and abetting its clients' actions relate only to advice

Recently, the Stoneridge holding has been extended to attorneys. See In re DVZ Znc. Securities
Litigation, 249 F.R.D.1 96,2 1 6-2 18 (E.D.Pa. 1008). holding that attorneys of a corporation owe no independent
duty of disclosure to investors and cannot be held liable for failure to divulge or prevent a scheme on the part of their
client to violate $ lo@) of the Securities and Exchange Act.

-
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r m d m d and positions taken in the Gourse of zealous rqresaatal-ion and, as such, must be dismissed
h r failure to state a =use of action.

C.

Reed Taylor Was No Standhg as a Creditor of AM Services to Brhg a Direct Cause
of Action Against the Directors of the Corporat-ion for a Breach of Ffdueiary Duty or
Against HTEH for AULegedly Aiding and Abetting any such Breach,
Liability for aiding and abetting does not exist in a vacum; in order for to liability to attach,

the &leg&aider and abettor must be found to have materially assisted in perpekating the wrongful
act of another. If the predicate act is not actionable, there can be no cause of action for aiding and
abetting. Reed Taylor alleges that because he is a creditor of AIA Services, which is insolvent, the
directors of that company owe a fiduciary duty to him. He avers that HTEH aided and abetted the
directors in diverting funds of the corporation to other purposes, thereby precluding the corporation
from making payments to him. Assuming arguendo these allegations are true, they do not state a
claim against opposing counsel upon which relief can be granted.
It is offen stated that directors stand in a fiduciary relation to the corporation, hence, to the
stockholders. Hanny v. Sunnyside Ditch Co., 82 Idaho 271,276,353 P.2d 406,409 (1960); Coeur
d 'AlenesLead Co. K Kingsbury, 59 Idaho 627,630,85 P.2d 691,692 (1938). It is said that should

the corporation become insolvent, this fiduciary duty runs also to the creditors of the corporation.
Tbrch Liquidating Tkust ex rel. Bridge Associates, LLC v. Stock-still, 2008 WL 696233 (E.D.La.

2008). The reason for this is that directors have the task of attempting to maximize the economic
value of the company. "By definition, the fact of insolvency places the creditors in the shoes
normally occupied by the shareholders - that of residual risk-bearers."
Group, L.L. C, v. NC2: 863 A.2d 772,79 1 (Del.Ch. 2004).
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Production Resources

However, this does not mean that either shseholders or creditors have a direct cause of
action against the dirsrtor.. See Weatherhead v. Grgen, 123 Idaho 697,705, 851 P 2 d 993, 1001
(Ct.Agg. 1993); iMcGivem v. A M S A Lumber Co., 77 Wis.2d 241,156,252 N.W.2d 37,378 (1977).
An infornative case illustrating the cwent evolution of the law is North American Catholic

Educational Programming Foundation, Inc. v. Cheewaila, 930 A.2d 92 (Del.Supr, 2007). There,
the Delaware Suprme Court held that creditors of an insolvent6 corporation or a corporation
operating in the zone of insolvency7could not bring a direct breach of f i d u c i q duty action against
such corporation's directors.

In Gheavalla, creditors of an insolvent, or at least financially challenged, corporation sought
to bring direct, not derivative, claims of breach of fiduciary duties against the directors for allegedly
causing the corporation to enter into improvident transactions, rather than preserving the assets of
the corporation for the benefit of its creditors. The trial court entered judgment under Rule 120>)(6)
dismissing the complaint for failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted. The
Delaware Suprme Court affirmed the dismissal, noting:
It is well-settled that directors owe fiduciary duties to the corporation. W e n a
corporation is solvent, those duties may be enforced by its shareholders, who have
standing to bring derivative actions on behalf of the corporation because they are the
ultimate beneficiaries of the corporation's growth and increased value. W e n a
corporation is insolvent, however, its creditors take the pIace of the shareholders as
the residual beneficiaries of any increase in value.

The Gheavalla court noted that insolvency of a corporation ". . . may be demonstrated by either showing
( I ) a deficiency of assets below liabilities with no reasonable prospect that the business can be successhlly continued
in the face thereof, or (2) an inability to meet maturing obligations as they fall due in the ordinary course of
business." Id. at. 98, n. 17. (footnotes and internal quotations deleted)
This term does not appear to have been precisely defined by the courts but has been used to indicate that
the corporation is in the "vicinity"of insolvency. Javell Recovery, L.P. v. Cordon, f 96 B.R. 348,355 (N.D.Tex.
1996).
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Consequently, the weditom of an inrotvent copration have stmding to maintain
derivative claims against the dirmors for breaches of fiduciary duties. The
copration" insolvency makes the a d i t o m the principal constituency injured by
any fiduciary breacha that diminish the firm's value. Therefore, equitable
considations give creditors standing to pursue derivative claims against the
dirmtors of an insolvent covrarion. Individud creditors of an insolvent corporation
have the same incentive to pursue valid derivative claims on its behalf that
shareholders have when the c o p r a ~ o nis solvent. (internal quotations omitted;
mphazsis in original)

Id. at 101-102.
The fact that a corporation has become insolvent does not turn derivative claims into direct
creditor claims. Id. at 102. "To recognize a new right for creditors to bring direct fiduciary claims
against. . . directors would create a conflict between those directors' duties to maximize the value
of the insolvent corporation for the benefit of all those having an interest in it. . . ." Id. at 104, n. 46,
quoting Production Resources Group, L. L. C. v. NCT Group, Inc., 863 A.2d at 797. Thus, Reed

Taylor's attempt to assert a direct claims in the present case is ill-founded, particularly because he
seeks to bring a direct suit not against the directors, but against defendants who are one step fwther
removed, lawyers who allegedly advised the director^.^ If he has no standing to sue the directors
directly, he certainly has no standing to sue the corporations' counsel directly.

D.

The Complaint Fails to State a Cause of Action for Civil Conspiracy.
The distinction, which plaintiff Reed Taylor ignores in his complaint, between civil

conspiracy and aiding and abetting is that an action for civil conspiracy cannot arise unless the
parties to the alleged civil conspiracy each independently owe a duty to the aggrieved party.
His complaint states at 1 10 that it is not a derivative action; rather, he is seeking to bring claims directly
against HTEH.
The plaintiff consistently fails to distinguish in his complaint between counsel for the corporations and
counsel for the individual directors.
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A civil conspiracy, however atrocious, does not per se give rise to a cause of
action unless a civil wong has been comitted resulting in dmage. The elemmb
of an a c ~ o nfor civil conspiracy are the formation and operation of the cornpiracy
and d m a g e resulting to plaintiff %om an act or acts done in m e r m c e of the
c o r n o n design. . . . In such an action the major si@fimce of the cornpiracy lies
in the fact that it r m d m each participant in the wron&l act jointly respnsible as
a joint tortfeasor for all damages ensuing fi-om the won& irrespective of whether or
not he was a direct actor and regwdless of the degee of his activity.

A cause of action for civil wnspiracy may not arise, however, if the alleged
conspirator, thou& a participant in the a g e m e n t undertying the injury, was not
pmonally bound by the duty violated by the wrongdoing and was acting only as the
agent or employee of the party who did have the duty. (citations and internal
quotations deleted)
Doctor's Co. v. Stcperior Court, 49 Cal.3d 39,44,260 Cal.Rptr. 183, 185-186,775 P.2d 508,510-

Thus, in the Doctor's decision it was held that an attorney retained to assist in the defense
of an insured against a third-party claim was not liable to the claimant for damages allegedly
resulting firom a conspiracy to violate provisions of the state insurance code which made it an unfair
practice for an insurer to delay prompt and fair settlement of a claim where liability has become
reasonably clear. The court reasoned that "[algents and employees of a corporation cannot conspire
with their corporate principal or employer where they act in their official capacities on behalf of the
corporation and not as individuals for their individual advantage." (Citations and internal quotations
omitted) Id. at 44, 260 Cal.Rptr. at 186,775 P.2d at 5 11.

In Skarbrevik v. Cohen, England & WhitJeld, 231 Cal.App. 3d 692, 282 Cal.Rptr. 627
(199 l), it was alleged that an attorney for a closely held corporation was liable for civil conspiracy
to conceal information &om a minority shareholder. The California Court of Appeal, however, held
that, absent either an individual duty to the plaintiff or a personal financial interest, the attorney
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could not be held liable on a theory of civil conspiracy bas& on his actions as attomey for the
copration. Id., at 71 1,282 Cal.Rptr, at 640. Receipt by an attomey of reasonable compensation
ces perfsmtxi does not constitute such financial interest as will support a cause of
action for conspiracy to deeaud, Id., at 710,282 Cal.Rptr. at 639; see also Camp v. Dema, 948 F.2d
455,463 (8* Cir. 1991).
Similarly, in Fischer v, Estate ofFfax, 816 A.2d 1 (D.C. 2003), it was held that an attorney
does not "conspire" with his own client merely by giving advice. The court stated, "To hold
otherwise would be akin to saying that 'a defendant could conspire with his right arm,which held,
aimed, and fired the fatal weapon.' " Id. at 5, n. 4. The complaint in the present case fails to state
a cause of action against HTEH for civil conspiracy. "[Tlhere can be no 'conspiracy' with a client
if an attorney merely acts within the scope of his employment as an advisor to, or an advocate on
behalf of, the client." Id. at 5.

E.

The Complaint Fails to State a Cause of Action for Interference with Contract

Plaintiff's first cause of action does not specifically allege intentional interference with
contract. However, the general allegations of the complaint contain averments that could be
construed as attempting to plead interference with contract. See, e.g., Complaint 7 14, alleging
"intentional violation and interference with Reed J. Taylor's contractual rights" by, among other
things, obtaining a TRO and preliminary injunction in the Underlying Litigation.
Since the analysis of interference with contractual relations is similar to that of civil
conspiracy, HTEH will respond here to the allegations that they improperly interfered with one or
more contracts between their clients and Reed Taylor.
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The e l m a t s of the tort of intentional interfamce with contract are:
(a) the existence of a contract, (2) knowledge of the contract on the part of the

defmdmt:{3) intentional interference cawing a breach of the contract, and (d) injury
to the plaintiffresdting ftQm the breach.
Barlow v. International Harvester Co., 95 Idaho 881,893,522 P.2d 1102, 1114 (1974).
A party cannot tortiously interfere with its own eontract. Ostmnder v. Farm Bureau Mut.

Ins. Co. ofldaho, Ine., 123 Idaho 650,654,851 P.2d 946,950 (1993). The actions of an agent acting
within the scope and course of his authority are imputed to the principal. In Ostrander, a former
mployee of Farm Bureau alleged that her supervisor, Hart, had interfered with her employment
contract by making an inaccurate evaluation of her perforrnance which led to termination of her
mployment. The court held:
As an agent of Farm Bureau, Hart had the authority to evaluate Ostrander and
terminate her contract. Since Hart's actions with respect to Ostrander were within
the scope of his authority as an agent of Farm Bureau, there was no third party to the
contract. Accordingly, Ostrander has not stated a claim for tortious interference with
contract.
Id. at 950, 851 P.2d at 654.

In BECO Const. Co., Inc. v. J-U-B Engineers, Inc., 145 Idaho 7 19, 184 P. 3d 844 (2008), a
contractor claimed that an engineering firm tortiously interfered with its contract with the City of
Pocatello by failing to approve its application for final payment until perceived defects in
csnstruction were remedied. The court held the engineers were acting within the scope of their
authority as project engineers for the city. Fulfillment of their duty to monitor the progress of
construction and advise the city progress payments did not constitute interference with contract:
Although J-U-B was not a party to the Construction Contract in the traditional sense,
it acted as the City's agent by the very terms of the contract between BECO and the
City. Ths case falls within the purview of Ostrander where an intentional
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intdermce claim was foufld not to lie against an agmt of a party who was acting
within the scope of his authority.
Id., 184 P.3d at 850.

Other m e s in accord with Ostrander and J-U-B are Leon v. Boise State Universip, 125
Idaho 365,870 P.2d 1324 (1994) (the chair of a ~ v e r s i t dep
y

ent could not be held liable for

i n t d h n g with a professor's employment contract); Gunter v. Murphy 's Lounge, U C ,141 Idaho
16,105 P.3d 676 (2005) (the managing member of a limited liability company was not liable for the
company's decision to terminate a contract); Jenkins v. Boise Cascade Corp. 141 Idaho 233, 108
P.3d 380 (2005) (former employee's managers were acting within the scope and course of their
employment and thus could not constitute third parties for purposes of a claim for intentional
mterfaence with contract); Thomas v. Medical Center Physicians, P.A., 138 Idaho 200'61 P.3d 557
(2002) (professional corporation could not be held liable for interference with its own contract);
Cantwell v. City of Boise, 2008 W L 2757046 (Idaho 2008) (employee failed to establish claim for

tortiow interference with prospective economic advantage when employee's supervisors
recommended termination of his employment contract).
The relationship between an attorney and his or her client is that of principal and agent. An
attorney cannot be held liable for interference with contract by giving advice to the client within the
scope of the attorney's representation of the client. Therefore, Reed Taylor's complaint fails to
plead a cause of action for intentional interference with contract.

-

IV. SECOND CAUSE OF ACTION CONVERSION
Plaintiff's second cause of action is for alleged conversion of an indeterminate sum of
money. Conversion has been defined as "a distinct act of dominion wrongfully asserted over

@
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mother's pmonal property in denial [ofl or inwnsistent with (the] rights therein. " Torir v. Allred,
100 Idaho 905,919,6116 P.2d. 334,139 (1980); see aim Pearlq irom/rr d 9ornge Co. v. Smith,
132 Idaho 732,743,979 P.2d 605 (1999) reh 'g denied (citation omitted) "Conversion in the legal
sense applies only to personal property." Rowe v. Burrup, 95 Idaho 747,750,5 18 P.2d 1386 (1974).
Plaintiffcmot state a valid claim for conversion against HTEH, however, for three reasons:
(1) plaintiff does not own or have a possessor/ interest in the money claimed; (2) HTEH has not
wrongfully asserted dominion over the money claimed; and (3) the money claimed by plaintiff is not
identifiable as a specific chattel. Plaintiffs conversion claim therefore fails as a matter of law and
should be dismissed.
A.

Pliaintifll Does Not O m the Sum of Money Claimed.

Tn order to state a valid claim for conversion, a plaintiffmust demonstrate that he or she has

6

title to the property claimed, or a right of possession. Portland Seed Co. v. Clark, 35 Idaho 44,4647,204 P. 146,146-47 (1922); Bowman v. Adam, 45 Idaho 2 17,227,261 P. 679,682 (1927) reh g
denied (citation omitted). "Generally, a plaintiff must establish legal ownership or right to
possession in the particular thing the specifically identifiable moneys, that the defendant is alleged
to have converted." Macomber v. TravelersPropert and Casualty Corp., 804 A.2d 180,199 (Conn.
2002) (internal quotations and citations omitted). No action for conversion of money may be
brought if the plaintiff did not have ownership, possession or control of the subject money. Flute,
Inc. v. Rubel, 682 F.Supp. 184 (S.D.N.Y. 1988).
The allegations of plaintiffs complaint do not clearly identify what specific sum of money
plaintiffpurportedly owns or is entitled to possess or control. It appears plaintiffis a creditor of AIA
Services (Complaint,

@

W

51-55) whose right to payment of the debt has not been completely
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established and is cmmtly at issue in the Underlying Litigation. (See Complaint, fl 15-16.) At

@

best, p i ~ n t i 8 h a as claim to a sum of money. Until pl&ntiffs claim is adjudicated and his allegcll
rights are asmatively established, plaintiff has no right to any liquidated sum. Plaintiff therefore
c m o t eskblish a necessary elment of his cause of action for conversion.

B,

Defendants Have Not Wrongfully Asserted D a d i o n Over the Property.
A claim for conversion fails if the plaintiff cannot establish that the defendant w r o n m l y

exerted dominion over the subject personal pro
P.2d 1334,1339 (1980). 'Wo convmion action can exist against a defendant who did not exercise
any form of dominion or control over the property that was allegedly converted." US. Claim, hc.
v. Fl~menhaJt,519 F.Supp.2d 532,536 (E.D. Pa. 2007).

In this case, HTEH is not alleged to have taken any property directly from plaintiff. Instead,
plaintiffs complaint alleges HTEH was compensated for attorney fees and costs incurred in
defending its clients in the Underlying Litigation filed by plaintiff. (Complaint, 7 54.) Idaho law
clearly permits corporations to hire attorneys to represent the corporations' interests and to
compensate those attorneys for their services. See LC. 5 30-1-302(1) (establishing general corporate
power to defend in its name); I.C. $ 30-1-302(7) (establishing general corporate power to make
contracts and to incur liabilities); I.C. 5 30-1-302(15) (establishing general corporate power to make
payments that further the business and affairs of the corporation); I..C.

5

30-1-850 et seq.

(establishing general corporate power to indemnify directors and advance litigation expenses); see
also Wayne v. Murphey-Favre & Co., 56 Idaho 788,791,59 P.2d 721,722 (1936). AIA Services,
AIA Insurance and CropUSA are legally authorized to hire HTEH and to pay the attorney fees and
costs incurred relating to the defense of the claims asserted against the corporations in the
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Underlying Litigation. merefore, m y exedion of dominion or con&ol over the attorney fees and
soits paid to HTEH, whrthn by AIA S h s r r . AIA Insurance, or CropUSA cannot be wrongful such
that a claim for conversion arises in favor of plaintiff.
G.

Plaintiffs Claimed Sum of Money Is Not Identifiable as a Specific Chattel.
Pliiintifs conversion claim against NTEW alleges only the conversion of an indeterminate

amount of money. “Normally conversion for misappropriation of money does not lie unless it can
be describedor identified as a spec$c chattel," Warm Springs Properties, Inc. v. Andora Yilla, Inc.,
96 Idaho 270, 272, 526 P.2d 1106 (1974) (emphasis added). "More particularly, if the alleged
converted money is incapable of being described or identified in the same manner as a specific
chattel, it is not the proper subject of a conversion action." High View Fund, L.P. v. Hall, 27
F.Supp.2d 420,428 (S.D.N.Y. 1998) (citation and internal quotations omitted).
An action for conversion of money is insufficient as a matter of law unless it is
alleged that the money converted was in specific tangible h d s of which claimant
was the owner and entitled to immediate possession. An action for conversion does
not lie to enforce a mere obligation to pay money.
Ehrlich v. Nowe, 848 F.Supp. 482,492 (S.D.N.Y. 1994) (citations omitted); see also Landskroner
v. Lanhkroner, 797 N.E.2d 1002 (Ohio App. 8 Dist., 2003). "In other words, an action alleging

conversion ofmoney lies only where there is an obligation to deliver the specific pieces of the money
in question or money that has been specifically sequestered, rather than a mere obligation to deliver
a certain sum." SouthTrust Bank v. Donley, 925 So.2d 934,940 (Ala. 2005) (citations and internal
quotations omitted) Even if Reed Taylor were a shareholder of AIA Services or AIA Insurance, he
would have no personal right to possess or exert dominion over the assets of either corporation.
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V. T H I m CAUSE OF ACTION IDAHO CONSUMER PR0TECTLC)N ACT

Plaintiffs third cause of action is for an alleged violation of the Idaho Consmer Protection
Act @meinafter the "Act"). Plaintitiff, however, has not asserted - and indeed

assert - a valid

claim under the Act against HTEH be~auseplaintiff had no contract with HTEH fiom which an
alleged claim could pssibly arise. Accordingly, plainlips third cause of action must be dismissed

as a matter of law.
The Act, Idaho Code §Ej 48-601 through 48-619, prohibits unfair methods of competition and
unfair or deceptive acts or practices in the conduct of trade or commerce within the State of Idaho.
The purpose of the Idaho Consumer Protection Act is "to protect both consmers and
businesses against unfair methods of competition and unfair and deceptive practices
in the conduct of trade or commerce, and to provide efficient and economical
procedures to secure such protection. It is the intention of the legislature that this
chapter be remedial and so construed." I.C. Ej 48-601. Idaho Code Ej 48-603, which
contains a knowledge requirement, provides an enumeration of unfair methods of
competition and unfair or deceptive acts or practices in the conduct of any trade or
commerce that the legislature declared to be unlawfil. I.C. 9 48-603C also declares
any unconscionable method, act or practice in the trade or commerce to be a violation
of the Idaho Consumer Protection Act whether it occurs before, during, or after the
conduct of the trade or commerce.
E'hite v. Mock, 140 Idaho 882,890, 104 P.3d 356, 364 (2004).
Idaho Code $9 48-603 and 48-603A set forth certain practices which are prohibited under
the Act. Idaho Code Ej 48-608(1) allows individuals to pursue a cause of action for an alleged
violation of the Act and provides, in relevant part, as follows:
Any person who purchases or leases goods or services s d thereby suflers an
ascertainable loss of money or property, real or personal, as a result ofthe use or
employment by anotherperson ofa method, act orpractice declared unlawfirl by this
chapter, may treat any agreement incident thereto as voidable or, in the alternative,
may bring an action to recover damages or one thousand dollars ($1,000), which ever
is greater....
MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF MOTION TO DISMISS - 21
G:\7082\M)13\Pleadings\Motionto Dismiss - MemoWotion to Dismiss - Memo ver_l l.wpd

REQUEST FOR ADDITIONAL TRANSCRIPT
AND ADDITIONAL CLERK'S RECORD j 3 g

I.C. S, 48-608(1) (mphasis added).
Idaho case law limits claims under the Act to circmsmces involving a clear and distinct
con&ach;lal relationship b e W m the piarties. See Na&n v. Glass, 102 Idaho 785,640 P.2d 1186
(Gt.App. 1982). In E l a s h , the pasties entered into negotiations for the sale of real property. The
proposed sale never occmed and the buyers, who were renting the subject property at the time,
ultimately pmued damage claims against the sellers. The buyers later filed a motion to amend their
pleading to assert a claim against the sellers under the Act, claiming the sellers engaged in deceptive
acts or practices, The trial court denied the buyers' motion to amend, finding that no valid claim
could be asserted under the Act because no contract existed between the parties. On appeal, the
Idaho Cowt of Appeals of Idaho upheld the trial court's denial of the sellers' motion to mend, and
specifically held that a claim under the Act must be based upon a contract:
I.C. 9 48-608(1) of the ICPA provides that "[alny person who purchases or leases
goods or services and thereby suffers any ascertainable loss of money or property,
real or personal, as a result of the use or employment by another person of a method,
act or practice declared unlawll by...[the] act," may file an action for damages. We
do not construe this language to require that a purchase or lease be "completed" in
order for an action to be brought. However, we have reviewed the regulations
promulgated by the Idaho Attorney General pursuant to I.C. S, 48-604(2), the
decisions of the Idaho Supreme Court interpreting the ICPA to date, and cases
reported under 15 U.S.C. S, 45(a)(l), which are deemed guides to construction of the
ICPA under I.C. S, 48-604(1). We find no authority for applying the ICPA to a
merely contemplated transaction, where there was no contract. We hold, as we
believe the trial court intended, that a claim under the ICPA must be based upon a
contract.
Haskin, 102 Idaho at 788 (emphasis added).
Similar to the facts at issue in Haskin, there is no contract in the present case between
plaintiff and HTEH upon which plaintiffs claim under the Act can be based. The facts of this case
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in this w e pl&~.fThasnot allegd

er rmoved h m those Etf issue in HasKin

1

n was even 'bntmplatd*' between the parties.

I1
8

:

F h m , the Court of A
or her adv

held that a l l o k g a pl&tiff to sue his

's attorney under a commer pmtection act theory infringa on the attorney-client

relationship. Jeckle v. Grotty, 85 P.3d 931 wmh.App.Div, 3,2004). In m p H oE&at finding, the
court relied on Connecticut case law, holding as follows:
Providing a private cause of action under [the Connecticut Unfair Trade Practices
Act] to a supposedly aggrieved party for the actions ofhis or her opponent's attorney
would stand the attorney-client relatiom&p on its h a d and would compromise an
aaomq's duty of undivided loyalty to his or h a client and thwart the exercise of the
attorney's independent professional judgment on his or her client's behalf. Su$ield
Dev. Assoc. Ltd. P'fhip v. Nat 'I Loan Investors, L.P., 260 Conn. 766,783-84, 802
A.2d 44.
Id., 85 P.3d at 384-85 (other citations omitted).

Not only is there a complete absence of any contract or consumer relationship between Reed
Taylor and HTEH which would form the basis for a claim, see LC. $48-608(1);H'kin, 102 Idaho
at 788, but Reed Taylor should not be permitted to sue his adversaries' attorneys under the Act.

-

VI. FOURTH CAUSE OF ACTION LEGAL MALPRACTICE

A.

There Is NOAttorney-Client Relationship between PIrafnW and Defendants.
The plaintiffs fourth cause of action is for legal malpractice.
To establish a claim for attorney malpracticelprofessional negligence, the
plaintiff must show: (1) the creation of an attorney-client relationship; (2) the
existence of a duty on the part of the lawyer; (3) the breach of the duty of the
standard of care by the lawyer; and (4) that the failure to perform the duty was a
proximate cause of the damages s u f f d by the client.

Becker v. Callahan, 140 Idaho 522,526,96 P.3d 623,627 (2004), citingMcColm-Traskav. Baker, 139
Idaho 948,951, 88 P.3d 767, 770 (2004); Jovdan v. Beekr, 135 Idaho 586, 590, 21 P.3d 908, 912
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(2001); Marias v. Marano, 120 Idaho 11, 13,813 P.2d 350,352 (1991); Johnron v. Jones, 103 Idaho

a

702,652 P.2d 650 (1982).

14

The first impediment to plilintiffs maIpracdice claim is the failure to allege the existence of an
attorney-client relationship - the so-called privity rule. The complaint does not allege that HTEH
represented the plainriff in connection with any events alleged therein." Ordinarily, one not in grivity
of contract with an attamey cannot bring suit for legal malpractice against the attorney. Stated
othmise, the care md skill an attorney owes his or her client ordinarily do not extend to third parties.
National Sav. Bank v. Ward, 100 U.S. 195,205-206,25 L.Ed. 621 (1879); Buscher v. Boning, 114
Hawai'i 202,159 P.2d 8 14 (2007); Rhode v. Adams, 288 Mont. 278,957 P.2d 1124 (1998); Lilyhorn
v. Dier, 214 Neb. 728,335 N.W.2d 554,555 (1983).

The reasons for the privity rule are manifold: "The scope of an attorney's contractual duty to
a client is defined by the purposes for which the attorney is retained." Johnson v. Jones, 103 Idaho 702,
703,652 P.2d 650,652 (1982). Absent the privity rule, "clients would lose control over the attorneyclient relationship, and attorneys would be subject to almost unlimited liability." Barcelo v. Elliott, 923
S.W. 2d 575,580 (Tex. 1996). Allowing a broad cause of action in favor of third parties would create
a conflict of interest between an attorney's client and such third parties, thereby limiting the attorney's
ability to zealously represent his or her client. Id. at 578. "Attorneys owe fundmental duties to their
clients. Among themost important of these duties are the duties of zealous representation and loyalty."
10

In approximately 1987 Mr. Riley was employed by the fm of Eberle, Berlin, Kading, Turnbow &
McKlveen, Chtd., a law fm that represented Reed Taylor in connection with his divorce from Donna Taylor.
Taylor. The complaint does not
Incident to the divorce, Series A preferred stock in AIA Services was issued to k.
allege any act or omission of Mr. Riley in connection with the divorce or the issuance of the Series A preferred stock
as the basis for damages allegedly sustained by Reed Taylor. Even if such allegation were to be made, the applicable
two-year statute of limitation, Idaho Code $ 5 - 2 19, has long since run.
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Heinze v. Bauer , 145 Idaho 232, 178 P.3d 597, 603 (2008). Those duties would be irrevocably
u'mpomised if attorneys were required to t a n p a their representation by tding into aaovnt the
economic interests of third parties. Finally, the attorney-client relationship, although based on contract,
involves a hi&Iy personal and confidential relationship ". . . more analogous to a mnbact of a personal
nature than to an o r d i n q comercia1 contract." Jachon v. Rqgers & fills, 210 Cal.App.3d 336,
342,258 Cal'Rptr. 454 (1 989). Imposing duties to non-clients would give rise to increased malpractice
suits and cause attorneys to practice in a manner calculated to protect themselves personally rather than
advance the interests of their clients.
The Idaho Supreme Court in Harrisfeld v. fincock, 140 Idaho 134, 90 P.3d 884 (2004),
confronted the issue of whether a legal malpractice action must arise out of an attorney-client
relationship. In that case disappointed heirs sought to bring a legal malpractice action against the
attorney who drafted a decedent's will and three codicils. Each of the two later codicils revoked prior
codicils. The heirs contended the codicils were intended by the testatrix to be cumulative. The court
acknowledged: "As a general rule, an attorney will be held liable for negligence only to his or her client
and not to someone with whom the attorney does not have an attorney-client relationship." Id. at 137,
90 P.3d at 887. However, the court held this is not an invariable rule and that in deciding whether to
recognize a new duty or extend a duty beyond the scope previously imposed the court would adopt what
it called a "balance-of-the-harms" test.
The Harrigfeld test involves weighing the following policy considerations:
[Tlhe foreseeability of the harm to the plaintiff; the degree of certainty that the
plaintiff suffered injury; the closeness of the connection between the defendant's
conduct and the injury suffered; the moral blame attached to the defendant's conduct;
the policy of preventing future harm; the extent of the burden to the defendant and
consequences to the community of imposing a duty to exercise care with resulting
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liability for breach; and the availability, cost, and prevalence of insurance for the risk
involved.
Id. at 138,90 P.3d at 888.
Considering those factors, the court held that an attorney preparing testamentary instrurnenb
owes a duty to the beneficiaries named in the instruments to effectuate the testator's intent. This is the
only instance to date in which the requirment of privity in a legal malpractice action has been
abrogated under Idaho law. The Harrigfeld court cautiond:
A direct attorney-client relationship is required to exist between the plaintifland the
attorney-defendant in a legal malpractice action except in this very narrow
circumstance.

Id. at 139, 90 P.3d 884.
The reason for such cautionary limitation was aptly expressed by theHarrigfeld court, quoting

While privity of contract has been abolished in many areas of tort law, the concern
is still that liability for negligence not extend to an unlimited and unknown number
of potential plaintiffs. In the area of legal malpractice the attorney's obligations to
his client must remain paramount. In such cases the best approach is that the
plaintiffs must allege and prove facts demonstrating that they are in the nature of
third-party intended beneficiaries of the relationship between the client and the
attorney in order to recover in tort. By this we mean that to establish a duty owed by
the defendant attorney to the nonclient the nonclient must allege and prove that the
intent of the client to benefit the nonclient third party was the primary or direct
purpose of the transaction or relationship.
Id. at 137, 90 P.3d at 887
The Idaho Supreme Court, in a case decided afier Harrigfeld, declined to create an additional
exception to the privity requirement. In Taylor v. Maile, 142 Idaho 253, 127 P.3d 156 (2005), the
Taylors, as remainder beneficiaries of a trust, attempted to sue the trustee's attorney for legal
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A pmon wishing to invoke the court's j-&sdiction mwt have standing, Yan Virlknk-enburgh
v. Citizens for irernr Limits, 135 Idaho 121, 124, 15 P.3d 1 129, 1 132 (2009). As noted in Miles v.

I h h o Power Go., 116 I d h o 635, 639, 778 P.2d 753, 761 (1989), the doctrine of standing is a
subcategory of justiciability. 'Standing focuses on the p w seeking relief and not on the issues the
party wishes to have adjudicatd." Young v, City ofKetchum, 137 Idaho 102,106,44 P.3d 1157,1159
(2002). See also Boundaty Baclcpackers v. Boundary County, 128 Idaho 371,913 P.2d 1141 (1996).
The court in Young, supra, elucidated the applicable principle as follows:
To satisfy the case or controversy requirment of standing, a litigant must "allege or
demonstrate an injury in fact and a substantial likelihood the relief requested will
prevent or redress the claimed injury." (Citations omitted) This requires a showing
of a "distinct palpable injury" and "fairly traceable causal connection between the
claimed injury and the challenged conduct." (Citations omitted)
Id. at 106,44 P.3d at 1159.
The requirement of standing was Eurther explicated in the case of Bowles Y. Pro Indiviso, Inc.,
132 Idaho 371, 973 P. 2d 142 (1999) as follows:

In order to fulfill the standing requirement, the plaintiffmust "'allege such a
personal stake in the outcome of the controversy' as to warrant his invocation of the
court's jurisdiction." Bentel, 104 Idaho at 135-36,656 P.2s at 1388-89 (quoting Life
of the Land, 623 P.2d at 438) (emphasis in original). The party seeking to invoke the
court's jurisdiction must allege such a personal stake in the outcome of the
controversy as to assure the concrete adversariness which sharpens the presentation
upon which the court so depends. See Miles, 116 Idaho at 641, 778 P.2d at 763
(quoting Duk Power Co. v. Carolina Env. Study Group, 438 U. S. 59, 72, 98 S.Ct.
2620,2630,57 L.Ed. 2d 595 (1978). This "personal stake" requirement dmands
that the plaintiff allege a distinct palpable injury to himself
Id. at 377,973 P.2d at 146.
Reed Taylor has failed to demonstrate a personal stake in any theoreticallyposited controversy
among AIA Services, AIA Insurance, CropUSA and their defense counsel. Accordingly, he lacks
standing to assert any direct claim for professional negligence against the defendants in this case.
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VII, THE CLAIMS OF LEGAL WLPMCTICE, AIDLNG AND mETTINC,
AND CIVIL CONSPIMGY ARE BARJRED BY LITIGATION P M L E C ; E
It would be particularly pernicious and dffhuctive of the attorney-client relationship if
aeomeys in a litigated matter were held to have a duty of care or loyalty to the adverse party - in
eff"wt, that they become co-counsel for the oppnent. The defendants cannot possibly act as zealous
advocates of AM Senrices, AIA Insmmce and CropUSA if they are also deemed to owe duties of care
and loyalty to Reed Taylor. "An attorney owes no duty to a third party in an adversarial relationship."
Bowman v. Two, 104 Wash.2d 181, 188, 704 P.2d 140 (1085). '"xistence of a duty to an adversary
party beyond the courtesy and respect owed all participants in the legal process. . . would interfere with

the undivided loyalty an attorney owes a client and would diminish an attorney's ability to achieve the
most advantageous position for a client."'Id. at 189. Accord, Tlre Chapman Children's T m t v.
Porter &Hedges, L.L.P., 32 S.W.3d 419 (Tex.App. 2000); Rhode v. Adam, 288 Mont. 278,957 P.2d
1124 (1998): Gnrcia v. Rodey, Dickason. Sloan, Akin & Robb, P.A., 106 N.M. 757, 750 P.2d 118
(1988); Friedman v. Dozorc, 412 Mich. 1,312 N.W.2d 585 (1981).
Section 890 of the Restatement (Second) ofTorts (1979) provides: "One who would otherwise
would be liable for a tort is not liable if he acts in pursuance of and within the limits of a privilege of
his own or of a privilege of another that was properly delegated to him." The statements and conduct
of an attorney who participates in the judicial process are protected by the litigation privilege, or as
it is sometimes is called, litigation immunity. The privilege is not absolute; for instance, it does not
permit a lawyer to steal documents, IBP, Inc., v. Klurnpe, 101 S.W.2d, 461 (Tex.App. 2001), to
physically assault another party, Miller v. Stonehenge/FASA - Texas , 993 F.Supp. 46 1 (N.D. Tex.
1998), or to c o r n i t acts which constitute abuse of process or malicious prosecution. Otherwise, the
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privileg is broad. "VTphe litigation privilege proteets Iawyem not only against defmation actions but
against a host of other tort-related claim..*

Loigman v. Middietown, I85 N.J. 566,889 A.2d 126,436

It was held in L o i e a n that an attorney who excluded a spectator and self-styled cornunity
watchdog h r n a heaiing on the allegedly specious ground that the person was a potential witness was
held to be immune from a 42 U.S.C. $1983 suit brought by the d i s m t l e d watchdog. The court
observed that '"t]he c o r n o n policy h e a d that runs thou& judicial, prosecutorial and witness
immunity is the need to ensure that part-icipants in the judicial process act without fear of the threat
of ruinous civil litigation when performing their respective hctions." Id., at 581,889 A.2d at 436.
The privilege applies even where the theories advanced by counsel are new. or innovative:

Typically, the litigation privilege has been invoked by attorneys to safeguard
them &om defmation suits arising from comments made in the course of judicial
proceedings. However, to address creative pleading, courts have extended the
litigation privilege to cover unconventional and sometimes novel causes of action
against attorneys acting within the judicial process. As one scholar put it, as new tort
theories have merged, courts have not hesitated to expand the privilege to cover
theories, actions, and circumstances never contemplated by those who formulated the
rule in medieval England. (Citations and internal quotations deleted)

Id. at 583,889 A.2d at 435-436.
If attorneys must work in constant fear of civil liability, then the rights of all clients will suffer.
Thus, it has been recognized that counsel owes no duty to a party opponent in litigation:
Historically, our court system has always been adversarial in nature. The role
of the attorney therein is to represent and advocate a client's cause of action as
vigorously as the rules of law and professional ethics will permit. For that reason
an attorney's exclusive and paramount duty must be to the client alone and this duty
cannot run to the client's adversary. Not only would the adversary's interests
interfere with the client's interests, but the attorney's ongoing and justifiable concern
with being sued would detrimentally interfere with the attorney client relationship.
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Thw, an altorney in dischar@ngprofessional duties on behalf of his client cannot be
held liable for ne&igence toward an advme party. As a matter of public policy in
order to mllinlain and a f o r e the fidelity and duty of the attorney toward the client,
t jeopardize the inteMty of the advmarial system by imposing a
professional duty on nattorney toward an advarse party. (Citations omitted)

a

Garcia v. Rody, Dickason, Sloan, Akin & Robb, 106 N.M. 757,761,750 P.2d 118, 122 (1988).

Nor does violation of the Code of Professional Responsibility give rise to a private cause of
action, either in favor of the laver's own clients or third parties. "The rules are designed to provide
guidmce to lawyers and to provide a strucwe for regulating conduct through disciplinary agencies.
They are not designed to be a basis for civil liability." Id. at 762,750 P.2d 123.
Nmerous r q r t e d cases support the proposition that the privilege attaches where attorneys
represent clients in litigation or other contested or advmarial matters. See, e.g., Al'pert v. Crain, Caton
& James, P.C., 178 S.W. 2d 398 (Tex.App. 2005); C X Transportation, Inc. v Gilkinson, 2007 WI,

858423 (N.D.W.Va. 2007); Weaverv. Superior Court,95 Cal.App. 3d 166,156 Cal. Rptr. 745 (1979);
Clark v. Dmckman, 281 W.Va. 417,624 S.E. 2d 864 (2005); Friedman v. Dozorc, 412 Mich. 1,312

The case of Kahata Royal Corp. v. Goodrr'llAnderson Quinn & Stifel, 113 Hawai'i 25 1, 151
P.3d 732 (2007), contains an extensive review of the authorities and the policy reasons for baning a
litigant's claim for civil damages against an opposing attorney for statements made or actions taken
in the course of the attorney's representation of an opposing party related to the civil litigation. The
policy reasons include:
(1) promoting the candid, objective, and undistorted disclosure of evidence; (2)
placing the burden of testing evidence upon the litigants during trial; (3) avoiding the
chilling effect resulting &om the threat of subsequent litigation; (4) reinforcing the
finality of judgments; (5) limiting collateral attacks upon judgments; (6) promoting
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zealous advocacy; (7) discouraging abusive litigation practices; and (8) mcowadng
settlment.

Id. at 268, 151 P.3d at 750.
The allegations in the present case relate to thmries advanced, positions taken, e o m e n t s
made and defenses raised by HTEH in litigation or related adversarial m a t l a relating to disputed
control of closely held corporations. Those cowrations are entitled to zealous rqresentation by
atlomeys of their own choosing, who should not be required to labor under constant threats of
vindictive and raliatory litigation by the adverse party. The litigation privilege applies not only to
plaintiffs cause of action for professional malpractice, but to those of aiding and abetting and civil

conspiracy, which should be dismissed in their entirety on the ground that the actions of HTEH as
litigation counsel for AIA Services, AIA Insurance and CropUSA are privileged.
VIII. CONCLUSION

The complaint fails to state a cognizable claim. The plaintifirs cause of action for aiding and
abetting does not state a claim upon which relief can be granted because he fails to allege any facts
that, if true, would establish that HTEH owed any duty to him or that he has any standing to sue HTEH
directly. His claims of civil conspiracy and intentional interhence with contract also fail because,
as a matter of law, an agent, such as an attorney, is incapable of conspiring with his principal or
i n t d i n g with the principal's contract. His claim under the Idaho Consumer Protection Act fails as
a matter of law because he does not allege he has purchased any goods or services from HTEH. His
claim for conversion is legally deficient because he fails to allege any specific chattel of which he was
wrongfully dispossessed by HTEH. He fails to allege any facts which would show that he is in privity
with HTEH or has any standing to sue that firm or its attorneys for malpractice. Finally, plaintiffs

@
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complajnt is deficient because the actions of WTEH in mmection with the Underlying Litigation are
protntcd by ihc litigation pfiuilege.
DATED this

4

day of

2008.

By:

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

9

I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the
day o f L
h a .2008, I caused a true and
correct copy of the above and foregoing instrument to bk served upon the following in the manner
indicated below:
Michael S. Bissell
CAMPBELLBISSELL& KIRBY,PLLC
7 South Howard Street, Ste. 416
Spokane, WA 99201

U.S. Mail
Hand Delivery
- Federal Express
7
Facsimile Transmission (509) 455-71 11
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NO. 9026

1)ISWC"Ir
C O ~ OF
T THE %COW m
STAm OF IDABO, l[N AND FOR

REED J. TAYLOR, an individual,

1

I WD
X
S
m
a
OF NEZ PERCE

CASE NO. CVO8-01763

)

1

)
)
)
M C W L E.MGMCHOLS,an h&ddwl; )
C L E m 8 , BROWN & McMmOLS,
)
P.A., an Idaho professional corpors'ltvn;
)
J A l E DOES I-V, WOW
hG~dd~; 1

Defendants.

P- 1/19

OPrnION ANL, ORDER ON
D E F E N D W ' MOTTON

TO DISMSS AND PLmmFF'S
M o n o N T O m

cow-

1

1

This matt0r is before the Court on DefendmtsWotion to Dismiss and Plaintiffs Motion
was held on October 16,2008 and a

to h a n d Colldpfaint. A heari~gon tha Motion to

he+

on thc Motion to Amend Complaint was h01d on December 4,2008. PIaintiEFReed

Taylor was represented by attorney Michael S.Bisall. rlefendrrnts Michael E. McNiehols end

the law firmof Clments, Brown & McVichols were represented by attorney John J. Janis. The
G o ~ r thaving
,
read the motion and briefs of the parties, b ~ considered
g
the record in Ulc

matter, hming heard oral arguments of counsel and bering fully advised in the matter, hereby
tenders its decision.

rrrylov v. McNtchDLr
Opinion & Order on Motion KO Disrniw

I
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Percs C o m v Case No. CV07-00208. The ismw in.the mdwlag casd RE complex a d its
pmeedutal bistctry len@y, though the mtta has yert to go to triiiL Reed Taylw" comp&t in
the d e r l m case, amen$ed five times,asserts eleven claims including one for d d d t of a $6
million ~ ~ I t r i s s onoEB
r y issud to Reed Taylor by the q o r a t s defisndants as part of a bupout
or re&ement package. In ordar to mderstahd the ol

being asseed in the instant matter,

certain events in the mderlying o w must be reviewed.

On January 29,2007, Reed Taylor filed auit against AIA Sewises Coxporation, AIA
e, h.John
, Taylor,C o d e Taylor, Bqm Freeman md JoLee hclos. A U Insurance,

Inc. is a buhess entiv under the mbmlla of ALA Services Comporatioa At the time of the
E lof thp,Iawdt, John Taylor was the aana&g director of the corporations and a board

member along with Bryan Freeman and JoLee hclos. Coanie Taylor, tEre former wife of John
Taylor, held a m

m ~property
v kitemst inthe corporations. Following the filing of the

lawsuit, attorney Michael McNichols was retained to repraent AYA S ~ C R SAIA
, Insurance and
John Taylor; attorney David O i ~ ~
was
mretained to represent Bryan Freeman and JoLec Duclos;
attorney Jan H d y was r&&ed to fepwesent C o d e Taylor.

On February 27,2007, upon motion by the Defendants, the Court granted a temporary

res*

order against Reed Taylor &BT he artemp&d to exercise mmgcment authority over

the copraze Defendants.A hearing date was them set on the Defendants' accompmag motion
for a preliminary injunction. On March 8,2007, as a result of actions taken by Reed Taylor
before and immediately foIlowing the filing of his lawsuit, tbe Court entered a p m l i a r y
injunction pmkbiting Reed Taylor from acting or attemptingto act as manager and/or a board

Taylor V M&f~hob
Opinion& Order onMorton IO 13imIss
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memba of AIA

On ME& 28,2007, agomey NcNchols filed a modon to witfidraw as co-1
S c ~ m and
s AIA

for AIA

e- b e d Taylor did not objcot and, at a hemlag on April 12,2007, the

Court @mad&0 motion to *&aw.

Oa May 7,2007, a notice of appaxance on behalf of

S & G ~ and AL4 h m c e %?a$
tiled by aameys Oary Babbitt. and John A&ky of the law

firm mwl~y,~ x e lEnnis
l St Hawley, LLP. The firxu w n ~ u w
to reprment the cofpo~afXons.
The last rngtter in the underlying case that is of rele~mwto the htmt awe is a &g

by

the Goutt on motion for partial s m q judment filed by Reed Taylor- A f k sigaifimt

briekg md ord a m m b on the motion, the C o w found the corporate D~fendarltswere id

default on a $6 d i o a pmissory note issued to Reed Taylor by the corporations. Howmer, the
Court mde no detednation relative to other t m s in tfie ateasivo buy-out *mmW beWen

AIA W m c e Corporation and Reed Tc~ylor,such as the effect on voting shares and receivables
upon default of tho promissory note. Those issues were not before &a Coat in the context of the
motion for &p

judgment and,therefore, have yet to be d e t e d e d .

After twenty-one months of motions and h d g s in the uaderlying ease, after trial dates
had been set and reset, and with a number of motions still panding before the Court, Reed Taylor

filed the above-entitled action a
g
W attorney MC%Ch613 and the law firm of Clements, Brown
& McNichols, who currently remain as counsel for J o h Taylor in the wderlag ease.

In his

action, Bed August 8,2008, Reed Taylor asserts the following claims against attorney
M~NichoZsand his law fbm: (I) aiding Emd abetting or afsistin$ others in the c o d s s i o n of
tortiom am inthe underlying case; (2) conversion and mis~ppmpr3.ationof M A oorporate

'Wch 8,2608 Opfnfon and Order on Defkndm' Motion for prelim in^ fqjmction
Taylor 9 McNichok
Opfnion d Order cm Modmto Dismiss
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assea; (3) dol&~m
of Idaho" am-r

Pmkcldbn Act, I.C, 5 48-@I & sq-;and, (4)

p r a f d ~ m@gmw
d
w.d/or bmch of Bduciary dub.es. 011 Sepwber 29,2008, Dehdant
McNiohols, k u & hwmek filed a m o ~ o to
n dmk purmant to 1KC.P. 120,3(6) along with
brifig

Reed Tayfor filed briew fn oppodtidn and on Octdber 15,2008, the Coutt h d ord

armmts of c o ~ a l ,
One day prior to the COW'Sh e h g on D&ndm&' Motion to W

s s , Pl&m filed a

motion to m a d his wmpkc attach&his pmposed mended pleding, By order ofthe
Go-

haaring on tha Motion to Amend was held on Dtcenrbe~4,2008 and the Court will

addtess the maw herein

.ST-rn

ON MOTION TO DISMIR

In d i h g on a motion to &missp u r m t to 1.RC.P. 12(ti)(6), a coat is to review all
facts and infmnces in favor of the non-movhg party atld ask whether a daim for relief has been

stated, Kohr v. Rohr, 128 Idaho 137,141,911P2d 133,137 (1996). Inthe instant matter, the
arguments made by &a parties incorp~raedevants and actiotls that have occmed in the

m&rlging w e of Taylor v. AU, et 4.Therefore, ki making its analysis in the instant mattex

and p m 8 n t to I.R..E. 201, the Cow willtake judicial notice of the waderlying case fn toto

pNALYrn

m_D m m M s l MOZm TO DIEMISS
The hut%raised in the instant matter appear at fitst blmh to bc complex and at times
convol\aed However, despite lengthy briefs and pleadings, the issucf are not as daunting as thcy

,
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first appesr.' A6 stated by R&

Taylor in his opposition Wsf the p v m m of his Complaint ir

that a&oancyMeMchols and tha law fkm of CbmW, Brow $ MoNiohols aided and abet.ted

John T d o r md othm in co
of mvnq md prop-

g torts ag&

Reed Taylor and acted to daprive rteed Taylor

to which ho is atitled?

Each of fithe claims asserted by Plaintiff relies upon his contation that aDefendant law
firfa md a a m e y wete xetahed to mpresent the AIA caqorations by J o b Taylor and/or others,

that John Taylor and/or others had no 8uthan:ty to fetafn Iegd qresmtation for the corparations,
and fiat Defendants knew they were r e a e d wi&owt proper corporate authocty, This fsctual
asselrtion by PZainWIs critical to his elalms and oanses each of Plain=$ cfatms to fail as a

In tbe undmIwg case, the events of the litigation can be divided into three & s h t time
frames based on pxocedd svents in the case. The first h

efime m
s fkom the fiIing of Reed

Taylor's fawsuit iigainst tha AIA corporations, Jabin Taylor and other8 until the Court's Order
e n t e ~ agprelimhay injunction in the case. The siecond time f i m e begbs with the mtry of the
p r e l g injm&on
~
until, the Comt's Opinion and Orda finding AM in default on the $6
million promissor~rnote (but defening any tinding on other terms of the buy-out agreement until
trial), The third time h m e begins with the COW'Sfin*

of default an the pro~ssorynote and

continua to the present

In the instant owe, aftomey McNichols was retained to represent .MA Services, AIA
I n m c e and John Taylor after Reed Taylor filed suit against the corporations and its board

members in Nw;Psrce County Cast No. WO7-00208.At the time o f

filing of the lawsuit,

John Taylor was the managing director of the cofpohons and had bcan for many verns Reed
Pmtiffs Complaint is twc:nty-tbme pages fn hgth. ~efc-'
briefin suppat of@e motion to &amiss is
thfrty-ebt pegas in lsngtk PfefnWsbidin opposflion is
pages in length
PlaintifPs Response to Dafkndants' Motion to Dismisb at p a p 19.

m- even

Tcp,forv MENichotr
OphIon & Otdu on Nation to Dismiss
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T@ot mnmds fbamment at issue; in Ult mdml*g

cme inchdm t e r n that n a k him fhe

sole skeholder ofthe cclfpoxacionsupon defdt of ihe @odssoq aote, md, bwwe he

b@G@v@d
the P ~ S O W note was in def8ulf he was the only person with a u a o ~ to
p r6t&

wmel fol the wqoxatiom to defend ag*

B

tZle acGon he br0ugh.t. Howeva, at the time

d to mrmeat tfie ~ w m % o nand
s J o h Tqlor, the question of wheaer

the pa&sory note rnin d e f d t h d not b
C o d Until such a dnt
wmel for the c q g d o m n*sted with Zfic: cofpottifc board of directom, which incIuded John

Taylor. Thesefore, at .thetime attorney McNichols tyas retained to represent the cozpomtians,
rn&o~Q to enter into a contracr for legal strrices rested with the corporzfte board of directors,

Reed Taylor, on the other hand, had no authority dwkg this time period to make decisions for
the cerponrfrions.

It would be a s m g e situation b d c d for a aivil pl&tifF to be mpowred to

seIect counsel for t;hs defmdant or, by logical extansion, decide the &fendant should have no

eourasel at all.
Mer he vras mtained to represent John TsyIor and the corporatiom, attorney M~Ni~hols

filed a aotion seeking a p r e r m q injmctioa

Reed Taylor. The motion was filed after

Reed Taylor a m p b d to have locks changed at the corporate oBces in an effort to take over

m q e m e n t of the corporations. The liti~tionaction of attomy McNiA~lswas cleas1y
wananted whem litre~oodof peat ham to thf:corporation existed &om Reed Taylor's conduct

ahd no & t e a t i o n on the question of defiiult andlor the effectsof any default had been made
by the Comt As xetained counsel for thc corporations and John Taylor, attorney MeNichols was
obIig8a to pursue dl eRom necessary to prevent ham to the wrporations and defend his
clients against the nmerow claims of Reed Taylor.

Taylor v. McNkhol~
Opinion 8t Order on Motion ut Dfsmths
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MwCtt 8,2007, after M o m for inwcdos were filed by both parties inthe
mtlerlying mit, &a h @ y M e k g wm
hjmdm o r d a g mmgment of the co~Wonit:
to

staW qua, i.e. for m a g e m a t of

the c o p d o n to remain vestsd in Qe mprasions' board of dkcctors. In addition,the
hh&on p~oh%ited
Reed Taylor from
d l e r of the COW

FoHoPving .the Cow's mtxy of the

injmction, a b q

McNichoXs moved to *thdraw as counsel for the corporatiom The Court m t e d bre motion

and new ootlflsel was scibs~utjnflyrctaincd to repregeslt tfic corpomti~ns.

Ia tbt hstmt matt&, PIainWs

assertionis that aftomey XvIc=~hob was retained

to tt3prwm.t the ALA wwr&o118 by pesons who had no authotity to retaincorporate co\msel

a i d that attorney McMchok knewIile was retained without proper authorizatioa This fwt fails
as a matter of law as theCourt entered an Order eatly in the&=lying acdmthat estabbhed by
judicial orda that tbe operatiom md m g e m m t of the AUI. csxporations was to remain
unchged until furthtz order of the C o d The Court's Oxder m a i n s in effect to date. Under

Idaho Code 5 30-1-302, corpandom have the same power as individuals to mdce con&acts and
incur IiabiXities as necessary to carry out its bwhss t&%rs and John Taytor, as CltiO of the

qoratiws anii pumasit to the Cow's Ordw, had .the aa%oIity to retain counsel for the
~~onttians.

PlainWs a

W also f&l under dre doctrine of litigation privilege.

The Court found no

Idahb case law addressing the doctrioe. Nevdetess, numerous other jwisdictions haw
addrrnscd fhe doctrine at length, pmviding the Court Nit$ direction as to the applicabifjty of thc
pzivilegc.

Trrylorv . Mch'fdiofa
Qpitniod & Odw on Modon to Dismiss
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in West Virginis,h v c dhwd thpi Utigation pxivilcge ooa a

occasiom. Ia CZWRV.Dnrcfkmm, 624 5 8 2 6 864,218 W.Va 427 (W Vn2005), tfre pl&tiff. a

physician and f m e r defendmt in a medical m k m t i c e suit, asserted claims in neggencc

counsel for the plaintiff in the malpfactice lawsuit. The Clmk Court, loo-

fixst at the

Wts of an aMomy, found an inffedblc e m e n t that attorneys diligmtly, faithfufly and
dely p d o m every a d necessary to prow$, corn-

and advance the interests of thelr

clim&. Clwk v Drrrchan, 624 S.E.2d at 868. The Court then noted that its mswch revealed
no case law thf
would support Clark's assertion that an aaomey owes a duty to aa opposing

psxty, such fhatbreach of the duty woutd subject an attorney to liability. Id. at 869. The Court
stated, "This COWcan find no j m c a t i o n for imposing a duty of care in favor of an opposing

party upon camel. hposition of such a duty can only ~ o r kto the detriment of cowel's own
client md would adversely hpaot counsel's duty of zedous advocacy for his or her own client
and would mmta an impossible and unjus~dconflict of interest.'? Id.

Court's that have had the o p p o M q to address the litigationMvilege recognize the

adversarid system would be turned on its b d ifparties to a lawsuit were allowed to bring

claims fox torts andlor Isgd dprwtice against opposing counsel for conduct done within the
scbptpe of litigation. While attorneys must not kno-y

counsel or assist a client in c o d ~ n g

a crime or fraud4, Idaho's Rulm of Pmkssional Conduct. require an attorney to pursue m&ts on

behdf of a elisn~tdespite opposition, obstmtim or personal inconvenienceto the attorney and
require, an attorney to take whatever 1awfid and ethical m e m are nquircd to vindicate a
climtts cause or endeavor. IX.P.C.,Rule 1.3[l]

The docthe of litigation privilege a-

htended to create a safety zone for attorneys

so that they may zealously advocate for their client without Bar of retribution. The Supxcmt

* I.W.C., Rule 13[10]
Taylor v McNtcho&
Oplnlan & Ordw on Motion to D i d 8 s
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Cam of A p w s of West V m i a aptly &crib& the scope and purpose of the litigation

Xn her c m c d g apinioa in Barcrfeld v. DPIC Conrpmier, fnc., 215 W .Va. 544,
600 S,E.Zd256 @OW), J w t h Davis dismserd titre policies undexlfiw the
litigaGon pduilcge. Thmin she st&
[tlhe pubfir: policies as9~iiate-dwith the Wgdm privilege include: (1)
p m h g thrs candid, objective and
rted disclo- of widma;
(2) placing bra butda of ~
~ tbe j
g up6n the litigarrts during
W, (3) avoidhg thc cki
ct resulting f b m the threat of
s u b s ~ mlitigation;
t
(4)
m g the finality of judpents; (5) limiting
c o l h M attacks upon j d ~ e d s (6)
; pmmom zealous advocacy; (7)
d i s c o m ~ abusive
g
fitigation pr~cItices;and (8) tncouraging settlemtiat.
M a t m a v. BI du Pont de Nmours dt Co., 102 Hawai'i 149,73 P.3d
687,693 (2003).
B~efleld,215 W.Va. at 560,600 SB.2d at272 @a*, I., concWg). In light of
these policits, we see no reason to
between cmmunicariom made
during the litigation process and cordvct owurring during the litigationprocess,
As ncognked by the F'loxids S u p m e Court:
absolute immunity must be affotded to any acf occurring d d n g the course
of a judicial proceeding, repdless of whather the act involves a
defamatory statement or other tortious 'behavior such as the alleged
misconduct at ism, so long as the act bas some relation to the ptow&ng.
T ~ rationale
B
behind the immunity afforded to defamatory statements is
ccp&y applicable to other nulscondmt occurrjng during the c o w e of a
juafeial proceeding. Just as participants in litigaon must be free to engage
in amhindered c o m ~ c & 80
o t~w must those participants be free to use
their best judgment inprosecuhg or defending a lawsuit withoat fear of
bhp,to defend their actions in a subsequant civil action for misconduct.
Levin, Mfdmeb~ookr,
Mabie, Thomat,Mqes & MltLhell, PA., v. U~titedStates
Fh.e b a n c e Company,639 S0.2d 606,608 (ma1994). See also Jackson v.
BellSouth Talecommnfcatium,372 F.3d 1250,1274 (1Ith Cir.2004)(qwtbg
Levin ).

In Collins, we recogoizedthat absolute privileges, m h as the litigafionprivilege,
should only be: pmnittd in limited c i r c w c c s . ColZim, 2 1I W-Va at 461,566
S.E.2d at 598. Thus, we do not believe that a litigationprivilege should am,Iy to
bar IiebiIiV of an attorney in all c4rc-w.
In M e h e , Rider, Windholz &
WZIsorl 'v.Gentrat Bank Denver, N.A.,892 P.2& 230,235 (Colo. 19951, the
Colorado Supreme court noted that "an attorney is not liable to a non-client absent
a findingof'fiaud or malicious conduct by the attorney." See also Baglini v.
h l e f t u , 338 N,J.Super. 282,768 A.2d 825, 833-34 (2001) ('The one tort
Tzyforv. MaNiohoir
Optnfon & W w on Motion to D

9

m
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excepted from the m h of tbe litiw~onprivilege is aclficiow prosea~on,ot
use of prwm.". WP'
M e v e S U C emep.tiom
~
to RII absolute fitim~on
the &#on process are
&m@s duty of zealous
conduct which is unrelated to
oppo* parly. As recently n o w

&&OW

mafrauddaagainst
ftisd&pvvitha
third party, the fbct he did so in tha ~ w ofw
attorney fbr a client does
not relieve hiaa of Uabilw. W e an attorney's pmfmsiod duty of care
extends only to his own client and hmded bencfici&cs of bis legal work:
the W M o m on liabill'ty for negligme do not apply to liabiliq for
fraud.
Vega v. Jim& Dapt, Reavfs8 Pogue, 121 Cal&p.4th 282,291,I7 Cal,F@ix,3d
Z6,31-2(Cal.CtApp.2004)(mtmal citarfons md quotations omiM).

In order "([to rndtain an d o n for malicious proseculion it is essential to prove:
(1) That the pros~jutionwas rnallciow; (2) &atit was without masodable or
probable cause; and (3) that it k h t e d favoxably to plaintifE." Syl. Pt. I, Lyom
v D-Pocahotrl:~~ Coal Co., 75 W.Va 739.84 S.E,744 (1915). The tern
malioious is dofined as '"$]lub~tially wxtain to cause iqjwf' and "without just
cause or exmse? Blaclc's Law Diaionary 977 (8fh Ed2004). This definition
implies azl improper or gvil intent or axolive or the intent to do barn. Whmc an
attorney files suit without reasonable or probcible aause with the intent to harm a
d&enh$ we do not believe the litigation privilege should insulate him or fier
fim liability for dfoious p~secudon,
As noted above, we can thd no reasonablej a m t i o n for didnfnp;uisbingconduct
from c o m ~ a fc
m
$the parposes of the H~gationpriaege. Rowewer, tve
otlso recogniz-z the need fbr W t e d ~ x q t i o nfrom
s application of the absolute
litigation p ~ l e g for
e wrtain intentional actions. Aecor&gly, we now hold that
thc litigation privilege is p d l y appkable to bar a civil litigant's ofaim for civil
damages a m t an opposing party's &mey if the alleged act of the attorney
occurs in the c o m e of the attorney's we~entationof an opposing party and is
oonduct related to thc civil action,

Clark v. DmIbnun, 624 S.E.2d at 870-871.

In the instant mattes, P b m b argurx;t his fs a unique situation bemuse he has filed
suit against the A3.A corporations and its board membcrs, that the contractual tern at the core of

his undalying suit makc him the sole shareholder of the AXA corporations and, themfore, there is
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a C O ~b m
& e e n the MA oorpora~omand bre hard mmbsrs &it makes it bmropriae,
even %addent, fbr the board, or more pattioulaly far mm&g b o d m~mbe;rJ o b Taylor, to

fathff corporations, to direct m m e 1 for

thecorporations in my way, OT for them

to be my cooperation between mmsdfor the oorpoMom end c o w 4 fdf John Taylor. Boaom

line, Rwd Taylor mam& he is the only person witb a&onlty to d e t d n e who shodd serve as

wmsal for tht,corpodom he is suing. The Courl; like thcJ PlainM, has been unable to find a
case where a plhtighas filed suit ageinst a corpomtion and its board members and, while &at
litigation remains fling, has filed suit age%t.stthe attorneys r e p s e n ~ the
g various

inthe underlying suit. Nevertbelm, the Court does not fmd the!instant matter to be
as dcfue a9. P l W p h b it.
A casa with many similaritiesto tbe inmt owe is helpAil to thc analysis the Court must

makc. bAlpe& v Crain, Caton B James, P.C.,178 S.W.3d 398 flex.App.=Hourton [I" Dist]
2005), Robert Alp& filed suit against the law firm representing Wrk Riley, the d c f m h t in a
separak d

o n filed by Mt. Alpat Maik Riley was an attorney who had assisted klr. Alpert in

his b a a s aud leg$ &&. M8r the reMonsfip betPz8en Alpcrt and Riley sowed, Mpert
filcd sait against Riley and Riley asserted cctuntr:relaims. Riley was rcpresated by the Crain
Caton law firm during the litigation. Alpat then fded suit against Crain Caton law finYl asserting

the firm had conspired with Rilq to defiaud Alp%&had aided and abetted rrilty to deftaud

Alp&&had tortiously interkred with Riley's fiduciary duty to Alp& by concealing Riley's
maipxwticcs end braache6 of fiduciary duly, by filing frivolous la-ts

against Alperl and b

y

disparaging Alpert's repM~tionin the business coxum~ty.The law firm moved to dismiss the
lawsuit based on nlpert's Edilura to state a r e c o g h b l claim. The Zowcr court granted the

TQIW v. McNIubolf

Opinion & Order on Motion to Dismiss
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motion and Alpsrt appealed The tdd cow's didssd of tbe lawsuit wss a m r e d by the Toras
Cow of Appeals.

In raac&g its dedsioq the Texas Cow made the following sta~smb:

PcrMs as gn osboot of its $ ~ j*pm&nce,
q
Texas case Iaw has
dmouragd l t w ~ & ~
an opposing caunsel if the lawsuit if based on the
S&e& 14 S.W.3d 756,766

aaomey
a dm to zeals
IfrudtY. FB&,
892 S,W.LZd56,71-72 vex.App.-HoMon [lst bist ] 1994,wit
deded). In W-g
tbis duty, an
has %e rigfit to interpose defenses a d
pursue legal si&(s
he d e m necessary and p r o p I *.&out being subject to
damaa. Id If an mmey could be hdd h b l e to an opposing party
cat8 made or actiow taken in the course of rg,xmmw fnis cliet&he
m d d be fo& cor&antly to balm? his o m p t m W expome against his
clients best -&. See id Such a co&& h p e r s rhe resolution of disputes
through tbe court system d the a-at
ofjustice. T$us, to promote zedow
q m a t i o b murts have Wd that an aEomey is '"MCKUy -me''
ftom
civil liabflity,with reqmrt to rran-~licnts,for actions takzn in comecdon wifh
r q r e s m h a client in li*ation. See, e.g., Bvtler v. LZlly, 533 S.W.2d 130,13134 Vex.Ap.-Rousron [lst Disk] 1976, wit dism'd].

This @ifidb
~ gemrally
q appBes wen if conduct is w o n m in the
context of the m d m g lawsujt. R e ~ o v.
e Jones & Rrsocs., 947 S.W 2d 285,
288 Penr4pp.-Fort Worth 1997, writ dcaicd) ('Wndm Texas law, attorneys
catmot be held liable for wro@ 5tigation wnduct.").For sxmple, a third party
has no independent fi@t of recovery against an attorney for iiling motions in a
lawuif evm if ftivolom ox without merit, &thou& such conduct is sanctionable
or con~mptibtaas 0nfomd by the m t o q or inbereat powers of the court. Weft,
892 S.W.2d at 72. Courts have re&sed to acbowledge an hdepmdent cause of
d o n in swh htmces "becausem&g motions is wnd& an attorney engages
in rts part ofthe discharge of his duties in wmenting a party in a lawsuit."Id
(holding no cause of actioa existed for m&ing motion for contempt because
ammeys do not om du?yto be carrect in legal ar~en&-"evenif the ...motion
for coattmpt hsd b e a meritless, thek oonduct in so mocoming as it did in
the discharge of their duties in repramltlng a part~rin a lamuit, w d d still not be
actionable.")). 7'hw, an attorney'sconduct, even if frivolous or without metit, i$
not independently actionable if the conduct is pact o f t . discharge of the lawyer's
duties in repmating his or her cli-t Id at 74; Chapman C;lhildm%TW v.
Porter & Hedges, LI;.P.,32 S.W-3d 429,441 m.App.-Houston tl4t.hDit]
2000, pet. denied). The b
~focwsv on the type of mhct,not on whether
thc conduct was meritorious in tht, write* of the underlying lawsuit. Renzoe, 947
S.W2d at 288.

ks the Texas Supxme Court observed in McCmlsh, a lawyefs protection fiom
liability arising out of his rcprcsentation of a client is not without limits,See
Taylor v. McNchok
O p W n 8; Ordbr on Motion to DtsmLnr
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Udamtsh, 991 S.W.2d at 793-94: see aIso Tole$ v Tole4 113 S.W.3d 899,91213 Vc;x@p.-Ddas 2003, no @).For eurmpke, a cause of mtion could exist
aomey d o bo*gly m-ts
a ftaudulcrat act o-ide the seopff of
e&aon of the clieak Sea LfRaverv. gmfloww Terrace B, Lfd,
8,472 v U p p . - H o ~ n
[lst DM] 1985, no writ). If a lawyer
@cip& in a q e n d a a y &ddmtactivitia, his d o n is ''foreign to the
&ties of an 8ttomey." Id (qwtingPaale v.
137 (I 8821). A lawyer thus cannot gMeld hi
buddent actions earn liaWQ shply on tho grad that he is an agent of his
client. See M

In fhe instant case2Read Taylor's c1

the Defendants are based solely on

eonduct engaged in by attorney McNichols as pat of his obligation to mdously mpresmt his

clients in the litigation procass brought about by Reed Taylor's lawsuit against attamey
McNichols's clients. PlainWs fiat cause of action asserts the Dtfi:ndaats, with fiall knowledge
of Reed Taylor's rights under the buy-out apemerzt, aided and abetted others inthe tortious
int~~~fetmcc
of Reed Taylor's mntraotual rights. Plaintiffasserts that in seeking and o b W g a

me, attomcy McNichols aided and abetted

p t e l m injtmtion qdmt him in the undeil-

in thr:hterEmnoe of P W s mtractual rights that are at issue in the underlying case.

The conduct alleged by Pl&Wwas not unlawful, was dope in tho course of the
litigation proccs and in the course of rqmenting his clients' rights mtil a debmbtion on the

legal ism= could be made though the judicial process. The conduct o f the Defendants done in
tho come of seeking a judicial detf:rmimtioa.on the numerous claims brought against the
Dcfendaats' clients inthe underlying case frills within the litigation privilege even though Reed

Taylor may eventually prevail in the underlying d o n . Whcn a party makes a claim that a
prodsory xrote is in default and that certain tenns of an agreement art triggered by the default,
an attorney is obligated to zealously defend his client against the claims. It is not enough that a
plaintiff believes he will prevail on his claims. The ALA corporationsand the board of dirc3ctors
Tbylor v. McNichok
Oplnion & Orbn on Motion to Dunriss
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A

have a l a m J$#I~, hdeed the obfim~on,to wroMately defend gp

h a d regadkg any d d w e s to tfie
za~onand its dire-

. In ddition, any aaomey

has aa M d b l e obligation to zealously q r w a t his clime in b

t

defense and is obligated to take a m e r Btsps me necossw *this thc litigation to protect his
clients rights until a dete

on of the issues is d

o by a cow.

The seaonti cause of action asserted by P l b i E i s for one of canvdon, In'&
u n d c r l h case, the question of *e&a
to the co&ssiom

the term of the bby-out & @ w e n tentitle Reed Taylor

and related receivabla of AlA Wed as security fox t6c promissory note

is an opan one. In the h

t c w zPlaintiff contands that by ac-g

sewim, attorney &Nichols and his firm have con-

paymat fm iegd

those assets of AYli fn which Reed

Taylor bas a security interest, knowing Reed T~ylorhas a security interest in the assets, aad thus

have & M l y mveded to Defend-

assets &longing to Reed ~ a ~ ~ o rA.s: 'the COM hzls

already stated, there is in place m Order that matlagwent of the colpadons is to remain with

the hard of directors until a damination of Reed's ctaitns is made or anti1 M c r order of the
Court, Secondly, the cowmtiona and the board of directors haw a right to defend against thrt
claims of Reed T~yloxand to retain counsel to provide the necessary defense. The Defendants'
aations in defending their clients agaimt the claims 5all squarely within the litigation privilege.
Reliance on 131.8 Cow's Order placing a&aity to mmage the corporatfonswith the board of

directors, which includes mmc&g to pay for legal services, is justified and does not make the
Defendants liable for conversion.

.'Plaintiff a r p that as a secured aditor, he has a right to m&e &&ions

negHniiag the operations of the
corporation. PlafntWhas provided ths Court with no aurhoriry for his pos!tion. As a sedured oreditor, Plamtiffhns a
right to seek a j u d w t atlowfaghfm to take control ofthe security, a clalm.he has asserted in rhe underlying action
and one that has yet to be dstumined.
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e of d o n as-

MO. 9426

,

DefenhB violated the IWo Gonsma

ProteGtion A&, h p d c u l s X.C.8 48-608(2), by enga@g in acts,conduct, and represendom

andlor deqtive c

unf& mdlor d e M m acts andlor

pmodces. This allegation xlot onfy fallswithin the p o t d o n s of fhe litipti,onprivilege, as the

ace M c h PIainWdege!esDefendants engaged in w m mprestntatio~~
presented to the Court

within the scope of & f e w @ ' mresenation of the corpomte clients, but the claim fails for
la& of ~

~whichqis elearly
, mq&d mder the 1 m p g e of I.C.

§ 48-608(1).'

PldnWs fourth cause of action asgas profe~sionalnegligence andlor breach of
Dehnciants' fiduciary duties to Read Taylor a
d the AIA co~porations.This claim fit& fbr two

reasom; (1) litigation privilege aad (2) lack of an &ttomey-clfantrelatiomEp between Plaintiff
arrd the Defehbts. In H a ~ d ~v.l Humck,
d
140 Idaho 134,90 P.3d 884 (2004) and again in
&late of Becker u Canahan, 140 Id&o 522,96 P3d 623 (2004), Idaho's Stlp2eme Court

directly

sed the qw&n of whether an attorney-oliant reltrtionship is necessary before a

claim for d p r a c t i w may be sserted against an attorney. The Court hid that, with the narrow

exception of the

g of Wrnw do~menb,
thae must be an attorney-client

mlationship for a mdpotim claim to be viable. In the instant matter, not oaly has Plaintiffnot
asserted tSle cxistttlce of en attorney-ctientrelationship with the Defadants, a key component of

his C o m p l d i s that he has not been coaeuIted or aUowed to choose counsel for the

F W y , them am two positions w r t e d by Plaintiff that thc Court finds should be
&wed.

Ths f ~ sist the assertionthat aftomey NdMichols should have withdrawn &om

representing not only the corporations, but from representing Jab Taylor. Plaitltiffargues

@LC.9 48-608 reads in n ~ c mpan,
t "Any parson who ptnchaees or lease goods or sa-vim . .
his own admiion, didnot purchme the mrvices of attomoy McWtchols or bifilaw firm.
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momey McNicbob owed a duty of loyalty to t h corpma~ons
~
as cliab a d that ptmdd

h ~ b-een
m

the corpodons and J o h Taylor dm=& McMi~hohnot rqfisent

him The relatio11ships b

Zhe def%ndm&inthe u n d t r l h case have mmy overiayo, some

C O & ~

of *oh

of

potmWy create ~nflicti;
of &rests

potenliaay ereate c

the

the defmdmta and some of a c h

of ~ a g s bb a e n &t dcfahb. One comonaliv batween

in the mdaiying caw: is that they are all defdmb. H%ere are w ~ c of@

intereat b t hava been created by attorney McNj~holsinitidy aoting as c o w e l for the
co~poratiomand John Taylor, it is ibr the w m o n clients to raise or to waive, not the opposing
party- Rule 1.7 of the Idaho Rules of Professional Caadwt adhsses conEtict8 of interest

betpreen cLi~ft.ts.Come-

23 makes clear that then arc & c m c e s in wbich it is not

imprapex for m affomey to represent codefadants wen though m&cts of intereat may
potandally exist, In the inmint case, attom~yMcNchoXs r w e n t e d dl three clients for only a
brief patiod at the very b e m g of ths litigation, doing so at a very critical period in the case.

His h e & & % actions were clearly within that which is acceptable under rhe rules of
pmfgssiod conduct established for attomcys mramting codefmdm&in a Iitigatioa
The second position asserted by Plaintiff is Ms m m a i

the codefendants have acted

monplly in entering into a joint defense agrecxncnt Xn the underlying case, many of Reed
Taylor's claims challmge btcrcsts

fbe m~orationsand t&eindividul board msmbm have

in common and tha6 tberefore, require a common defense. It is o d y reasonable that a degree of

cooperation mmt exist between cowel for thc corporations and counsel for the inrtividual board

members, as the carpomtionis incapable of c o m e c a k g vVith its counsel except through those
individuals who run the corporations. Con-

to the assertion by Plaintiff*,enbring into a joint

defense agreement does not probibit rhc codefendants from asserting claims against each otber if

?''lor u McNfchofs
Opinion & Order on Motlon to DLsrniss
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such c I h s atre ~mm%d.
h&cr, it p r o v i b thr!partim certain protections in regard to their
w m d c a t i o a s with each o&a on thase arcas o f c b m o n d e f e ~ and
~ e c o m o n htesst, The
joint

pridege, or

tl & f a s t . nrfe, is an e m i o n of tbe artomey-client pfivilege

hause it ptects m m ~ c a t i o nbWm
s
the pBstics w h a they am part of an on-gokg and
joint effort to mt up a cornon defanse sWte@ h iamcction with a c t d or p r o q d v e

E~gadm.Intax Rscreazlon Coy. v. Team Worl&ide Corp ,471 f;.Supp.Zd 1I (lI).L).C.200T),
The rule qplias not only to c o m h c a t i o n s but atso to docmeats ~otectedby &e work
yoduct doc-e.

Id

In conclmion, for the reasors sWed above, the Court: finds the c l h s assextedby
P1hm fail to state c l b for which relief my be $rmW As a matter of law, PlaintifPs
claims must be climhsed.

@'r P L m m ' S MOnON TO J W EC~O m U T

"The deofsion whethm to dIow a perty to amend its pleadings is left to the sound
d i s m ~ o nof the t&d c o w . .. ." Wet18 v* United Stcite.s Imtrrance Co., 119 Idaho 160,166,804
P2d 333 (Ct.App.1991). It is not an abwc of discretion to deny a motion to amcnd .Nhttri the

record mntains no allegationh$ if proven, mdd entitle a plainti@to the tclief claimed. Id. at
167.

The Court, after hearing oral s p e n Q of counsel and after reviewing Plaintiffs

proposed metided complaint, finds it would bc a %tile aot to grant Plaintifl's motion to amend
8s the proposad amended complaint wouId not withstand a motion to dismiss.

h his proposed

mmded compl&n&P l h W asserts the same claims as set for& in his original Complakit and

seeks to add derivative claima. PlajnWs amended direct claims fail as a matter of law for the

Taylor v. Mifdiak
Opfnion & Onfa rm M o t h to Dfsmkrs
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sme reasam as ad&esed by tfie Court above, despite PlainWs bare rtlltgation that the c m h e t

aid d o l l s of& Befendm e x a d d d~

scope of their r4prtsen&~o~.

PlainWs aaempt to bring dgxiva6ve claims on behalf of AIA Inswmce and AZA
Sedc89 fail es a me0r o f law, Idaha Code 8 30-1-741 clearly and uttmbjguowly pwihs

sW&g to W g derivattve pceedings only to b s e who art sbdoMers at dLc time of the act

or o m i s ~ o ncompl&ed o f and only to those shareboldnn;who f k i y and adeptely rupresw
the htmsts of b corpofation. As noted by tht M A Official Cornmat at the end of I.C. 4 30-

1-741, while some state's have e-d

the "mnbmpmous" o m e ~ M dp e , Idaho's

l e e b e chose to retah the q ~ m e n t as, is evidenced by tfie language in the staWt6.

PMntiffcontm& that, because other Btates have dlowed creditors and stock pledges to bring
derivad~eclaims, standing should not bc limitad to sheholdas. The Court is not p-ded

Td&o Code fj 30-1-741 is clear and unanbiiguous, making it clear Idaho's legislature has chosen
to Mt detivative claims to ~ e h o l d m
only.

!2EiwB
P I h W s Motion to Amend Campfaint is hereby DENIED.
Defendants' Motion to W s s is hereby 0-P.

Dated this

%3
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In the Supreme Court o

&of Idaho

rn

li
I'1
I

REED J . TAYLOR, an indiv~dual,
Plaintiff-Appellmt,

I
L E. MC MCHOLS, an individual;
)
CLEmmS, B R O W & MC MCHOLS, P.A., )
an Idaho professional colporation; J
1 V, d n o m individuals,

.

Supreme Court Docket No. 361302009
Nez Perce County Docket No.
2008-1763

1
Defendants-Respondents.
...........................................................

WED J. TAYL,OR,

I
1

Plaintiff-Appellant,

1
V.
1

I

GARY D. BABBITT, an individual; D.JOHN
ASEXBY, an individual; PATmCK V.
COLLINS, an individual RICI3AFXI A. RILEY,
an indvidual; HAWLEY, TROXELL, ENNIS &
HAWLEY, LLP, an Idaho limited liability
pmership; JANE DOES I-X, unknown
ir~dividuals,

)

)
)
)
)

Supreme Court Docket No. 3613 12009
Nez Perce County Docket No.
2008-1765

/I/

1
)

Defendants-Respondents.

1

It appearing that these appeals should be consolidated for all purposes for reasons
of judicial economy; therefore, good cause appearing,

//I

IT E R E B Y IS ORDERED that appeal No. 36130 and 36131 shall be
CONSOLIDATED FOR ALL PURPOSES under No. 36130, but all documents filed shall bear
both docket numbers.
IT FURTHER IS ORDERED that the District Court Clerk shall prepare a
CLERK'S RECORD, which shall include the documents requested in the Notices of Appeal,
together with a copy of this Order.

1

/I/
/I/
ill

ORDER CONSOLIDATING APPEALS
FOR ALL PURPOSES
,
b

MICHAEL S. BISSELL, ISB No. 5762
CAMPBELL, BTSSELL & KIRBY PLLC
7 Sot1t.h Howard S k e t , Suite 41 6
Spokme, WA 99201
Tel: (509) 455-7 100
Fax: (509) 455-71 11
Attorneys for Plaintiff Reed J. Taylor

IN 'FHE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF NEZ PERCE
REED 3. TAV LOR, an individual;

r

C' AXY 1). BABBITT, an individual; D. JOHN
ASMBY, an individual; PATRICK V.
COLLINS, an individual; RICHARD A.
RII.,EY, an individual; I-IAWLEY TROXELL
ENNIS &, HAWLEY, LLP, an Idaho limited
liability padnership; JANE DOES I-X,
u h o w n individuals;

Case No.: CV08-01765

APPELLANT'S m Q U E S T FOR
ADDITIONAL DOCUMENTS FOR
CLEW'S RECORD

TO:

THE ABOVE NAMED RESPONDENTS AND THEIR ATTORNEY

AND TO:

THE CLERK OF THE ABOVE ENTITLED COURT

NOTICE IS HEREBY GIVEN, that Appellant in the above entitled proceeding
hereby requests, pursuant to Rule 28(c), LA.R., the inclusion of the following materials in
the clerk's record in addition to that required to be included by the I.A.R. and identified

APPELLANT'S REQUEST FOR ADDITIONAL
DOCUMENTS FOR CLERK'S RECORD - 1

-?a2

?J

it1 the

Notice of Appeal and subsequent Request for Additional Transcript and Additional

Clerk's Record filed by Respondents.
1.

Clerk's Record:
a.

AfJidavit qf Michael S. Bissell in Szpport nfYlainfiSf',r Reed L.

Taylor's h h t i o to
~ Dical'low Defendants' Request for Rt2"orneys'
Fees a~zdCosfs (filed January 20,2009).

2.

I certify that a copy of this request for additional record has been served

upon the Clerk of the District Court and upon all parties required to be served pursuant to
Rule 20, I.A.R.
DATED this

/? A
day of February, 2009.
CAMPBELL, BISSELL &,KIRBY PLLC
By:
Attorneys for PlaintifUAppellant

Data\l3 15\1322\lequest iecord 021909 doc

APPELLANT'S REQUEST FOR ADDITIONAL
DOCUMENTS FOR CLERK'S RECORD - 2

373

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

,/f

I HEKEBY CERTIFY that on the
'day of February, 2009, 1 caused to be
served a true and correct copy of the fbregoing d o m e & to the following:

HAND DELIVERY
U.S. MAIL
OVERNIGHT MAIL
FAX TRANSMISSION
EMAIL ('pdf attachent)

~ e C c t Pi. ~T k

James D. LaRue
Elam & Burke, PA
P.O. Box 1539
Boise, ID 83704

MICHAEL S. BISSELL

APPELLANT'S REQUEST FOR ADDITIONAL
DOCUMENTS FOR CLERK'S RECORD - 3

,A

A

IN 'THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SI-iCOri'DJUDICIAL DISTRICT OF
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF NEZ PERCE

REED J. TAYLOR, an individual,
SUPREME COURT NO. 36130

Plaintzff-Appellant,
1

vs.
T4TCHAEL E. MC NICHOLS, an
~ndividual;CLEMENTS, BROWN &
MC NICHOLS, P.A., an Idaho
professional corporation; JANE DOES)
I-V, ~ i n k n ~ windividuals,
n
Defendants-Respondents.
----------_---------------------

REED J. TAYLOR,
)

Pliiritiff-Appellant,
vs.

CLERKrS CERTIFICATE

)
i

GARY D, BABBITT, an individual; D. )
JOHN ASHBY', an individual; PATRICK )
V. COLLINS, an individual RICHARD )
4 . RILEY, an individual; HAWLEY,
)
TROXELL, ENNIS & HAWLEY, LLP, an
)
Idaho limlted liability
i
Partnership; JANE DOES I-X, unknown)
Individuals,
Defendants-Respondents.
I, DeAnna P. G r i m , Deputy Clerk of the ~ i s t r i c tCourt of

the Second Judicial District of the State of Idaho, in and for
the County of Nez Perce, do hereby certify that the foregoing
Clerk's Record in the above-entitled cause was compiled and bound

by me and contains true and correct copies of all pleadings,

CLERKrS CERTIFICATE

<
-

"4

t4

/4

-

3. A SECOND J O N T MOTION TO AUGMENT RECORD with attachment was filed
by counsel for Respondents on July 27,2009.

I

4. A RESPONSE IN OPPOSITION TO RESPONDENTS' SECOND JOINT MOTION
TO AUGMENT RECORD AND OBJECTIONS TO TAKING JUDICIAL NOTICE,
AND,
IN
THE
ALTERNATIVE,
SECOND
MOTION
TO
STAYiSUSPENDiENLARGE TIME AND STAY ENFORCEMENT OF
JUDGMENT with attachments was filed by counsel for Appellant on August 12,
2009.
The Court is fully advised; therefore, good cause appearing,
IT HEREBY IS ORDERED that RESPONDENTS' JOINT MOTION TO AUGMENT
RECORD REQUEST FOR JUDICIAL NOTICE be, and hereby is, DENIED; however, this
Court shall take JUDICIAL NOTICE of the document listed below, a copy of which is attached
to the Joint Motion to Augment the Record and placed with the EXHIBITS for the convenience
of the Court:
1. June 17, 2009 Opinion and Order on Plaintiff's Motion for Rule 56(f) Continuance;
Plaintifl's and Defendants' Motions to Strike Expert Affidavits; Defendants' Motion
for Partial Summary Judgment; Intervenor's Motion for Reconsideration.
IT FURTHER IS ORDERED that Appellant Reed J. Taylor's MOTION TO
STAYISUSPENDIENLARGE TIME AND STAY ENFORCEMENT OF JUDGMENT be, and
hereby is, DENIED.
DAlXD this

day of August 2009.

By Order of t$e Supreme Court

cc:

Counsel of Record

ORDER - Docket Nos. 36130-2009 (3613 1-2009)

I

tll

In the Supreme Court o f the State of Idaho
REED J. TAYLOR, an individual,
Plaintiff-Appellant,

MICHAEL E. MC NICHOLS, an individual;
CLEMENTS, B R O W & MC NICHOLS,
P.A., an Idaho professional corporation; JANE
DOES 1-V, unknown individuals,

)

AUGMENT THE M C O R D

)
)
)
)

Supreme Court Docket No. 361302009136 131-2009
Nez Perce County Docket No. 20081763/2008-1765

Defendants-Respondents.
REED J. TAYLOR,
Plaintiff-Appellant,

GARY D. BABBITT, an individual, D. JOHN
)
ASHBY, an individual; PATRICK V. COLLINS, )
an individual; RTCHARD A. RILEY, an
individual; HAWLEY, TROXELL, E W I S &
)
H A W E U , LLP, an Idaho limited liability
partnership; JANE DOES 1-X, unknown
Defendants-Respondents.
A MOTION TO AUGMENT THE RECORD AND STATEMENT IN SUPPORT
THEREOF was filed by counsel for Respondent Hawley, Troxell, Ennis & Hawley, LLP on
September 4,2009. Therefore, good cause appearing,
IT HERFiBY IS ORDERED that Respondent Hawley, Troxell, Ennis & Hawley LLPYs
MOTION TO AUGMENT THE RECORD be, and hereby is, GRANTED and the augmentation
record shall include the documents listed below, copies of which accompanied this Motion, as

ill

C

1. Satisfiction of Judpent, file-stamped August 26,2009; and
2. Check firom the personal account of Appellant Reed J. Taylor, dated August 22,2009
in the amount of $20,527.28 paid to Hawley, Troxell, Ennis & Hawley Respondents
for "'Judgment".
DATED this

of September 2009.
For the Supreme Court

Stephen W. Kenyon, elerk
cc: Counsel of Record

documents, and papers designated to be included under Rule 28,
Idaho Appellate Rules, the Notice of Appeal, any Notice of CrossAppeal, and additional documents that were requested.

I further certify:
1.

That no exhibits were marked for identification or

admitted into evidence during the course of this action.
IN WITNESS WHEREOF I have hereunto set my hand and affixed
the seal of said court this

4

day of-

M&

2009.

PATTY 0. WEEKS, Clerk

Deputy Clerk

CLERKfS CERTIFICATE

-

In the Supreme Court of the State of Idaho
mEf)J. TAYLOR, an individual,
Plaintiff-Appellant,

MICHAEL E. MC NICHOLS, an individual;
CLEMENTS, BROWN & h4C NICHOLS,
F.A., an Idaho professional corporation; JANE
DOES 1-V, unknown individuals,

)

ORDER

)
)
)

Supreme Court Docket No. 36130-2009
Nez Perce County District Court No. 20081763

)

Defendants-Respondents.
REED J. TAYLOR,
Plaintiff-Appellant,

)
)
)

GARY D. BABBITT, an individual, D. JOHN )
ASHBY, an individual; PATRICK V.
COLLINS, an individual; RICHARD A.
RILEY, an individual; W W L E Y , TROXELL, )
ENNIS & HAWLEY, LLP, an Idaho limited
)
liability partnership; JANE DOES 1-X,
unknown individuals.

Supreme Court Docket No. 3613 1-2009
Nez Perce County District Court No. 20081765
Ref No. 09s-446

Defendants-Respondents.
1. A REQUEST FOR JUDICIAL NOTICE AND PROFERRED RECORD PURSUANT
TO I.R.E. 201(d) with attachment was filed by counsel for Appellant Reed J. Taylor on
September 14, 2009, requesting h s Court take judicial notice of Appellant Reed J.
Taylor's Notice of Appeal filed on September 8, 2009, a copy of which is attached to
this motion as Exhibit A.
2. A RESPONSE TO APPELLANT'S REQUEST FOR JUDICIAL NOTICE AND
PROPER RECORD PURSUANT TO I.R.E. 201(b) was filed by counsel for
Respondents Michael E. McNichols and Clements, Brown & McNichols, P.A. on
September 18, 2009.
3. A RESPONSE TO APPELLANT'S REQUEST FOR JUDICIAL NOTICE AND
PROFERRED RECORD PURSUANT TO I.R.E. 201(d) was filed by Respondents
Hawley Troxell Ennis & Hawley on September 21,2009.

The Court is fully advised; therefore, good cause appearing,

IT HEREBY IS OWERED that Appellant Reed J. Taylor's REQUEST FOR JUDICIAL
NOTICE AND PROFERRED RECORD PURSUANT TO I.R.E. 201(d) be, and hereby is,
GRANTED and this Court shall take JUDICIAL NOTICE of Appellant Reed J. Taylor's Notice of
Appeal filed on September 8, 2009, in Taylor v. ALA Services, et al., Nez Perce County District
Court No. CV07-00208, a file stamped copy of which was attached as Exhbit A to the request, and
Exhibit A shall be placed with the EXHIB$TS for the convenience of this Court.
DATED this/PHday

of October 2009.
By Order oft& Supreme Court

-

Stephen W. Kenyon, Clerk
cc:

Counsel of Record

ORDER - Docket Nos. 36 130-2009/36131-2009

-

In the Supreme Court of the State of Idaho
REED 1.TAYLOR, an individual,
Plaintiff-Appellant,

CLEMENTS, B R O W & MC NICHOLS, P.A., )
an Idaho professional corporation; JANE DOES )
1-V, unknown individuals,

Supreme Court Docket Nos.
36130-2009 (36131-2009)
Nez Perce County District Court Nos.
2008-1763 (2008-1 765)

Defendants-Respondents.
Ref No. 09-342
REED J. TAYLOR,
Plaintiff-Appellant,

GARY D. BABBITT, an individual, D. JOHN
ASHBY, an individual; PATRICK V.
COLLINS, an individual; R I C H D A. RILEY, )
an individual; HAWLEY, TROXELL, ENNIS & )
HAWLEY, LLP, an Idaho limited liability
partnershp; JANE DOES l-X, unknown
Defendants-Respondents.
1. A JOINT MOTION TO AUGMENT RECORD and MEMORANDUM IN
SUPPORT OF RESPONDENTS' MOTION TO AUGMENT RECORD were filed by
counsel for Respondents on July 10, 2009, requesting this Court for an order
augmenting the appellate record with the opinion of Judge Brudie file stamped June
2. A RESPONSE IN OPPOSITION TO RESPONDENTS' JOINT MOTION TO
AUGMENT RECORD AND OBJECTIONS TO TAKING JUDICIAL NOTICE,
AND, IN THE ALTERNATIVE, MOTION TO STAYlSUSPENDlENLARGE TIME
AND STAY ENFORCEMENT OF JUDGMENT was filed by counsel for Appellant
on July 21,2009.

In "the Supreme Court of the State of 1dah6
REED J. TAYLOR, an individual,
Plaintiff-Appellant,

MICHAEL E. MC NICHOLS, an individual;
CLEMENTS, BROWN & MC NICHOLS,
P.A., an Idaho professional corporation; JANE
DOES 1-V, unknown individuals,

)

ORDER GRANTING MOTION TO

)
)
)

Supreme Court Docket No. 36130-2009/
36131-2009
Nez Perce County Docket No. 2008-17631

Defendants-Respondents.
REED J. TAYLOR,
Plaintiff-Appellant,

GARY D. BABBITT, an individual, D. JOHN )
ASHBY, an individual; PATRICK V.
COLLINS, an individual; RICHARD A.
RILEY, an individual; WWLEY, TROXELL, )
ENNIS & HAWLEY, LLP, an Idaho limited
)
liability partnership; JANE DOES 1-X,
imknown individuals.
Defendants-Respondents.

A MOTION TO AUGMENT THE RECORD AND STATEMENT IN SUPPORT
THEREOF was filed by counsel for Respondents Michael E. McNichols and Clements, Brown &
McNichols, P.A. on September 17, 2009. Therefore, good cause appearing,
IT HEREBY IS ORDERED that Respondents' MOTION TO AUGMENT THE RECORD
be, and hereby is, GRANTED and the augmentation record shall include the documents listed .
below, file stamped copies of which accompanied this Motion, as EXHIBITS:
1. Satisfaction of Judgment, file-stamped September 3, 2009; and

~
2. Capy of! a check from PlaintiffiAppellmt Reed Taylor to the Respondent 1 s firm
Clements, Brown & McNichols in the amount of $20,518.00, dated August 12, 2009.
DATED this

29 ""of September 2009.
For the Supreme Court

cc: Counsel of Record

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF NEZ PERCE
REED J. TAYLOR, an individual,
Plaintiff-Appellant,

SUPREME COURT N0.36130
I

VS.
MICHAEL E. MC NICHOLS, an
individual; CLEMENTS, BROWN &
MC NICHOLS, P .A., an Idaho
professional corporation; JANE DOES)
I-V, unknown individuals,
Defendants-Respondents.
REED J. TAYLOR,
VS

.

Plaintiff-Appellant,
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

GARY D. BABBITT, an individual; D. )
JOHN ASHBY, an individual; PATRICK )
V. COLLINS, an individual RICHARD )
A. RILEY, an individual; HAWLEY,
)
TROXELL, ENNIS & HAWLEY, LLP, an
)
Idaho limited liability
Partnership; JANE DOES I-X, unknown)
Individuals,

'

Defendants-Respondents.

I, DeAnna P. G r i m , Deputy Clerk of the District Court of
the Second Judicial District of the State of Idaho, in and for
the County of Nez Perce, do hereby certify that copies of the
clerk'F A ~ e o o r d
and Reporter's Transcript were delivered on Tile.
day April 2009, to Michael S. Bissell,7 South Howard St,
-4

b

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

.-

*

S u i t e 4 1 6 , S p o k a n e , WA
J. J a n i s ,

99201, A t t o r n e y f o r A p p e l l a n t a n d t o John

P O Box 2 5 8 2 , B o i s e , I D

83701-2582 b y t h e U n i t e d

States Postal Service.
I N WITNESS WHEREOF,

I h a v e h e r e u n t o s e t my h a n d a n d a f f i x e d

t h e s e a l of t h e s a i d Court t h i s

day o f A p r i l 2009.

PATTY 0 . WEEKS
CLERK OF THE DISTRICT COURT

y.@"c?~.7^-*'
L

..,-

*u-.

-

BY
Deputy C l e r k

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

*

-

3 ;&$

